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Abstract

In the last forty years, significant developments in neuroscience, psychology, and
robotic technology have been cause for major trend changes in the philosophy of mind.
One such shift has been the reallocation of focus from entirely brain-centered theories of
mind to more embodied, embedded, and even extended answers to the questions, what
are cognitive processes and where do we find such phenomena? Given that hypotheses
such as Clark and Chalmers‘ (1998) Extended Mind or Hutto‘s (2006) Radical
Enactivism, systematically undermine the organism-bound, internal, and static pictures of
minds and allow instead for the distribution of cognitive processes among brains, bodies,
and worlds, a worry that arises is that the very subject of cognitive science, the ‗cognizer‘
will be hopelessly opaque, its mind leaking out into the world all over the place, thereby
making it impossible to rein in and properly study.
A seemingly unrelated and yet parallel trend has also taken place in feminist
theorizing about the body over the last forty years. Whereas feminism of the 1970s and
early 1980s tended to view ‗the body‘ as the site and matter of biological sex, while
gender was a more fluid and socially constituted mode of existence, more recent feminist
theory has questioned the givenness of bodies themselves. In other words, rather than
seeing gender categories as manifestations of the already given sexed body, thinkers such
as Butler (2000) and Lorber (1992) argue that the very notion of a body is often a product
of scientific inquiry, which is itself a product of the power structures aiming to maintain a
rigid binary between feminine and masculine gender roles. If the world at large plays
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such a constitutive role in determining who we are, then this implies that the tools we use,
the language we speak, and the power relationships in which we are enmeshed are
components of what it means to be embodied in any genuine sense. For thinkers like
Haraway (1988) the image of the cyborg is most fitting for this new understanding of
embodied subjects, as the cyborg is a coupling of machine and human. Gender and even
biological sex will always be a technologically hybridized ‗monster‘ consisting of matter,
machine, and mind.
The overall aim of my project is thus to bring the two concurrent developments in
theorizing about embodied subjects into discourse. As the cyborg features largely in
recent feminist thought about embodiment, so too has it been a prominent metaphor in
philosophy of mind, ever since Clark (2003) claimed that we ought to think of our
‗selves‘ more appropriately as Natural-Born Cyborgs. I therefore focus on this imagery
as I go on to make the argument that this distributed account of cognition as well as of
sexual identity is more fruitful for making progress in understanding ‗the human‘ more
generally. Likewise, I argue that bringing the discussion of sex and gender into the arena
of an otherwise asexual philosophy of mind, will shed light on some important facets of
embodiment that have been overlooked but that ought to be addressed if we are to have
an adequate account of ‗the proper subject of cognitive science.‘
My chapters include 1) a survey of the discourse between science and philosophy
of mind leading to these embodied and extended approaches, 2) a first attempt at
defending the extended mind thesis, 3) a discussion of how even the supposed resolution
to the objections raised against extended cognition fails to properly take into account just
how problematic subjectivity is, regardless of its being defined entirely organismic or not,
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as organisms themselves are highly malleable and socially constituted, 4) an explanation
concerning how the same problematization of embodied subjectivity is ongoing in
feminist theory, especially considering the phenomenology of transgendered
embodiment, intersex, and technologically mediated bodies, 5) further elaboration on
technologically enhanced bodies, exposing what I see as a continuum between bodies
modified by ‗hard‘ technologies, such as implants, prostheses or surgeries, and those
modified by ‗soft‘ technologies, such as gender norms, the social gaze, and
technologically mediated metacognition, and last, 6) an argument for the image of the
cyborg to replace ‗organism‘ in cognitive science, along with the corollary argument that
cyborgs ought to represent not just embodied minds, but should also be the metaphor in
attempting to understand ‗embodiment‘ more generally, which must, at its roots, be
underpinned by gender and sexual identity. I argue that the imagery is fitting for the
proper study of cognitive subjects as well as sexed and gendered bodies, but moreover,
that just as the cyborg suggests a blending and hybridizing of seemingly unrelated
elements, so too should the two areas of inquiry, philosophy of mind and feminist theory,
pay heed to one another‘s use of this imagery and themselves begin to be more
integrative in their approaches.

vi

Introduction
―I am optimistic that we will soon see the end of those over-used, and mostly ad hoc
appeals to the ‗natural‘‖ – Andy Clark
―The cyborg is a kind of disassembled and reassembled, postmodern collective and
personal self. This is the self feminists must code.‖ – Donna Haraway

In a short but now infamously contentious paper entitled The Extended Mind
(1998) Andy Clark and David Chalmers begin by posing a rather simple question: Where
does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin? Their question, although seemingly
uncomplicated, in fact marks the beginning of over a decade of debates, publications, and
conferences devoted to suitably answering the supposedly straightforward query
regarding the location of cognition. The thesis they put forth, Extended Cognition, is
itself a radical shift in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. In particular, the last
fifty years have witnessed the gradual reallocation of focus from entirely brain-centered
theories of mind to more embodied, embedded, and eventually extended approaches to
studying the mind. Hypotheses such as the ones Clark and Chalmers suggest, or similarly,
Dan Hutto‘s (2006) Radical Enactivism, systematically undermine the organism-bound,
internal, and static pictures of cognition and allow instead for the distribution of cognitive
processes among brains, bodies, and worlds. Worries arise, however, concerning
precisely what the subject of cognitive science will turn out to look like; namely, as
Robert Rupert (2004) has complained, the ‗cognizer‘ will be hopelessly opaque, its mind
leaking out into the world all over the place, thereby making it impossible to rein in and
properly study. In response to these objections, Clark (2003) for example, has argued that
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despite apparent difficulties associated with studying such a subject, it really is more
reasonable to think of ‗the human‘ as a motley crew of biological organism, nonbiological tools, and language. In other words, when answering the question concerning
where we are, ‗we‘ ought not be limited to biology; likewise, in answering the question
concerning what we are, Clark suggests, the best way to conceive of ourselves is as
blending of organism and artifact – or more precisely, as cyborgs.
Around the same time The Extended Mind was published, in the opposite corner
of the academic universe, we find the feminist theorist, Donna Haraway (1991), asking:
Why should our bodies end at the skin, or include at best other beings encapsulated by
skin? Just as Clark and Chalmers‘ paper marks an important change in philosophy of
mind, Haraway‘s Cyborg Manifesto differs importantly from previous feminist theory
insofar as it stands as a point upon which the myriad of preceding ‗feminisms‘
triangulate. Whereas feminist theory of the 1970s and early 1980s tended to view ‗the
body‘ as the site and matter of biological sex, while gender was a more fluid and socially
constituted mode of existence, more recent feminist theory has questioned the givenness
of bodies themselves. Thinkers such as Haraway and Judith Butler (1992) argue that the
very notion of a body is often a product of scientific inquiry, which is itself a product of
the power structures aiming to maintain a rigid binary between feminine and masculine
gender roles. If the world at large plays such a constitutive role in determining who we
are, then this implies that the tools we use, the language we speak, and the power
relationships in which we are enmeshed are components of what it means to be embodied
in any genuine sense. For thinkers like Haraway (1988) the image of the cyborg is most
fitting for this new understanding of embodied subjects, as the cyborg is a coupling of
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machine and human. Gender and even biological sex will always be a technologically
hybridized ‗monster‘ consisting of matter, machine, and mind.
Given these similar although unrelated reevaluations of who we are, concurrent in
philosophy of mind and feminist theory, it is my aim in this project to bring the two
developments in theorizing about embodied subjects into discourse. As the cyborg
features largely in recent feminist thought about embodiment, so too has it been a
prominent metaphor in philosophy of mind, ever since Clark claimed that we ought to
think of our ‗selves‘ more appropriately as Natural-Born Cyborgs. I therefore focus on
this imagery as I go on to make the argument that this distributed account of cognition as
well as of sexual identity is more fruitful for making progress in understanding ‗the
human‘ more generally. Likewise, I argue that bringing the discussion of sex and gender
into the arena of an otherwise asexual philosophy of mind, will shed light on some
important facets of embodiment that have been overlooked but that ought to be addressed
if we are to have an adequate account of ‗the proper subject of cognitive science.‘
The first chapter surveys the last nearly fifty years in philosophy of mind and
cognitive science. My aim in this opening chapter, however, is not purely exegetical.
Instead, the discussion is tailored toward exposing an oversight made by nearly all
theories of mind to date – namely, how body and situation shape and perhaps even
constitute cognition. Specifically, I point out the flaws typically associated with
behaviorism, type physicalism, and token physicalism. Although each is problematic in its
own unique way – behaviorism runs the risk of too liberally ascribing cognition to
otherwise non-cognitive entities, and type physicalism is often accused of what Ned
Block (1980) has referred to as ―species chauvinism,‖ while token physicalism or
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functionalism can actually be guilty of both of these charges – all three of these attempts
to explain what cognition is and how it arises take for granted a crucial third element. By
looking at recent developments in Artificial Intelligence (AI), for instance, it becomes
apparent that where cognition is occurring is assumed at the outset to be solely internal to
the organism, or the robot as the case may be in AI research. It is this supposition – that
the mind is simply ‗in the head‘ or ‗internal to the body‘ – that plagues philosophers,
psychologists, and roboticists in trying to come up with a suitable understanding of how
cognition works and how we might come to duplicate it in a non-human machine.
It is not until theories of embodied cognition (cf. Varela, Thompson & Rosch,
1991) begin to be taken seriously that we find proper attention not just to the body itself,
but to embodiment, or how the body is situated in its environment, how the world shows
up through the body, and how the body actually shapes how we think. It was Gibson and
his theory of ―affordances‖ (1979; 1977; 1966; 1954) that provided the psychological
antecedent to this philosophical movement, in addition to the phenomenologists of the
early to mid-twentieth century, in particular, Merleau-Ponty (1962). These accounts of
cognition set the stage for one of the most radical, yet, as I argue, most plausible
hypotheses regarding precisely where we ought to locate the mind. Pushing what it means
to characterize the mind as embodied, situated, and enacted (cf. Noё, 2004) to its logical
conclusion, it becomes less and less clear where the mind stops and the external world
begins. In other words, by examining how the environment can and most often does
shape the way we think, a case can be made that certain parts of that world – in particular,
tools that we employ to help ourselves think – should be considered as parts of our
minds.
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In chapter 2, therefore, I spend a great deal of time fleshing out the hypothesis of
Extended Cognition (HEC) and I rehearse some of the difficulties with accepting the
view that cognition is a distributed process spanning biological organism and nonbiological circuitry (cf. Clark, 2008, 2003; Clark and Chalmers, 1998). The chief aim of
this chapter is to highlight the strengths of the HEC while attempting to adequately reply
to some of the more challenging objections, namely, that cognition is driven by nonderived content and so must be internal to the ‗system,‘ (Adams & Aizawa, 2010; 2008;
2001) and that ‗the mind‘ is a natural kind, which disallows for its being constituted by
an unruly and motley crew of processes, the mergers and couplings of which could never
be the proper subjects of cognitive science (cf. Rupert, 2004). While I further Clark‘s
(2010; 2008) replies to these objections to some extent, I also argue that his most recent
‗retreat‘ – the hypothesis of organism-centered cognition (HOC) – is too large a
concession. For one, I argue, giving up the notion that the body and the world are ‗equal
partners‘ in cognition seems to be giving up the original thesis altogether. Furthermore,
by problematizing what Rupert has claimed must be the proper subject of cognitive
science – the subject itself – it is clear that even centering cognition on a organism is
dubious because that biological entity is only one component of a much larger and much
more complicated story about embodied subjectivity.
Developing an account of embodiment and cognitive subjectivity is the focus of
the third chapter. First, by adopting Shaun Gallagher‘s (2005) distinction between the
body image and the body schema, we are able to account more phenomenologically for
the way the body shows up in experience. In particular, my body can be a reflective
object of my perception and thought – that is, I can imagine it – or, it can be lived
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through, pre-reflectively, via a motor program executed below the level of explicit
awareness. Likewise, in non-pathological embodiment, I typically maintain a sense of
ownership and a sense of agency, not simply over ‗the body‘ itself, but over my
embodied intentions for action and execution of that action. But just as I am able to
dissociate from the tools and ‗cognitive aides‘ I use – a potentiality for detachment that
the intracranialists argue ‗marks‘ these objects as non-cognitive – I am also able to
dissociate from my own body. To see how this is possible, I look at several cases of
―body pathologies,‖ ranging from Phantom Limbs to Möbius Syndrome. What we glean
from these ‗abnormal‘ cases is that cognition occurs on a multitude of levels and can be
captured by a variety of phenomenological descriptions; it can be constituted reflectively
and pre-reflectively and can involve robust ownership and agency, only one of these
dimensions, or potentially neither of them. This multifarious phenomenology of
embodiment is, I argue, not limited to pathological cases. Indeed, it ‗marks‘ embodied
subjectivity generally – the ability to lose agency or ownership over, or to feel ‗not-athome-with‘ one‘s body, albeit less extreme in non-pathological embodiment, is a
constantly present feature of cognition.
At the end of chapter three, I suggest comparing the body to other tools we use, in
particular, regarding cases of breakdown. Just as I can dissociate from my body if I have,
say somatoparaphrenia, so too can I take a hammer to be wholly other-to me, whereas, in
pre-reflective, non-pathological, body schematic action, the hammer, much like the rest
of my body is not present-at-hand. It is rather an incorporated and integral component to
the larger system of hammering; and similarly, when I perform actions with my body, so
long as I am not experiencing any dysphoria with any parts of it, I do not explicitly
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represent it as an object to be manipulated. Indeed, I + my body are one system. So too, I
argue, should we count me + my prosthetic limb, a blind man + his cane, and Otto + his
notebook. That is, when the coupled system, at the pre-reflective level, does not show up
as two or more disparate objects, but rather, as one unified subject performing an action,
the whole system should count as cognitive.
This claim concerning embodied subjectivity – that it is constituted at the prereflective and reflective levels, both as a unified and as a hybrid system – is carried over
into chapter 4, where I suggest that we ought to consider the ways in which sex, gender,
and sexuality figure into embodied cognition and subjectivity more generally. For one,
this facet of ‗the mind‘ has been relatively ignored in philosophy of mind and cognitive
science. Likewise, as I argue, if we are to achieve a comprehensive account of cognitive
subjectivity, it makes little sense to leave out a discussion of one of the very few
necessary elements in experiencing myself as a ‗thinking being.‘ That is, ‗I‘ am always a
sexed and gendered person, although of course, the specifics of these identifications can
and do change. The argument I defend in this chapter begins with the premise that sexual
identity, although much more tied to biological anatomy than something like gender roles
or sexual orientation, remains highly contingent upon embodied practices rather than
strictly on body parts. In other words, it is only through the lens of sexual reproduction,
for example, that certain parts of my body show up as ‗feminine,‘ which is itself based on
a narrative of sexual reproduction.
Furthermore, by examining what Merleau-Ponty (1968) has to say regarding the
―The Body in its Sexual Being,‖ I argue that a case can be made to see sexual identity as
1) just as malleable and socially informed as the body in its gendered identity and thus, 2)
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not always a ‗that-through-which‘ I act at the pre-reflective body schematic level of
awareness. Instead, by looking at examples provided by feminist phenomenologists such
as Iris Young (2005) and Elizabeth Grosz (1994), we see that very little about female
bodies translates into hardwired facts about female embodiment. Despite arguments made
by psychologists such as Straus (1966) concerning the anatomy of female bodies as
precluding certain actions and confidence, the case is stronger, I claim, on the side of the
feminist phenomenologists, who, like Gallagher (2005), recognize the role of body image
in shaping how we come to represent ‗ourselves‘ in embodied practice. What people like
Grosz, for example, add to Gallagher‘s discussion, is the notion that one‘s projected
gender identity – in the form of a body image – can and does alter one‘s ‗postural
schema,‘ or the pre-reflective body-in-action. In this way, ‗thinking like a girl,‘ for one,
achieves meaning only insofar as we can juxtapose this mode of cognition to some
‗other‘ – i.e. boy thinking – but also, by altering one‘s imagined gender, the ‗sexed
schema‘ – if we want to say there is such a thing – also alters. In short, the claim that
there is anything inherently true and necessary of female embodiment based solely on
facts about the biological organism is weak to say the least.
However, as chapter 5 will explore, it is not so easy to simply dismiss all notions
of ‗hardwired sex‘ or inherent gender identity. In particular, by looking at Gender
Identity Disorder, Intersex Embodiment, and Transgender Embodiment, there are reasons
to consider how an innately ‗sexed self‘ might at least appear to be the most suitable
phenomenological description. The chapter begins with the proposal that the dysphoria
experienced by persons who feel trapped in the wrong body can be likened to the
phenomenology of the bodily pathologies discussed in chapter 3 – in other words, we
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might say that in cases of Gender Identity Disorder, for example, a person‘s body image
is misaligned with his or her body schema, or that there has been a disruption in the sense
of agency, ownership, or both. Examining narratives from transgendered persons is one
way to affirm that this intuition might provide an accurate explanation, but the problem
remains that among the narratives, as well as the medical and scientific discourse
surrounding these phenomena, there is a persistent Cartesian idea that one‘s sexed or
gendered identity is somehow independent from the reality of the flesh itself. The
problem is made worse when we consider that the proposed ‗solution‘ to these various
modes of dissociative embodiment is often surgery – i.e. altering a body that was
presupposed to have nothing to do with one‘s ‗true self‘ in the first place.
In order to address these concerns, I turn from purely phenomenological
descriptions to the theoretical underpinnings of what has now come to be known as
Transgender Studies. To this end, a detailed account of Queer Theory and its treatment of
transgender as a motif for the subversion of traditional conceptions of sex and gender
provide the best framework. By utilizing Butler‘s (1990; 1992; 2004) argument that the
figure of transgender serves to illuminate the performative nature of all gender, we can
come to think of the supposed binaries characterizing sex and gender as fluid, figurative,
and eminently transgressable, much like I argue, in previous chapters, we ought to think
of ‗the human‘ more generally. With Queer Theory as a point of reference, I return to the
proposal made earlier in the chapter and suggest that within the field of Transgender
Studies, there is evidence that trans-theorists would support the notion that a
misalignment of body images is the best way to characterize the overarching
phenomenology of having a ‗true self trapped in the wrong body.‘ Jay Prosser‘s (1998)
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rendering of Queer Theory is particularly useful here, as it 1) allows for a conception of
gender identity disorder that resists an unpalatable Cartesianism, 2) helps to further refine
and clarify the discussion of body image and body schema as they are proposed by
philosophers such as Gallagher (2005) in order to weave sex and gender into an otherwise
‗sexless‘ philosophy of mind, and 3) sheds light on all embodied subjectivity and how it
is constituted in terms of sex and gender. It is this last point upon which I close chapter
5, suggesting that we return to ‗the human‘ more generally in order to determine to what
extent this necessary yet eminently malleable facet of embodiment augments what we
mean by ‗the mind.‘
The final chapter begins by drawing an analogy; namely, just as the
natural/unnatural divide serves as a myth to juxtapose non-transsexual with transsexual,
so too does it work to ‗artificially‘ differentiate between human and machine. This
division between ‗us‘ and our machines, I claim, conceals the fundamentally hybridized,
eminently dissociable, and yet always already technological nature of cognitive
subjectivity. To defend this claim, I argue that we ought to conceive of gender as a form
of technology. If we do, then it is clear from chapters 4 and 5 that we are always already
coupled to this ‗tool,‘ although it can and often does become another to us; or, in
Heideggerean terms, gender might show up as present-at-hand, a that from which I
dissociate. To see why we ought to consider gender to be a technology, I further
differentiate between what Nikki Sullivan (2001) calls ‗hard‘ and ‗soft‘ technologies, in
order to show that certain ―sociotechnical systems of use‖ (cf. Kline, 1985) are best
conceived as technological in nature – that is, they add to, aide, and augment human
cognition. Based on this much more liberal notion of what counts as technology, together
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with the idea that gender is a form of technology we are always already coupled with,
there is yet more evidence to adopt Clark‘s (2003) insights discussed in chapter 2, that
‗we‘ are best thought of as cyborgs – human-machine symbionts – language, and now
gender, as two of the chief ‗machines‘ constantly interwoven with our biological
organism. This idea is argued by Donna Haraway (1991), whose ‗cyborg feminism‘ seeks
to blend not only human and machine, but is also a call for the blending of theories and
practices surrounding feminist theory, which itself should be thought of as a hybrid. Most
importantly, Haraway adds to the discussion so far, something I claim is missing even in
Clark‘s radical ‗Tools-R-Us‘ account of human cognition, namely, the idea that genuine
decoupling from our technology is not possible, as it wrongly assumes that there were
original, non-technological wholes prior to this coupling. Because gender is one of the
tools with which we are always already conjoined, Haraway‘s case for the cyborg to
stand in for ‗the human‘ allows for a conception of human cognition that is not only a
biotechnological, but a sociotechnological hybridization as well.
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Chapter 1
From Encapsulated to Extended: Situating Cognition over the Last Fifty Years
This is Descartes' error: the abyssal separation between body and mind, between the
sizable, dimensioned, mechanically operated, infinitely divisible body stuff, on the one
hand, and the unsizable, undimensioned, un-pushpullable, nondivisible mind stuff; the
suggestion that reasoning, and moral judgment, and the suffering that comes from
physical pain or emotional upheaval might exist separately from the body. – Antonio
Damasio, Descartes‟ Error

1.1 Introduction
Shaun Gallagher (2008) has recently provided a rich account of the historical
underpinnings of situated cognition in the hopes of situating, as it were, the current trend
in philosophy of mind and cognitive science, which has shifted its focus from brains and
encapsulated egos to organism-environment systems. His approach is not purely
historical, as he makes clear at the outset: ―My intention, however, is not to provide a
simple historical guide but to suggest that there are still some untapped resources in these
past philosophers that may serve to enrich current accounts of situated cognition‖ (35). In
the same spirit as Gallagher, this chapter is intended to provide an account of recent
trends in philosophy of mind, a field that now finds itself at a strange impasse. My aim in
doing so is not just to illustrate the historical progression of ideas; indeed, such a project
could conceivably tell several distinct stories about many protracted battles: eliminativists
vs. reductionists, non-reductive vs. reductive physicalists, and of course, the myriad of
debates over the possibility of artificial intelligence, and these are just to name a few.
Instead, the story I want to tell focuses on a specific facet of this historical trajectory,
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namely, the way in which a suitable theory of embodiment has been systematically
overlooked and avoided, at least until the very recent past few years. Examining this
oversight will make clear why the particular impasse I have in mind – that between the
internalist and the externalist – is a culminating point, one upon which many of the other
disagreements just mentioned eventually converge.
In the wake of anti-Cartesian metaphysics, militant physicalism, and the
neuroscientific revolution, one might expect that in the place of immaterial minds and
free wills would be instead detailed accounts of bodies. What we tend to find however, is
either some form of behaviorism or ‗brain-mania.‘ The rest of the body, however,
remains on the sidelines; it is assumed to be a necessary component of cognition, but this
is typically all the thought given to human embodiment. It is taken for granted, in other
words, that human minds have human bodies. This contemporary neglect of the body is
not unlike the way Descartes1 treated it so long ago. Despite his weak proof that bodies
actually exist, even he was well aware of their intimate connection with minds; he simply
failed to explain that connection properly. I want to suggest that this failure is not specific
to Descartes, but is endemic to much of contemporary cognitive science, insofar as it
affirms the importance of embodiment and yet fails to account for its role in cognition.
Again, nearly everyone2 agrees that the body is integral to cognition; it‘s the lack of
explanation of how and to what extent this is the case that is the real source of disparity.
And although I think the so-called mind-body problem has changed very little in this way
since Descartes, I do intend to argue that the focus has shifted from a debate regarding

1

See in particular, Mediation VI, Ariew and Cress, ed.
Certain forms of cognition, in particular, social cognition, might however, turn out to have little to no
dependence on the body itself per se, but more on embodied interaction. (cf. Goldman & de Vignemont,
2009)
2

13

what minds are – what they are made of, what sorts of things they do, and so forth – to a
debate concerning where we should expect to find minds ‗in the world,‘ and in particular,
if we are willing to count parts of an otherwise external world as proper parts of the mind.

1.2 Something on the State of the Parts
When Ryle (1945) exposed what he saw as a ‗category mistake‘ both in Cartesian
Dualism and in strict mind-brain identity, philosophy of mind was split into two factions
of materialist monism. Some chose, as Ryle did, to maintain some version of
behaviorism, Ryle‘s particular brand being a ‗dispositional behaviorism,‘ while thinkers
immediately in Ryle‘s wake (cf. Place, 1956, 1988; Smart, 1959; Feigl, 1967; Armstrong
1968) chose to refine and defend mind-brain identity in the name of parsimony. To be
sure, these two options are not exhaustive, but their complementary strengths,
weaknesses, and ultimate failures, along with the concurrent advances in computing,
provide a space from which functionalism as an alternative explanation of cognition can
easily make advances. The purpose of this project is not merely historical however, and
functionalism‘s roots and development are surely common knowledge among my
readers. Thus, I will gloss over many of the details of this history, highlighting instead
what I take to be significant for the purpose of ultimately exposing a flaw not just
common to behaviorism and mind-brain identity, but to functionalism itself as well.
As Fodor (1981) notes, one facet of logical behaviorism that makes it particularly
appealing is its ability to explain mental causation. Appealing to material monism of any
sort sidesteps the intractable problem of interaction between material and immaterial
substances, but more importantly, explaining mentality in terms of observable behavior
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allows for a genuine ‗science‘ of mind, with quantifiable, predictable, and observable
data. Skinner‘s (1953, 1957) original notion that we can accurately predict a person‘s
behavior given sufficient historical information about their reactions to environmental
stimuli is similar to what we find in Ryle‘s (1949) argument that the tendency to behave
in one given way or another depends on certain dispositions, which are themselves
products of environmental history. Skinnerian and Ryleian behaviorism alike avoid the
pitfalls of the causal nexuses between immaterial and material as well as between inner
and outer. For example, under Ryle‘s account, if I get up from my chair and go to the
fridge to obtain a beverage, this behavior (the observable physical effect) is said to be
caused by a dispositional state, namely, that when I desire a drink and the fridge is in
close proximity to me, I will be disposed to walk over to it and procure a beverage. The
etiology is captured quite simply by ordinary language, language which, as the positivists
would have it, is freed from metaphysical obscurity. Mental states cause physical states
by dint of 1) their both being physical phenomena and 2) the antecedent mental states
themselves being behavioral dispositions which tend to bring about the corresponding
outward behavior.
One concern with behaviorism is the perhaps insuperable difficulty it faces in
providing comprehensive dispositional laws for all observable behavior. As Chomsky‘s
(1959) painting example compellingly illustrates, the human mind seems eminently
capable of ‗surprising‘ us. In his response to Skinner‘s (1957) operant conditioning as an
explanatory model for human behavior, Chomsky highlights that while we might be able
to develop systematic principles for understanding a person‘s behavior based on their
prior history, there is nothing in that personal history which entails a specific verbal
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behavior in response to a painting. Taking linguistic behavior as a specific mode in which
predictability is limited provides this insight: given universal structures of all human
language, such as infinite generativity and recursivity, 3 it can be said that language itself
is unpredictable and hence, human employment of it will depend not solely on prior use,
or even simply on some dispositional state, but also on the specifics of the situation. As
the painting example illustrates, we can at best approximate a general list of typical
responses for each person who views the painting, based on their prior reactions to art or
their current dispositional state. However, if person A is viewing Painting X under a
variety of different circumstances, e.g., at one museum versus another, with a large group
of artists or with a gaggle of schoolchildren, or if person A is trying to impress person B
who is also viewing the painting, the set of responses grows in complexity. Chomsky
argues that it would be impossible to predict responses with 100% accuracy.
Furthermore, if we consider, beyond Chomsky‘s syntactic point, concerns about
pragmatics and sociolinguistic markers, the issue is further complicated by considerations
such as what would make a response useful for each possible scenario, what would be
polite or impolite in each context, and moreover, what sorts of responses might be
generated based on seemingly irrelevant background information, such as the reaction ‗I
wonder if I remembered to turn off the coffee maker.‘ Moreover, and this is a point I
shall highlight in later chapters, Chomsky‘s rejection of behaviorism on linguistic
grounds points to a unique status that language holds in terms of behavior. Language is
not just outwardly observable behavior, such as the lifting of a glass to one‘s lips or
walking purposefully towards the door as Chomsky (1957) successfully demonstrates ,

3

Cf. Chomsky, 1965, in particular, Chapter Three: Deep Structures and Grammatical Transformations.
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our to ability utilize and understand a language involves an often tacit awareness of
structures that underlie the surface structures we encounter. For example, when I begin
stringing together clauses and phrases with conjunctions whilst recounting a story to a
friend, I have an implicit understanding that this process could go on indefinitely. Indeed,
the longest sentence in any language is impossible to conceive, hence, a universal
principle governing all languages, namely, that they are infinitely generative.
Nevertheless, we never actually ‗observe‘ this infinite generation because it is quite
literally unobservable, and yet, structures and principles such as these must certainly be
part of the overall story of how we come to be competent users of a language. To put it
briefly, language manifests itself as more than mere behavior. In other words, if
Chomsky is right, then behaviorism misconstrues language on two grounds: first, while
some aspects of language are behavioral, it is wrong to claim that language just is another
behavior. Second, if linguistic rules are the means by which linguistic behavior as well as
other observable behaviors are often generated, and these linguistic rules, while being
universal and finite at the deep level, allow for an infinite and unpredictable set of surface
constructions, then the further claim that all behavior should be predictable given enough
‗dispositional information,‘ fails miserably. Hence, a major problem for behaviorists after
Chomsky is the demotion from a theory that can explain all observable behavior to one
that at best, can explain some of it some of the time.
Yet, another worry for behaviorism that has arguably been successfully solved by
alternative theories is its inability to account for causation between mental states. While
focusing all of their attention on how dispositions are causal antecedents for observable
behavior, behaviorists overlook the possibility of unobservable behavior, as well as the
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point that ‗inner‘ thoughts often cause other thoughts. The assumption that all behavior is
manifest through external bodily movement or speech is a hasty move at best, but
perhaps the most damning feature of logical behaviorism is that the brain and central
nervous system (CNS) are effectively left out of the discussion. To be sure, behaviorists
are not interested in the nervous system, or they at least think it is of little use in
understanding behavior; as Skinner argues, regarding a discrete behavioral response:
We shall know the precise neurological conditions which immediately precede,
say, the response, ‗No thank you.‘ These events in turn will be found to be
preceded by other neurological events, and these in turn by others. This series
will lead us back to events outside the nervous system and, eventually, outside
the organism…The causes to be sought in the nervous system are, therefore,
of limited usefulness in the prediction and control of specific behavior [1953;
38].
Thus, the appeal to overt behavior assumes that all antecedents of outward behavior are
eventually traceable back to other outwardly observable behavior – the CNS causes, if
they count as causes at all, are intermediate and unimportant. Even more unfounded is the
assumption that all behavior must be of the global, outwardly recongnizable, external
variety. On a very coarse grained analysis, it might be true that one behavior can cause
another, but then there is nothing to prevent us from refining our understanding of
behavior to include things like the behaviors of neurons, somatosensory systems, and so
forth, all of which are partially responsible for causing the more easily recognized outer
behaviors of the whole organism. Later, we will see why perhaps delimiting the brain‘s
importance is a productive strategy, but for now, at this point in the historical
progression, the denial on the behaviorists‘ part that internally caused thoughts can cause
other thoughts or even outward behavior is tantamount to claiming that it matters not
what is going on inside, so long as what we observe counts as ‗mindful.‘ Experimental
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paradigms such as Heider and Simmel‘s (1944), in which mindless shapes move about a
screen and people viewing these otherwise mindless objects readily attribute mentality to
them simply by virtue of their observable ‗behavior,‘ reveals this particular problem with
behaviorism. Figure 1 is an image of one frame from the original video, in which the
circle and triangles have been tracing a wild pattern around the large rectangular shape,
which itself remains relatively still, except for one of its sides which swings back and
forth at a 45 degree angle. The shapes‘ movements however, mimic embodied human
movement; for example, upon seeing two shapes move together, one preceding the other
until eventually stopping behind the rectangle, subjects claim that these two shapes are
‗hiding‘ from the other shape. Indeed, the box, if it is supposed to be an occluding object
of some sort, would prevent a normal embodied human, at certain angles, from seeing
what is behind it. This is precisely what happens in the experiment; before long, the
whole scenario is explained in terms of one shape ‗hiding‘ from another, the other
‗growing angry,‘ and even an ‗argument‘ among the shapes ensuing. If we completely
disregard the inner causes of behavior, the logical consequence of behaviorism as an
explanatory mechanism is to allow anything whose outward behavior is characteristically
‗human enough‘ to count as having mentality just like a human.
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Figure 1.1: Depiction of Heider and Simmel Experiment. Visual
representation of the short video played for experimental participants. The
shapes move about the screen, going in and out of the large box and
according to most reports, ‗one shape is angry at another,‘ or some similar
emotional state and corresponding behavior is attributed. One of my
students, upon viewing this video, went so far as to conjecture that a love
affair was ongoing with two of the shapes and in this scene, the third has
found them out and then goes into a manic rage, finally breaking down the
‗house‘ (the box gets shattered in the end). From: Heider, F. and Simmel,
M. (1944). An experimental study of apparent behaviour. American
Journal of Psychology, 57, 243–259.

In contrast with traditional behaviorism, central state identity theory allows for
internally caused mental states by simply identifying them with brain states or processes.
In the name of parsimony, Smart (1959) for example, advocates a strict mind-brain
identity whereby any mental process or sensation just is a brain process. This identity is
argued to be a metaphysical claim about the nature of the mind and not necessarily a
semantic one. In other words, if Jones is hungry, this does not mean the same thing as
Jones is having this or that brain process, even if the two events described are in fact one
and the same. By addressing this point, Smart is able to respond to objections that stem
from the rather crucial observation that I might have a lack of epistemic access to my
own brain processes but have perfectly transparent access to my beliefs, desires, and
motivations.
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While mind-brain identity appears to explain what behaviorism could not, it is not
without its own set of problems. For one, the role of the brain is moved not just back onto
center stage, but is now the only relevant player in the entire story. We might question,
for example, whether the rest of the sensorimotor system plays any role in cognition, or if
mind-brain identity can be forced into an untenable scenario in which thought – the very
same kind of activity that embodied agents engage in – is possible for beings without
bodies, the proverbial ‗brain in a vat‘ scenario. I will address this worry more fully in the
next section, but there is a corollary concern, which is evident if we consider just how
difficult it is to perform metaphysical reductions without simultaneously performing
intertheoretic one. As Fodor (1981) notes, because Smith is in pain does not mean the
same thing as Smith has X brain state, identity theory allows us to talk about
psychological types generally, at a level of abstraction from brain states. In other words,
while minds and brains might just be the same entities, both psychology and
neurobiology remain vital and necessary sciences, as they concern themselves with two
very distinct theoretical stances towards a single entity. And yet, the very element of
mind-brain identity that its proponents praise it for, its parsimony, would seem to suggest
that if we can have one unified theory of mind, then this would be even simpler than the
dual-theoretical identity originally proffered by Smart and other central state identity
theorists.
In other words, mind-brain identity runs up against this dilemma: either take
parsimony so seriously that the end goal really is one unified theory of mind – call it
neurobiology – or carve up mental states in such a way that a single brain process could
very rarely if ever be identified strictly with the more global mental process. Although I
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face many objections, perhaps even from Fodor himself, my reaction to this ‗carving
problem‘, which he mentions in Something on the State of the Art, is that it forces mindbran identity into either an eliminative materialist or an entirely non-reductive physicalist
position. Thus, if one wants to avoid internal inconsistencies of Churchland-style (cf.
1986, 1981) intertheoretic elimination as well as avoid being forced into some sort of
epiphenomenalism or property dualism (cf. Chalmers, 1996), then it would seem that one
ought to steer clear of mind-brain identity. On the one hand, as I mentioned earlier, the
simplest theory of mind would seem to be the one that explains the most with as little
work as possible. If it turns out to be true that neuroscience can actually tell us everything
we need to know about minds, to the point that all mentality can be understood in terms
of brain processes, then I see no reason to take issue with Churchland‘s elimination
thesis. Much like other once poorly understood phenomena (the theory of phlogiston
being eliminated by the theory of combustion, e.g.), when we learn that there is a better
theory, we don‘t simply try to allow the old explanatory framework to coexist along with
the newer, actually true one. We simply eliminate our previous framework, as it has been
deemed false. I happen to think that neuroscience is not a complete science of cognition,
and I will defend this position throughout this project. While eliminative materialism
might in fact allow for a complete science of the brain, assuming that this is all there is to
‗the mind‘ is no better than behaviorism‘s assumption that brains are of little importance.
In other words, while behaviorists suffer from brain-neglect, eliminativists seem to suffer
from the inverse mania, brain-obsession.
On the other hand, if we take seriously the idea that global psychological states,
such as pain, might be realized in various ways that are not always entirely captured by
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simple identification of an exact brain process, then we face even more worries. What is
strict identity then if Smith can be in pain and Jones can be in pain, but the two of them
have different types of brain processes occurring? The typical reaction to type identity is
actually that it does not allow for other life forms or other species to share in the same
global mental types if they do not have the requisite brain processes, but I think the
problem runs even deeper than this. Even intra-species wise, if you and I don‘t share the
exact same types of brain processes, then either we cannot be having the same type of
mental process, or we do and strict identity does not hold. If we are not having the same
sensation, pain, by virtue of our different brain processes, then if I claim to be ‗in pain,‘
and you assert the same feeling, then one of us is simply wrong about in what we are
experiencing. This is problematic for identity theses, but even more vexing would be
accepting the other disjunct, that perhaps type identity just does not hold of many global
mental states. The identity theorist is ultimately therefore confronted with either rejecting
the occurrence a vast array of mental phenomena that resist strict identification with
specific brain processes, or worse, she must reject strict mind-brain identity altogether,
favoring the phenomenology of non-reductive mental states, whilst giving up the core of
the original theory. Of course, the dilemma might be avoided if our constraints on
identity are not so strong, namely, if it remains the case that mental types are always
identical to some physical types of process, but they need not always map isomorphically
onto brain ‗types.‘ In other words, if we adopt a token physicalist view, which would
mean that every mental event is some physical event, but that these physical events onto
which mental events must always be mapped are not necessarily type-specific, then
perhaps there is a third option for identity theory.
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1.3 The Virtues (and Vices) of Token Physicalism
The sort of physicalism put forth by central state identity theorists, is most
properly thought of as type physicalism, or the thesis that every mental type is a physical
type. Another way to put it would be to say that since the world is wholly physical, then
minds must be physical as well, but more specifically, that all mental processes are
identical to natural kinds, which are themselves physical objects or processes. For
example, microsaccades of the eye might constitute a natural kind of eye movement. 4
Thus, when you and I both look at an object, our eye movements are two distinct tokens
of that one physical type of eye movement. In terms of minds then, this is a highly
restrictive notion of what gets to count as this or that mental process. If pain is defined as
the firing of C-fibers, then any creature, machine, or entity that does not have the
requisite physical process, will ipso facto not be in the mental state of pain.
On the other hand, token physicalism makes a weaker claim insofar as it holds
that each mental token is identical to a physical token. This does not necessarily imply
that there are no longer natural kinds under a token physicalist picture, but if there are,
they will most likely be redefined in terms of their functional roles. For instance, a heart
might in fact constitute a natural kind of organ, but only insofar as its function is to pump
blood through the body. Hence, if we invent an artificial heart, even if it is not typeidentical to many other versions of hearts in the world, the token physicalist will have no
qualms with calling it a heart. Likewise, mental types might indeed turn out to be realized
by various sorts of physical types, but every instance of ‗pain‘ will always be identical to
exactly one physical token, which means that C-fiber firing might be a strong indicator of
4

For a detailed discussion of these eye movements and their necessary involvement in perception, hence,
an argument that they constitute natural ‗kinds‘ of processes that are themselves constitutive of cognition,
see Martinez-Conde, et al, 2009; Martinez-Conde, 2009; Tronosco, et al, 2008.
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pain, but it might be 1) that other physical mechanisms can realize pain – hence the brain
processes are not always necessary for the specified mental processes – and 2) there
might be instances of C-fiber firing without an experience of pain – thus, C-fiber firing is
not always sufficient for experiencing pain.
All seems well for token physicalism, except upon closer examination, it really is
just a dressed-up version of the very general material monist claim that all things in the
universe, including minds, are material. If we all agree that the world is comprised only
of physical things then the real goal of philosophy of mind and cognitive science is not to
determine what a mind is—this has been answered by the unanimous rejection of
Cartesianism—but instead, we are seeking to provide an explanation of how mentality is
constituted, what sorts of physical things, collections of things, or processes ought to be
called cognitive. Given this much more specific aim then, token physicalism is about as
informative as claiming that all matter is material. If however, we can come up with
specific functional specifications for the sorts of physical processes that are supposed to
be counted as ‗cognitive,‘ then the position is no longer bankrupt. Indeed, this is precisely
one of the virtues of token physicalism – it allows for the possibility of cognition being
explained more in terms of function rather than physicality. This is because unlike type
physicalism, which usually entails that mental types and physical types are both natural
kinds of ‗things‘ found in the world, token physicalism retains the intuitive appeal of
relegating all phenomena to the natural world, but does not insist that the feeling of
hunger is so specific as to warrant it only being realized by brain state X. The benefit of
this more liberal physicalism is that it invites us to seriously consider ‗the mind‘ as an
open and dynamic system rather than as the encapsulated, skull-ensconced brain, the
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latter of which is so often portrayed as a reified entity rather than as a ‗process of
processes.‘ Indeed, the terms ‗mental state‘ and ‗brain state‘ invoke stasis, and as Smart
(1959), Armstrong (1968), Hill (2001), and other strict mind-brain identity theorists have
argued, unambiguously, to be in a particular mental state just is to be in a particular brain
state. To be fair, however, even the strict mind-brain identity theorists will clumsily refer
to both brain ‗states‘ and brain ‗processes‘.5 Hence, it stands to reason that they recognize
that the brain is full of processes – C-fiber firing being one paradigm case of such an
event. Nevertheless, the brain itself is portrayed a closed system. Once again, the
charitable interpretation would be to say that this is precisely how mind-brain identity is
defined, and hence, the possibility, for example, that mental processes might be
constituted by the interaction between brains, bodies, and environments, or that mental
processes might be realized in a variety of physical mechanisms, some of which might
not even involve a biological brain, is a non-issue, given the established explanatory
framework. Put another way, most would agree that the rest of the body contributes to the
brain‘s overall processing and in turn, that the external environment provides the body
and brain with input. Where theorists differ is in the setting of boundaries. To the
question of just how much of the external world ought we count as part of the cognitive
process, the mind-brain identity theorist can answer, ex hypothesi, ―none.‖ The problem
is that in answering why this must be so, the best answer afforded is parsimony. We know
that brains are really important for cognition, so to make things simple, says the identity
theorist, let‘s just say they are the only important element in cognition. This gives us a
discrete and finite object – the brain – that can be scrutinized, studied, and mastered,

5

The title of Smart‘s inaugural piece, ―Sensations and Brain Processes‖ is a good example, as he goes on
throughout the article to refer both to brain states and to brain processes.
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thereby allowing mastery of cognition. While parsimony is generally a strong inductive
move to make in favor of one theory over another, to claim that it would be really nice
and simple if the brain were the only thing in the world that realizes cognition and
therefore it is the only thing that realizes cognition, is nothing more than wishful
thinking. A virtue of the competing version of physicalism – token physicalism – is
therefore that it leaves this possibility open, rather than assuming from the start that
simplicity is the best option. It may turn out to be the case that only biological brains can
constitute cognition, but if we can find other physical tokenings of functionally
equivalent systems, then we should be ready to call these processes cognitive just the
same. Thus, token physicalism is most likely paired with a functionalist interpretation of
cognition, and functionalism, as we shall see, not only provides a framework for thinking
about the mind in terms of dynamic and open processing, but it also avoids the major
pitfalls of logical behaviorism and central state identity theory.
It was Putnam‘s (1960, 1975) ‗machine functionalism‘ that first provided a rich
philosophical argument as to why the defining feature of mentality is not its neurology,
but rather its computationality. By redirecting the discussion of PAIN from being merely
a brain state, to being a functional state of the entire organism, pain is not limited to
identification with some brain state, which is the strict reading of type-physicalism, nor
must it even be identified with a biological body-state, a more liberal notion of typephysicalism. And, unlike behaviorism, pain is more than just wincing and groaning. The
―Total State‖ of a probabilistic automaton involves its physical constitution, its
dispositions to act in one way or another given certain inputs, and its actual behavior
given those inputs (Putnam calls these ―outputs‖). As Putnam claims, however,
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―knowing the Total State of a system relative to a Description involves knowing a good
deal about how the system is likely to ―behave‖ given various combinations of sensory
input‖ (323). Thus, a lot of functionalist literature since Putnam retains a sort of
behaviorist tendency, as computers themselves, which are ―discrete state machines,‖ to
use Turing‘s (1950) original phrase, are not too dissimilar from dispositionally governed
humans. In fact, part of Putnam‘s argument is precisely to claim that ―all organisms
capable of feeling pain are Probabilistic Automata‖ (1975; 433). The difference between
machine functionalism and logical behaviorism is the further move of claiming that all
organisms that feel pain have a corresponding ‗machine-table description‘ – in other
words, their mentality can be described and indeed must be at least partially understood
by reference to inner processes. This essentially means that the functional organization of
an organism, so long as it counts as typically productive of pain-like behavior and
sensations, will count as ‗being in pain;‘ thus pain does not necessarily have to produce
pain behavior, which thereby allows for pain to simply be an internal state of the system.
Where behaviorism and identity theory fall short, functionalism appears to pick
up the slack. Not only does it allow for internally caused mental processes, but most
functionalists are amenable to some sort of multiple realizability thesis, which absolves
them of the worries associated with strict type-identity. If mental processes can be
realized in various sorts of ways, from slightly different neural processes to physical
substrates of entirely alternate ‗type‘, such as artificial neural networks for example, then
the concerns about an overly restrictive and unrealistic metaphysics of mind seem
irrelevant. A caveat about functionalism is perhaps in order however: while functionalist
interpretations usually favor a token physicalism, this is not a necessary entailment of
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adopting such interpretive strategy. Polger (2006) for instance, maintains that typephysicalism is possible, indeed a likely outcome of functionalism, given that we will
eventually have to specify, with some constraints, what sorts of physical mechanisms can
constitute the functional organization necessary for cognition and hence, only certain
‗types‘ will fit this bill. Furthermore, as we shall see in later sections, there are disputes
as to whether or not functionalism implies extended cognition – a debate which centers
around the ‗where‘ of cognitive processes more so than the ‗what.‘
These disputes tend to suggest that functionalism alone is not intended to provide
a comprehensive ontology of mentality, but is rather an interpretation of how mentality
works, which in turn is supposed to guide research in the philosophy of mind and
cognitive science in a particular way – namely, to treat the mind not necessarily as a
unified object or ‗brain-thing,‘ but as a dynamic processing ‗machine‘ or computational
mechanism, which may – and usually does – involve a brain, and can include a wide
variety of other physical processes. On this read however, the nature of what this physical
system might be is vague. In this sense therefore, functionalism and token physicalism
are not robust metaphysical theories, but are rather, as Putnam and others originally
claimed they ought to be: ways to conceive of how minds work. The details of what and
where minds are in the world remain open questions.
Why then adopt a functionalist framework? As stated above, thinking of the mind
as a machine places emphasis on what minds do, such that the task of answering what
they are can be reformulated so as to be better asked as such: what sorts of physical
things out there are in fact constitutive of cognitive processes so understood? Such a
reformulation does not begin with Putnam of course, as we can see the transition quite
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clearly by examining the birth of Artificial Intelligence (AI). Even in its infancy, Turing‘s
‗Imitation Game‘ forced philosophers to reconsider the conditions for the possibility of
‗having thought.‘ The backlash against ‗strong AI‘ (cf. Searle, 1980) and the minutia of
the debate is of little concern to me, but what is important to consider is the way in which
functionalism and AI research are the first frameworks in which the boundaries
delimiting where or ‗in what‘ cognition can take place begin to be confused. No sooner
had the ‗neuroscientific revolution‘ which ushered in the hay day of type-physicalism
occurred, than it is seemingly undermined by functionalism, computationalism, robotics,
and cybernetics, which suggest that the grey squishy matter between our ears might not
be the only cognitive player in town. If mental states can be realized by a wide variety of
physical processes, then the brain-mania brought about by neuroscience should be short
lived, with functionalism quickly taking its place.
Rather than wholeheartedly endorse functionalism however, I want to be more
cautious. Based on the failures of type-physicalism and behaviorism in providing a
realistic and comprehensive account of how the mind works, it is reasonable to claim that
neither of the two alone should be conceived of as the best story we have about the mind.
Functionalism, on the other hand, as it aligns itself with a thesis of multiple realizability,
at least prima facie, appeals intuitively to our common sense understanding of cognition.
If I am to believe that Jones and I can have the same type of thought-behavior schema,
e.g. we both think that pizza would taste really good and believe that there is pizza in the
fridge, and thus, we get up to retrieve a slice, from whence does this belief that we are
both in the same mental state of HUNGER arise? The behaviorist will claim that it is only
by virtue of observed behavior that we make such an inference, but then this could mean
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that my friend Jones has nothing in between his ears and is a behavioral zombie as it
were. There is nothing to prevent maintaining this as a logical possibility under the
behaviorist framework. However, if I were to answer the question from a type-physicalist
standpoint, my answer would be something to the effect of ‗as long as the two of us are in
identical brain-states.‘ This answer is unpalatable because it rules out the possibility of
Jones having a slightly different neural schema at time t than I do and yet still being
hungry just as I am. It also rules out the possibility that my dog is hungry, that other
beings with type-distinct brain states can be hungry, and so forth, unless of course,
HUNGER as a global state of the whole brain or better, the whole organism, is allowed to
be realized by a motley of physical systems, in which case, we aren‘t talking strict mindbrain identity anymore. Based on simple verification procedures, many of which involve
observing behavior, verbal reporting, etc, it seems counter-intuitive to claim that
something like PAIN is not being experienced both by me when I stub my toe and by my
dog when he misses his Frisbee and instead crashes into the fence, even if I learn that my
dog‘s ‗brain-pain‘ looks nothing like mine.
Unlike a strictly behavioral interpretation, a machine functionalist interpretation
has as a virtue, a further specification that there must be a possible machine table
description for the cognitive state in question, such that not any old collection of
materials will suffice for the sensation HUNGER. In this way, functionalism shares with
behaviorism that they both allow for natural, typically effortless attribution of mental
states to others via behavior, but functionalism also allows that internal mental states are
causally efficacious. To put it another way, functionalism appeals to the intuitive idea
that if someone or something is behaving enough like myself when I am in mental state
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A, and if I believe that this creature is capable of experiencing the world similarly to me
due to an implicit belief I have about their physical composition as being also similar
enough to my own, then I will naturally endorse the idea that there are two distinct
physical realizations of one mental type.
For all its virtues, functionalism still carries around a lot of theoretical baggage.
Chief among this baggage is the grain size problem concerning multiple realizability. As
discussed above, agreeing that two distinct physical systems are in the same mental state
depends on what we mean by mental states such as HUNGER or PAIN –whether we are
talking about general food-seeking behavior, specific cravings, sharp pain, dull pain,
localized pain, and so forth – in other words, the specificity with which we are
characterizing the mental process. As Bechtel and Mundale (1999) note, the irresistible
urge to claim that psychological states are multiply realizable stems from the typical
philosophical usage of psychological measures to map the brain. More specifically, the
inconsistency with which these correlative mappings are made might hint at a case
against MR. Typically, researchers have used a coarse grain to classify mental states as
―the same‖ across individuals and species, while a finer grain is used to differentiate
among brain states. However, as Bechtel and Mundale note, if we keep the grain
consistent for both the psychological and the neural classifications, the case for MR does
not fair so well. A more fine grained mental classification would allow for differentiating
mental states among individuals or even within the same individual over time. For
example, rather than the coarse mental type PAIN, we might have PAIN-1, PAIN-2, and
so forth, to denote varying degrees and even kinds of pain, such as burning, sharp, or
pulsating. Utilizing this same fine grain to analyze the brain, we might be able then to
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map these nuanced versions of PAIN onto brain processes that reflect these subtle
differences. It is usually the case that in apparent instances of different brain activity
failing to produce apparent differences in mental states, one has usually just not used a
fine enough grain to analyze mental states (177-8). Bechtel and Mundale go on to argue
that given a fine enough grain, it will rarely, if ever turn out to be the case that genuine
multiple realizability is occurring. However, using a coarse enough grain, claims about
multiple realizability are too easily and too loosely made. The thesis of MR is appealing
for precisely this reason however; it is intuitive to claim that I, my dog, and even the
blood sucking mosquito annoying the both of us can all be hungry. However, depending
on the context in which the comparison is being made, this might turn out not to be true.
Lack of context, Bechtel and Mundale claim, makes it easy to assume that MR is
a viable thesis about cognition. It might be that Lisa and her pet octopus have the same
mental states, realized by different neural structures, for example; if they are both hungry
and this hunger is associated with some general food-seeking behavior. However,
regarding other factors, such as how the food is sought, what food is sought, under what
conditions, etc, then the food-seeking behavior and its corresponding mental state are
different. As Bechtel and Mundale rightly point out, asking whether two things are the
same or different only makes sense with respect to some third thing. Stating for example,
Lisa and her pet octopus have the same PAIN, would mean that each of their individual
realizations of pain share something in common, such that Lisa‘s pain (PAIN-L) and her
Octopus‘s pain (PAIN-O) are identical just in case they are both instances of PAIN more
generally. So, PAIN as the third thing could be specified differently for Lisa and her
octopus; we might say that PAIN can be realized by C-fiber firing in human brains, but it
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is realized by O-fiber firing in octopi brains. Hence, if we use different ‗third things,‘ it is
reasonable to assume that Lisa and her octopus have the same mental states, but if we
consider the context and keep it fixed while doing comparative analysis, both
psychologically and neurally, then the case for multiple realizability appears rather
dubious. If the environment has any role to play in an organism‘s realization of PAIN,
then matters become even worse. It is highly unlikely that, for example, Lisa and her pet
octopus are actually in the same total state, given the largely different embodied and
environmental contexts in which they are situated (202-3). In other words, if context must
be the same in order for two organisms to be realizing the exact same PAIN, then MR is a
rare occurrence indeed.
The example above is just one among many. Lawrence Shapiro (2000), for
instance, makes a similar argument, focusing his attack on Block and Fodor‘s (1972)
argument that a psychological entity is often associated with several distinct neurological
states (238). He claims that in an attempt to forge an existence proof for multiple
realizability by neural plasticity, the reality of the neurobiological evidence is
overlooked. The rewiring experiments actually show that the rewired rodents do not see
exactly the same as normal rodents-i.e. their visual acuity for recognizing light gradations
is largely impoverished. Furthermore, the auditory cortex of a rewired rodent comes to
look identical to the visual cortex possessed by its unwired friend. Thus, he argues, we
have neither a case in which the same function is realized in two different ways – the
rodents with the different – the rewired – neurology actually don‘t have the same mental
states, nor a case in which the same function is realized in two different ways - the two
physical systems realizing the mental state don‘t differ enough such that the difference
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matters. In other words, if one brain system or component comes to resemble another
such that they are indistinguishable, then the claim that the two brains can both realize the
same mental state is uninteresting (2000; 648-9). Surely, there are more objections to MR
lurking in the literature, but it is sufficient to note here that accepting MR without
scrutiny is problematic.
Perhaps the most important consequence of the grain-size problem is the
unfavorable bottom lines functionalism can be reduced to depending on how far and in
which direction we push it. As Block (1980) characterizes it, one can either be forced into
an unfair chauvinism or an unpalatable liberalism concerning the nature of mental
processes. That is, if Bechtel, Mundale, and Shapiro are right, then we must either insist
that only organisms with precisely the correct ‗human brain functionality‘ can have
human cognition or we allow that anything, so long as it has the proper input-output
sequencing characteristic of human thought, to be a ‗thinking thing.‘ In other words,
pushed to one end of the extreme, functionalism entails that only physical systems that
resemble closely enough the ones that we have established are capable of thinking –
which just so happens to be humans – can be characterized as properly ‗cognitive,‘ and
thus, we are back to an undesirable strict mind-brain identity, or as Block calls it, a
species chauvinism. Pushed in the other direction however, functionalism might force us
to accept that Heider and Simmel‘s (1944) shapes actually do have minds because they
act as though they do and furthermore, because the program underwriting them looks
sufficiently like the machine table description of a human mind. As we move on through
later chapters, I intend to argue that this latter option is a bit of a straw man version of
functionalism and hence, the dilemma is falsely constructed, but for now, it suffices to
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note that if we are not careful in how we specify what sorts of physical processes might
be capable of functionally organizing in such a way that constitutes thinking, either too
few or too many entities seem to walk away from this story with minds.
Once again, it is helpful to consider that functionalism is not inherently
metaphysical in its overall claims. By shifting the focus from what a mind is to how it is
realized, all that is being insisted upon is a change of emphasis. As the above discussion
illustrates, the big metaphysical questions concerning just what sorts of functions
constitute cognitive ones and the criteria for delimiting exactly ‗in what‘ these functions
can be realized remain thorny issues. If we want to avoid slipping back into logical
behaviorism or type identity theory, these questions demand answers. Rather than
continuing on with armchair a priori engineering by purebred philosophers, I think
examining some of the more interdisciplinary approaches to cognition is in order. Not
only will the intersection of psychology, neuroscience, robotics, and phenomenology
provide insightful and potentially more realistic ways to approach the problem, but by
engaging with what has come to be known as ‗cognitive science‘ most generally, it
quickly becomes evident that when seeking the elusive where of cognition, we have been
looking in all the wrong places.

1.4 Embodiment, Cognition, and Artificial Intelligence
Before turning to the more recent trends in philosophy of mind and cognitive
science that take the body much more seriously than their predecessors, I want to first
consider the project of Artificial Intelligence (AI). My aim here is not to provide an
historical overview and it is most certainly not in any way an attempt to settle the dispute
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between the believers and non-believers. Instead, I want to focus on the fact that despite
serious advances, the type of AI imagined by Kubrick 6 and others has not occurred as far
as anyone can tell. This simple point, whether you take it as a signal that the achievement
shall never happen or believe contrarily, that it is just around the corner, is an example of
a real-world attempt at applying the functionalist paradigm in order to achieve a
particular scientific end. The fact that for the last fifty years or so AI has continued to
come up short in terms of creating sufficiently human-like thinking machines highlights
the same idea I mentioned in closing the last section. By looking for the mind among
abstract and highly disembodied machine tables, AI proponents aren‘t just looking in the
wrong places; they are not looking anywhere for the mind. This question of how
cognition works, as we have seen, carries with it some notion of in what this functioning
is taking place, and yet, functionalist-driven cognitive roboticists have systematically
neglected the body and its role to play in the executing of said table. Hence, we find, as I
shall discuss, robot after robot that blows itself up, runs into walls, and is unconvincing at
the Turing Test. Relying mainly on Hubert Dreyfus as well as several roboticists at MIT
who seem to be exceptions to this general rule of body-neglect, I shall attempt to
illustrate how and why I think the turn to embodied approaches in cognitive science is a
reaction to the intractable identity-theory vs. behaviorism debate, but also, a response to
some of the failures in AI.
In What Computers [Still ]Can‟t Do,7 Hubert Dreyfus sketches several of the
major attempts in AI, along with the assumptions about cognition generally that subtend
each. I shall not attempt to discuss his account in detail; I think we can glean the relevant
6

For example, in the Movie, ―AI.‖
Originally published in 1972. The revised edition, ―What Computers Still Can‘t Do,‖ is from where I shall
be citing exact page numbers.
7
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details quite simply by a move Dreyfus makes late in the book, in a section titled ―The
Role of the Body in Intelligent Behavior.‖ This move is a turn back to some of the
original phenomenologists – Husserl and Merleau-Ponty in particular – as well as the
Gestalt psychologists, to show that what has yet to be replicated in any machine is the
ability to properly understand the situation involved in this or that cognitive action.
Husserl (1931) referred to this situation as a ‗horizon,‘ and he differentiated between
‗inner‘ and ‗outer‘ horizons in order to explain the way we are able to recognize objects
as whole, even when we don‘t experience them as such. For example, in The Idea of
Phenomenology (1964), Husserl expounds upon the ways we perceive a cube; we can
only ever see a particular side of it, which is dependent upon the angle at which we are
positioned with relation to it, both of which are manifest by a particular profile of the
cube – namely, its position in time and space relative to our own positions, and so forth.
To put it more simply, we always experience a presence in absence. Things appear to us
as partial and yet whole at the same time, those parts that are absent visually are
nonetheless present all at once. How is this possible? In Ideas I, Husserl claims we must
have background information about the ‗scene‘ such that we can comprehend the whole
of the encounter with the object as well as understand our own relation to the object,
spatially and temporally. Hence, we have an outer and inner horizon in which experience
is made possible. We don‘t just play chess or use language via some internal code written
into us, nor do we seem to participate in these activities entirely via trial and error. To
quote Dreyfus on Husserl‘s ―horizons:‖
In chess and in recognizing sentences, we find the same phenomenon playing a
crucial role. Our sense of the whole situation, outer horizon, and our past
experience with the specific object or pattern in question, inner horizon, give us a
sense of the whole and guide us in filling in the details [1992; 242].
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What has truly been left uncaptured by roboticists is not the higher-level rational
functions often assumed to be uniquely human, such as logical reasoning or ideal
language production and comprehension. Instead, as Dreyfus notes, the part of
intelligence that we share with animals – pattern recognition – has resisted simulation. As
well, natural language comprehension and use remains to be perfectly simulated, as even
the best chatbots such as Suzette – best new bot of 20098 – or A.L.I.C.E9 – three-time
winner of the Loebner prize – eventually expose themselves as ‗non-native‘ speakers of
the ‗human‘ language.
Dreyfus thinks that the Husserlian ‗horizons‘ with which we approach each
perceptual and cognitive experience are what computers systematically fail to come
equipped with, and this is in part because such knowledge, he claims, must be embodied,
a point Merleau-Ponty (1962) makes explicit in Phenomenology of Perception. The
problem with the AI project thus far, as Dreyfus sees it, is that researchers continue to
insist that this embodied ‗know how‘ can be duplicated via explicit and formalized rules.
In order for a computer or robot to achieve what Piaget (1966) termed the ―Perceptual
Constancy‖ with which we can perceive whole objects in each sense modality and
interact meaningfully with them, there would have to be an internal model of every object
encountered in every possible sense modality, along with a set of comparative principles
for each object in each modality. Encountering an object visually and tactilely; therefore,
it would need to pass through this analysis before the robot could interact properly with
it. As an example, consider the ease with which a typical human can reach into the

8
9

Chatterbot Challenge award recipient. See online at: http://www.chatbots.org/chatterbot/suzette/
2001, 2002, 2004
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refrigerator and obtain an egg. Grasping the egg without breaking or dropping it requires
a complex set of physical rules governing force, grip, and so forth, as well as the
interaction of this tactile modality with the visual system‘s information about the size and
shape of the egg. Most of us never even think about what goes into a simple task like this
and when asked to explain how we do it, it is likely that our explanations do not even
approximate the complexity with which the action is actually performed. As I will discuss
in Chapter 3, when a person‘s nervous system is damaged in a particular way and this
seamlessness of action is lost, regaining the proper motor functions to complete even the
most basic tasks can prove difficult, if not impossible.10 Instead, for most of us, we are
able to, as Dreyfus states, ―bypass this formal analysis‖ (249). His doubt that artificially
intelligent systems could ever achieve this seamlessness of action is due in part to the
failures in doing so to date, but moreover, by ignoring the way our ―wet engineering‖ can
and does play a vital role in encoding this information that is to a large extent, below the
level of conscious awareness, roboticists, he conjectures, will consistently and
continually fail in their endeavors.
There are, however, some roboticists – Rodney Brooks and Cynthia Breazeal, for
instance – who have taken this phenomenological lesson seriously. Both of these MIT
roboticists have taken cues from Marvin Minsky, whose robotic arm11 was one of the first
to be capable not only of picking up objects, but navigating around obstacles to obtain the
objects and use them meaningfully. Rodney Brooks‘ most famous robot, Cog, is a
continually evolving project that began as just a head, torso, and arms, with nowhere near

10

In particular, deafferented patients suffer from this problem. One patient I will be most interested in
discussing is Ian Waterman, who is in fact able to recover a large part of his motor functioning.
11
1968, ―The Tentacle,‖ MIT AI Lab
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the degrees of freedom that a human possesses, but now, according to Cog‘s website, 12
―the major degrees of motor freedom in the trunk, head, and arms are all there. Sight
exists, in the form of video cameras. Hearing and touch are on the drawing board.
Proprioception in the form of joint position and torque is already in place; a vestibular
system is on the way. Hands are being built as you read this, and a system for
vocalization is also in the works.‖ Below is a picture of Cog in his earliest days with
Brooks and to the right of that is photograph of the hands Cog will eventually have.

Figure 1.2 Rodney Brooks and Cog

Figure 1.3 Cog‘s Hand Prototype

Cynthia Breazeal has been following in Minsky‘s footsteps but has focused her
attention more on the ways in which humans perceive and express emotions. Originally
part of the Cog project, Breazeal‘s unique project, Kismet, is an even more limited robot,
insofar as it is only a head, but the detail with which the facial features have been
constructed is beyond comparison with any other project in AI to date. The robot is
12

http://www.ai.mit.edu/projects/humanoid-robotics-group/cog/cog.html. It is interesting to point out that
the face portion of Cog currently underway (Edsinger, O‘Reilly, Scasselatti, Scarpino, and Breazeal) has its
own research team and name – ‗Lazlo‘- as does a currently underway biochemical subsystem (Adams),
named ‗Meso.‘ In a sense therefore, ‗Cog‘ is slowly being replaced, component by component, by submechanisms that more genuinely reflect and respond to some of the concerns regarding embodiment we
have discussed thus far.
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pictured below and to get an idea of how intricate Kismet‘s construction is, I quote from
Breazeal‘s website:13
Our hardware and software control architectures have been designed to meet the
challenge of real-time processing of visual signals (approaching 30 Hz) and
auditory signals (8 kHz sample rate and frame windows of 10 ms) with minimal
latencies (less than 500 ms). The high-level perception system, the motivation
system, the behavior system, the motor skill system, and the face motor system
execute on four Motorola 68332 microprocessors running L, a multi-threaded
Lisp developed in our lab. Vision processing, visual attention and eye/neck
control is performed by nine networked 400 MHz PCs running QNX (a real-time
Unix operating system). Expressive speech synthesis and vocal affective intent
recognition runs on a dual 450 MHz PC running NT, and the speech recognition
system runs on a 500 MHz PC running Linux.
All of this allows Kismet to express a full array of emotions as well as to respond to other
humans who express those emotions. In this sense therefore, Breazeal is responding to
the recent trend in philosophy and cognitive science to view the emotions as fundamental
to consciousness (cf. Damasio, 2005; 2000) and as constitutive of our embodied social
cognition (cf. Gallese, et al 2004). The thinking behind Kismet has helped Brezeal launch
her most recent project, Leonardo (pictured next to Kismet), a fully embodied emotional
robot, that can learn from instruction, including voice tone and facial expressions.
While Brooks and Breazeal challenge Dreyfus‘ claim that roboticists simply are
not taking embodiment seriously, his point concerning formal rules remains. Because
Cog and Kismet still operate with a set of formal rules, all of which must be analyzed and
utilized for each action, the goal of possessing a set of seamless embodied motor skills
has not yet been achieved. Indeed, neither of these robots can pick up an egg, let alone
engage in a game of table tennis, activities that humans perform in real time quicker than
any robot could ever hope to, according to Dreyfus, because of the implausibility that it
could ever run through all the rule sets quickly enough.
13

http://www.ai.mit.edu/projects/humanoid-robotics-group/kismet/kismet.html
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Figure 1.4: Kismet

Figure 1.5: Leonardo. Pictured here, Leonardo is learning via behavioral feedback –
including facial expressions and tonal differences in the voice of his teacher – how to turn
on one button versus ―all the buttons at once.‖
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A simple rejoinder to Dreyfus‘ argument is to say that speed of processing is not
sufficient to count or discount a system as cognitive. Just because it takes person A five
minutes to complete a logic proof but it takes person B twenty minutes to complete that
same proof, we do not conclude that the former is a thinking human while the latter is
not. Moreover, these sorts of tasks – logic, mathematics, abstract reasoning –
interestingly enough, are what most artificially intelligent systems are capable of, more
so than most humans it turns out. However, the so-called ‗easy‘ component of cognition
that allows for the continual updating and integrating of the sensory modalities in
response to input is what has not been properly duplicated, at least not in terms of timing.
We can see, given the relatively brief history of the AI project, it appears more
reasonable to conclude that the progress towards replicating the motor skills and
embodied abilities of humans, regardless of timing, is making serious strides. Consider,
for example, Boston Dynamic‘s Big Dog14 robot, which is currently being tested as a
prototype for the U.S. Army ground forces. The ‗dog‘ (pictured below) is able to traverse
any terrain a human (or dog for that matter) can; it can react to changes, can overcome
obstacles, and can even respond to challenges not immediately present to its onboard
‗visual‘ system. For example, in the video provided online, we can see it navigate over
slippery ice as well as recover from being kicked by a human opponent who has snuck up
from behind.

14

http://www.bostondynamics.com/robot_bigdog.html
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Figure 1.6: Boston Dynamics ―Big Dog.‖ Show here in four different test modes –
walking uphill in snow, slipping and recovering balance on an icy surface, climbing an
unstable incline, and jumping over and obstacle.

All of this is not of course to suggest that Big Dog, or Kismet or Cog for that
matter, have fully replicated human cognition in all its complexity. Big Dog, for instance,
is specifically designed to help carry ammunition and supplies over rugged terrain and as
such, is not endowed with the full array of higher cognitive tasks found in a chatbot such
as A.L.I.C.E. Moreover, it is not my intention to settle the debate once and for all
between Dreyfus and proponents of AI; I think settling this dispute involves an empirical
question that can only be answered in due course. Nevertheless, I have highlighted these
extremely unique examples in AI in contrast with Dreyfus‘ skepticism for two reasons:
first, to show how our understanding of our own ‗situatedness‘ has revolutionized the
study and creation of artificially intelligent systems, but also, to suggest that these
changes that have taken place in AI have equally contributed to the phenomenology of
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embodied experience. The more seriously the ‗horizon‘ of experience is taken, the more
the environment itself begins to take less of a backseat. Indeed, the final iteration of the
situated theories of cognition – extended cognition – puts the environment in center stage.
So much of the recent work in AI has influenced philosophers and cognitive scientists,
but also performance artists such as Stelarc, whose robotic arm and implanted ear
challenge the idea that the utilization and near seamless integration of tool and tool user
cannot be replicated. It is to these theories of cognition which find themselves in the
middle of this awakening in AI that I now turn, as I will be at pains to argue throughout
this project that it is not just that we see ourselves more and more reflected in our
machines, but that we see ourselves more and more as a reflection of those same
machines.
Despite optimism concerning the progress of AI thus far, it remains to be seen
whether a robot possesses all that a human does in terms of embodied cognitive abilities.
In short, my robot friend is inferior to my human friend when it comes to being able to
hike along a mountain path, cross streams, dodge tree branches, and duck under rock
outcroppings, all while taking in the breathtaking views and engaging in a hearty debate
about Spinoza‘s theory of Substance. The special trick of human cognition, therefore, that
roboticists have not fully captured in artificial systems is the ability to absorb external
information, filter it for relevancy, and operate upon such representations of the world in
meaningful ways, without having to explicitly, at the same time, represent the rules for
doing all of these things. The same puzzlement vexes philosophers when they confront
the question of just how the physical brain can represent the very external things that are
supposed to be causally efficacious in bringing about experience in the first place. In
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other words, that the body and mind are open systems is not denied; we take in food,
light, minerals, perceive and learn from the environment. We allow the external world to
penetrate our minds, but for the most part in the history and theories of philosophy of
mind and cognitive science, it has never worked the other way around; our minds do not
penetrate the world because our minds remain stuck in our heads. To be sure, the brain is
active, insofar as it is constantly in motion, sending signals to this or that bodily system,
even working while we sleep to create fanciful dreams or file away the day‘s experiences.
Nevertheless, these processes take place solely behind closed curtains, within or inside
the confines of our skulls, and hence, a dual-world of process arises from this picture. In
other words, the received view has been that mental representations of the world go on in
the brain and thus, internally, while the processes or objects that these mental processes
represent take place in the external world.
The trouble with this view of representation as taking place in a head is that it
treats the brain ultimately as a passive receptor of information and effectively ignores its
active contribution to the world beyond its skin and skull boundary. This is problematic
because it is difficult to explain how a closed neural system such as the brain can actually
‗picture‘ the external world. The ‗magic‘ of representation begins to lose its mystical
nature however, when we take the mind itself as a dynamic and open perceptual system
and allow it to reach beyond its biological brain-barrier to actively create and change the
world it inhabits. Gibson (1977, 1979) spoke of ecological ―affordances‖ in just this way.
Perception of the world involves, he argues, potentials for action. We see not simply a
world of inert objects, but rather, action-ready situations and hence, our minds actually
constitute the world in terms of what is action-ready and what is not. His theory has
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helped usher in a new wave of cognitive studies, which involve understanding cognitive
processes as embedded (Haugeland, 1998), enacted (cf. Noё 2004, 2009; Hutto, 2005;
Menary, 2006b), and even extended (cf. Clark and Chalmers, 1998; Clark, 1998, 2003,
2008; Rowlands, 2003) in the world.
1.5 Conclusion: On the Path to Extended Minds
In order to explain how representation is demystified by adopting these views of
mind which emphasize its embodied, embedded, enacted, and extended character, it is
helpful to look at the ways representation is de-located under these accounts.
Furthermore, if each of these four characteristics of cognition, which result from the
Gibsonian and Putnamian traditions are placed on a continuum ranging from minor to
radical de-location of representation, then it becomes easy to see the gradual
relinquishing of the ‗hard problem‘ pertaining to dual phenomena in a physicalist world.
In its stead are left the problems of explaining action, situatedness, and coupling – much
less ‗magical,‘ indeed. In fact, as we progress along the continuum, the very existence of
representations themselves will be called into question, or at least will need to be
drastically reconfigured if we are to keep with what I consider to be a more sensible view
of consciousness, namely, that it ‗ain‘t all happening in the head.‘
The location of cognitive processes is fairly clear, or at least can be more easily
posited, as being somewhere in the body if boundaries are set at the skin and skull. In
other words, embodied cognition (cf. Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, 1991; Thelen &
Smith, 1994; Thelen, 2004; 2001) is a theory that could support a minimal mind-brain
identity, or at least a mind-body identity; namely, the mind is embodied in the physical
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workings of the brain. If the brain barrier seems too strict, then the mind can be expanded
to encompass other bodily processes, but nevertheless, ‗the mind‘ is still comfortably
‗situated‘ in a biological ‗body‘ incased by skin. Haugeland (1998) asserts that
―everyone agrees that the mind is embodied‖ (211), and hence, to understand why the
same people who claim to be defending a version of embodied cognition nonetheless
argue as to whether or not this means the mind functionally decomposes to biological
systems, it is necessary to examine precisely what embodiment entails. For Fred Adams
or Ken Aizawa (cf. 2001; 2008; 2010), having a body means having a precisely defined
boundary between ‗the cognitive‘ and the world of non-cognitive objects. More
specifically, having a brain is necessary for cognition and hence, ―the mark of the
cognitive‖ is not exemplified by computers or animals with brains too dissimilar from
human brains. For Haugeland, however, since embodiment is essential to cognition, and
embodiment is not just about the biological brain, and not even just about the biological
body, it cannot be reduced to either of these constituents.
An embodied account of cognition need not locate the mind entirely within the
brain and as we move along the continuum of locality, a more embedded mind emerges.
Namely, while Haugeland is certain that bodily situatedness is necessary for conscious
experience, he also thinks that ‗the body‘ as a clearly defined system that subsequently
marks off one mind from another is misguided. While Haugeland assents to the idea of
‗bodies‘ – i.e. physical systems that persist in the world and do indeed shape our
conscious experience – he nonetheless thinks that this taken-for-granted assumption often
―misleadingly enhances the apparent significance of bodily surfaces as relevant interfaces
for the understanding of other phenomena, such as intelligence‖ (214). What he means by
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this is that cognitive processes are not necessarily reducible to those processes readily
differentiated by biological function, surface discontinuity, or spatiality.
A mind ―embodied and embedded,‖15 is one that is intimately tied to the
environment in which it is situated. Rather than assume that the ―low-bandwidth‖
interfaces of the perceptual organs like the eyes and ears are where the world can sneak
into the mind, Haugeland argues that representational beings such as humans are in a
―high-bandwidth,‖ interactive and intimate relationship with the world. Thus, the mind,
brain, body, and world are not necessarily distinct components that interpenetrate one
another along narrowly defined interfaces; rather, in coming to represent something, or to
have an experience more generally, there is a ―slicing‖ across of these layers. This
multidimensional, non-reducible, and integrative characterization of representation decenters the brain and places much more significance on the embedded element of
cognition.
For Haugeland, representations might better be termed ―presentations,‖ as
Dreyfus (1972; 1992) and Manzotti (2003), for instance, have suggested. Rather than the
internal copies of perceived objects, there is simply the manner in which the object is
given coupled with the perceiver who intends16 it in this or that manner. While the
intracranialist would have it that a representation is the result of internal symbol
manipulations and transduction between and among sub-systems in the brain, Haugeland
sees the ability to represent the world as the result of collaborative efforts among these
various levels of interaction. The very word he uses to describe cognition, interactive,
15

The title of chapter 9 in Haugeland (1998).
‗Intend‘ here, of course, referring to taking an intentional stance towards an object and could thus be as
simple as seeing the chair as a chair, e.g.
16
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points to another departure from the rigid localization of mind in a physical body, by
calling into question the passivity of the mechanism (whatever it is supposed to be on the
internalist‘s account) responsible for receiving inputs. Instead of setting up yet another
dichotomy between perception and action, the former of which merely sits there and
inceives sensory data, it is better, Haugeland argues, to view perception and action as a
unit, a commingled occurrence happening in real time.17 Since it is reasonable to suppose
that perception is a large part of representational ability, then a more enacted story about
perception means a more ‗active‘ story about representations. In fact, given our
discussion so far, as one moves along the enactive continuum, the story tends to become
more and more anti-representationalist. Indeed, as Manzotti‘s insight suggests, perception
results in presentations – active constitutions of our world – but never do we genuinely re
– present. What we typically think of as representations are therefore simply new
presentations.
Indeed, the enacted account of perception that Haugeland alludes to is taken up by
many (cf. Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991; Noё, 2004; Noё & O‘Regan, 2001), and as
I see it, is yet another small move along the line of gradual de-localization of
consciousness. Arguing that perception amounts to ‗knowing how to act,‘ Noё (2004)
clearly takes up the Gibsonian tradition of the environmental ‗affordances‘ playing a key
role in our abilities to represent the world. Representations just are, on this view, actionpotentials, gleaned from a dynamic web of collaboration among the mind, body, and
world. It is not simply that the outer environment is actively penetrating our sensory
inputs whenever we have a perception, but ‗we‘ are just as active in contributing to the
17

1998, 221.
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meaning-making that constitutes rendering the objects of perception as action-ready in
the first place. It is much less clear where to draw the line therefore, between ‗us‘ and the
world, when the very constituting element of our cognition, interaction, results from a
commingled, active, and intimately collaborative slice of many levels, such that teasing
them apart, studying each one in isolation, or speaking of one causing the other in a
necessarily linear fashion is not as straightforwardly plausible as the intracranialist would
like us to believe.
We find a view similar and yet more radical than Haugeland‘s (1998) embedded
mind and Putnam‘s (1975) externalized meaning in the thesis of active externalism (cf.
Clark and Chalmers, 1998). Not only do the environment and the tools we use aid in
cognition, but in the type of high-bandwidth enacted coupling that occurs when a person
uses an ‗artificial‘ memory device such as a PDA for example, that tool is said to actually
participate in the cognitive process. The classic example of active externalism comes
from Clark and Chalmers (1998), who argue that not just meaning, but beliefs extend out
into the world. Not able to recall important information due to Alzheimer‘s, Otto must
consult his notebook, which contains every memory he has stored for the past several
years, including directions to the museum at which he is scheduled to meet his friend,
Inga. The simple moral of the story is that when asked to draw a distinction between
Otto‘s remembering where the museum is located, and Inga‘s remembering, no
principled difference can be given. To be sure, Inga‘s brain alone retrieves the
information, while Otto uses an external notebook, but in the larger context of what sort
of action is being performed – namely, desire to get to the museum, belief that it is on
53rd Street, and acting in ways that will fulfill this desire – these are functionally
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indistinguishable. Furthermore, all of the standard objections one might raise about
Otto‘s fallibility, the notebook‘s possibly being lost, etc, are easily remedied by
reminding the reader that these same dysfunction potentials are equally applicable to the
internal brain and hence, it is unfair to leave Otto‘s notebook out of the description of
Otto‘s cognitive processes. Therefore the mind, as Clark and Chalmers claim, ―ain‘t
entirely in the head.‖
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Chapter 2
A Decade of Dissent: Defending and Re-Defending The Extended Mind
The idea of environment is a necessity to the idea of organism, and with the conception of
environment comes the impossibility of considering psychical life as an individual,
isolated thingdeveloping in a vacuum. – John Dewey, The New Psychology

2.1 Introduction
As the first chapter has shown, the failure to properly account for the
‗situatedness‘ of cognition has resulted not only in unrealistic models of the mind and
inadequate AI engineering. It has also led to a schism between those who do take the
embodied, embedded, and enacted aspects of cognition seriously – thereby choosing to
‗extend‘ mentality out into the world – and those who claim that these elements are
indeed important but can nonetheless be explained via a framework of intracranialism. In
other words, given the undeniable claim that the environment and one‘s bodily
comportment play a role in cognition, one can either take a radical position concerning
the degree to which these non-brain factors actually constitute cognition, or, one can
maintain a conservative view, allowing that embodiment and situation contribute to the
overall cognitive experience, but are not proper parts of it. There are intermediate
positions to be sure, but in this chapter, I want to to follow the debate, as it has raged on
now for a little over a decade, between the so-called EXTENDED (cf. Clark, 2008)
proponents and the intracranialists (cf. Adams and Aizawa, 2008). In so doing, I intend to
provide support for the externalist side, but I will also highlight some inconsistencies and
oversights with this position. The aim is to develop an even more radical view, one that
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sticks more closely to the original 1998 thesis, as I think this argument remains the best
we have so far in explaining cognition.
In a recent critique of the Extended Mind (EM) hypothesis, Adams and Aizawa
(2010) accuse Clark and Chalmers (1998) of committing ―coupling-constitution fallacy.‖
That a notebook or any other object or process might be coupled to a cognitive agent and
thereby aid in her cognitive processing, they claim, has been conflated with the idea that
such coupling implies that the object or process is actually a constitutive part of the
agent‘s cognition. To illustrate the point, they cite this example:
Question: Why did the pencil think that 2 + 2 = 4
Clark‘s Answer: Because it was coupled to the mathematician. [Adams &
Aizawa, 2010; 67].
This misunderstanding, Adams and Aizawa argue, highlights what is wrong with pretty
much all accounts of extended or distributed cognition (cf. Haugeland, 1998; Clark,
2001; 2005), as such arguments mistakenly attribute cognition to objects or processes
simply by virtue of their being tools used by a cognitive agent. What makes a process
cognitive, they assert, is not what sorts of external objects are employed, but rather,
cognition is marked by what is going on ‗in the head‘ of the agent.
Adams and Aizawa go on to clarify that ―the mark of the cognitive‖ or ―what
makes something a cognitive agent‖ must be understood in terms of specific underlying
causal processes and the type of content produced by them. They argue that ―cognition is
constituted by certain sorts of causal process that involve non-derived content‖ (69). As
Clark (2008) notes, there are two elements to this argument; on the one hand, the claim
about content says that in order for a process to count as cognitive, the representations,
concepts or information employed must be non-derived, non-extrinsic, and internal to the
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system doing the processing. On the other hand, the claim about causality says that only
specific kinds of processes are sufficient for bringing about such non-derived content.
I will examine this particular criticism of the hypothesis of Extended Cognition
(HEC) as well as the responses Clark (2008; 2010) and others have offered to counter it.
Rather than proceed simply by way of recasting the debate and further buttressing the
externalist arguments, I will instead reconstruct Adams and Aizawa‘s objection in such a
way that the accusatory finger they have pointed might be better turned back on their own
argument concerning ―the mark of the cognitive.‖ Essentially, they have indicted Clark‘s
account of extended cognition on two charges: first, they claim, extended cognition
unnecessarily imbues discrete parts of coupled systems with cognition. As their critique
suggests, in a system such as a blind man using a cane to navigate his way through town,
extended cognition would have us believe that the cane itself actually ‗knows‘ where to
go, what obstacles to avoid, and so forth. In other words, Adams and Aizawa have set up
the argument such that if extended cognition is true, then this entails implausible and
undesirable consequences. Second, they have charged Clark with overlooking the special
sorts of processes that subtend cognition, namely, that it involves trading in non-derived
content and that this ability is caused by nomological regularities which happen to be, as
far as we can tell, specific to human neurobiology. This second accusation can also be
reformulated as a denial of an undesirable consequent; if extended cognition is true, then
the ‗received view‘ of what cognition is and where it is found will need to be revised.
In this chapter, I intend to show that neither of the two conditionals regarding
HEC hold. For the first, the idea that HEC implies that cognition can quite literally be
found in any object, so long as it is coupled to a human is based on a misunderstanding of
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what distributed accounts of cognition are supposed to offer. In the end, I will suggest
changing the metaphors slightly, such that the often misleading label, ‗extended‘ might
better be understood as ‗distributed‘ or ‗networked.‘ But more importantly, Adams and
Aizawa fail to recognize the reductio behind their own accusation. As Clark (2008)
notes, if we ask of a V4 neuron, how does it know that the museum is on 53rd street, and
answer, because it is coupled to the human agent, the absurdity of the original objection
is glaring. ―Talk of an object‘s being or failing to be ‗cognitive‘ seems almost
unintelligible when applied to some putative part or aspect of a cognitive agent or
system‖ (87). If what you are calling a cognitive process is for example, a person
engaged in a recall task, then the whole person is the cognitive system, not each of his or
her arms, legs, or neurons. And even if it turns out that only human brains can realize
genuinely cognitive states, this in no way implies that a brain cannot be or is not already a
coupled system. As we shall see, many genuinely cognitive systems, which include at
their core, a human brain, remain largely coupled either to brain implant technology, or to
external tools, all of which can arguably be said to constitute this or that particular
cognitive process.
The second conditional is a bit trickier to dismantle, as it involves arguing that the
received view of human cognition is flawed. Nevertheless, it is my contention that a
large part of the internalist-externalist debate is not just about where cognition is to be
found, but is also about what sorts of processes we want to call cognitive. Examining
Clark‘s responses to the content and cause components of Adams and Aizawa‘s
objections will highlight the ways in trading in non-derived content is neither necessary
nor sufficient for a system to be marked as cognitive. Second, in order to address the
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worry that coupled systems will fail to allow for a genuine ‗science‘ of mind due to the
improbability of locating the specific causes underlying cognition given an externalist
picture, I will look further at the ways in which Rupert (2004) pushes against the HEC,
but will argue that the objection from ―cognitive bloat‖ does not rule out the idea that a
cognitive system can be caused by the coupling of human organisms and artifacts. It will
not be sufficient however to simply re-defend extended cognition (HEC) via Clark‘s
latest concession of Organism-Centered Cognition (HOC). Although his response
provides a way to stave off some of the worries raised by Rupert and Weiskopf, it is also
an overhasty retreat. Thus, in order to disprove this second condition of Adams and
Aizawa‘s I will ultimately return to and defend a claim implicit in the original HEC,
namely, that the received view of what cognition is and where we can expect to find it
might need serious revision.

2.2 Non-Derived Content
In order to expose the problematic nature of ―cognition‖ as defined by Adams and
Aizawa, Clark examines each component of their definition in turn. The first necessary
characteristic of cognitive processes, according to Adams and Aizawa, is their being
comprised of non-derived content. Paradigm cases of items bearing non-derived content
are they say, ―thoughts, experiences, and perceptions,‖ while items that bear derived
content would be things like ―traffic lights, gas gauges, and flags‖ (2005; 662). As an
immediate response, one might demand that Adams and Aizawa provide a way out of
such viciously circular stipulations. Indeed, if the question at hand is what makes
something count as thinking, and you answer, if it bears non-derived content, to which I
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reasonably ask, what then, is non-derived content, and you reply, thinking, then I will
hardly have learned anything interesting about ‗the mark of the cognitive‘ other than that
it is, well, cognitive.
The explanation Adams and Aizawa provide regarding how and why non-derived
content actually constitutes thought spans a large amount of text (1992; 2001; 2005;
2008; 2010; Dennett, 1990) and a full discussion of the debate concerning it is too timeconsuming and not entirely relevant for our purposes here. The way they defend nonderived content can be summarized as thus: mental content arises from very different
sorts of processes than non-mental content; in other words, mental content is said to be
non-derived just insofar as it is intrinsic to a cognitive agent and are therefore not
dependent or at least are only partially dependent on external objects or processes. To
further illustrate, they cite an example from Clark (2005) in which he seeks to defend the
idea that derived content can genuinely be said to characterize cognitive processing in a
case such as thinking about set theory by way of representing Euler circles to oneself.
Clark argues that the meaning of the Euler circles, even in our heads must still be derived
from social convention, but nevertheless, the circles feature as part of our thought
process. Adams and Aizawa respond first by charging Clark with overlooking a crucial
difference:
Intersecting Euler circles on paper getting their meaning is one thing; intersecting
Euler circles in mental images getting their meaning is another. Clark apparently
overlooks this difference, hence does not bother to provide a reason to think that
Euler circles in mental images get their meaning via social convention [2010; 72].
So, according to Adams and Aizawa, there is a principled difference in the way mental
items become meaningful and the way external objects do. Nevertheless, they can be
accused of precisely what they charge Clark with; namely, they never provide a
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compelling reason to believe that such a principled distinction exists. What they do go on
to argue is that mental items are constituted by different sorts of processes than nonmental items. To quote them at length:
It is like this. The dependence of meaning of the mental image of intersecting
Euler circles on the social contrivance regarding the intersection of Euler circles is
just like the dependence of the meaning of a mental representation of a car on the
contrivance of a car. Had the car not been invented, there would not have been
mental images of cars. Had the usage of Euler circles not been invented, there
would not have been mental images of Euler circles for set-theoretic purposes.
This sort of historical truth, if it is a truth, does not show what Clark might want it
to show, namely, that the content of certain mental items derives (in the relevant
sense) from a social convention [2010; 74].
Here we see the idea that non-derived content might be partially dependent upon external
objects – without the invention of cars, we would not have the relevant mental images –
but this, they argue, does not entail that the mental image we have of a car is derived
from social convention. Another way to put it: mental content most certainly depends, at
least in a large part, upon our having perceptions of external objects, but in order for it to
be considered derived, mental content must be said to arise solely via socio-linguistic
convention.
However, Clark is not concerned with showing that the actual content is not itself
intrinsic; rather, that the meaning of the intersection of the Euler circles must be
extrinsically derived. In this sense therefore, Clark‘s point is quite simply a harkening
back to classical semantic externalism. The content of a mental state, such as the wetness
of water or its drinkability, can be non-derived, but its meaning, namely, that it is H20, is
a product of linguistic convention and social agreement that the term ‗water‘ in fact picks
out the stuff that is composed of hydrogen and oxygen molecules. We might think of it in
this way as well: clearly, thoughts, perceptions, and the like usually depend on some
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external objects in order to be contentful. Indeed, every thought and every perception are
thoughts and perceptions of something. This is one level or type of mental content, while
meanings are often much more complex and often do derive entirely from social
convention. The idea that one of the Euler circles functions as a representation of a
particular set, whose members are in some way related to other sets of entities
represented by other Euler circles, is all part of the larger social contrivance known as set
theory. While the truths of set theory might indeed be human-independent or perhaps
even Fodorian innate concepts (in which case they would be entirely non-derived), set
theory as a practice, the way we come to know these truths and understand them, is an
external, social practice, from which mental meanings involving set theoretic principles
are entirely derived. In this sense therefore, we can think of the relationships among
pieces of mental content as the sorts of cognitive content that Clark wants to claim can be
derived and hence, something can be extrinsic and still count as genuinely cognitive.
Adams and Aizawa foresee this objection, as they claim:
Insofar as there must be a social convention regarding the intersections of Euler
circles in order to have a mental representation regarding the intersections of
Euler circles, this is not a fact about the constitution of the content of a mental
image of the intersections of Euler circles. [2010; 73].
Again, the idea is not that the images are what Clark is claiming to be derived, but
precisely the ―mental representation regarding the intersections of the Euler circles.
Clearly, information about what those intersections mean, imply, denote, and so forth,
should count as cognitive and yet, even as Adams and Aizawa claim, these
representations are constituted by social convention.
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Adams and Aizawa go on to argue therefore that the original thought experiment
in which Otto consults his notebook in order to remember the location of MOMA (Clark
and Chalmers, 1998) involves nothing more than a coupling in which an external object,
the content of which is derived, aids in Otto‘s ability to get to the museum. Whatever
cognition we want to attribute to Otto must still be going on within his head, most likely
in the form of a standing belief that his notebook is a reliable source of information that
supplements his imperfect memory. The ability to execute actions based on these beliefs
arises solely internal to Otto‘s organism, and more specifically, it is caused by certain
neural patterns of activation which produce their content intrinsically.
In response, Clark (2008) claims that Otto and his notebook is not ipso facto a
story about extrinsic content. Based on Clark and Chalmers‘ (1998) original Parity
Principle, if we can imagine that a process which is otherwise external to a system were
going on inside of it, and then would have no qualms about calling that external-turnedinternal process cognitive, then the divide between internal and external is not in itself
sufficient for marking off cognitive processes from non-cognitive ones. Neither is
location of processing a sufficient marker for derived versus non-derived content. As he
suggests, the words in Otto‘s notebook might in fact require interpretation and
convention to be utilized, but ―that need not rule out the possibility that they have also
come to satisfy the demands on being, in virtue of their role within the larger system,
among the physical vehicles of various forms of intrinsic content‖ (90). In fact, Adams
and Aizawa (2005) endorse this very idea when they provide an exposition of their view
on non-derived content by way of machine intelligence. If, as they suggest, we were to
design a thinking machine modeled on human thought, there must be symbols or
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representations that mean something to the machine solely by virtue of their being
internal to the machine‘s processing. To be sure, the cause of such meanings might be
originally engineered by the machine‘s designers, but that symbols mean something to
the machine, cannot be derived. And yet, Adams and Aizawa concede that it might turn
out that ―the symbols in the machine ‗X,‘ ‗Y,‘ and ‗Z‘ could mean X, Y, and Z in virtue
of satisfying conditions for both derived and non-derived content‖ (665). Thus, within the
larger system of Otto + Notebook, it is conceivable at least that the entailment conditions
for something being both derived and non-derived are indistinguishable.
Even if we must admit that the notebook encodings are entirely derived, the
demand that absolutely no part of a cognitive system can trade in conventional
representations, argues Clark (2008, 2005) is too stringent. Suppose there were Martians,
he suggests (2005), who had an extra-biological mechanism responsible for storing
bitmapped images of blocks of text, such that they could later recall and use the images,
much in the same way Otto utilizes his notebook. Surely, Clark argues, we would grant
that the images stored even prior to retrieval count as part of our Martian friend‘s
cognitive processing, and if we can accept that some skin-and-skull bound processes
trade in extrinsic representations, then it makes no sense to claim that only those
processes involving derived content that occur in the head count as cognitive. Thus, if
other forms of memory are going to count as memory at all, then, as the Parity Principle
holds, it would be overly presumptuous to exclude synonymous cases of memory based
solely on the fact that the confines of the brain have been breached.
Based on the functional similarity of memory retrieval in these various cases,
Clark (2008) concludes that every truly cognitive system need not operate entirely with
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intrinsic representations, nor must every proper part of a cognitive system operate with
such representations. Interestingly, Adams and Aizawa (2008) claim to have never made
such demands in the first place: ―it is unclear to what extent each cognitive state of each
cognitive process must involve non-derived content‖ (2001; 50). In one sense, it could be
said that Clark has misrepresented their position and that their actual argument runs
something like this: for something to count as truly cognitive, it must trade in nonderived representations at least some of the time. But then, if this is the case, what good
does such a specification do if we are trying to define and delimit the mark of the
cognitive? If the answer is simply that some of the system‘s content must be non-derived,
then Otto and his notebook can easily be smuggled back into the picture, as quite clearly,
some of Otto‘s mental content is intrinsic. Furthermore, if this is truly the position Adams
and Aizawa want to maintain, then they are not at odds with Clark‘s original claim that
cognition might be characterized by one or the other or both kinds of representational
processes. At the end of the day, nevertheless, Adams and Aizawa stubbornly resist the
idea that certain sorts of extrinsic content, especially that content which is externally
derived, could ever feature as a proper part of a genuinely cognitive system. In order to
understand why they keep returning to this intracranialism as an explanatory marker for
cognition, we must now turn to the other of their two conditions, namely that genuinely
cognitive processes arise from specific types of causes, none of which could be external
to the system or agent in question.
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2.3 Kinds of Causes
The motivation for claiming that specific causes of cognitive processes are
necessary for determining the ‗mark‘ of cognition in general seems to be twofold. First,
we find in Adams and Aizawa a continuation of the claim that what makes human
thought special is that it involves non-derived content and this kind of content can only
be caused by specific processes. Second, and closely related to Adams and Aizawa‘s
concerns, Rupert (2004) echoes the notion that if cognitive science is to remain a
meaningful enterprise whatsoever, it should proceed like any other unified science, by
attempting to discover causal regularities or nomological features of the human mind. In
fact, we should expect that cognition should be explicable in terms of as few laws as
possible, if we are to believe that there is a ‗science‘ of mind and that this science, like
any other, should strive to be elegant and simple.
I have explained above why it is at least dubious that the mark of the cognitive
will be made solely on the basis of finding systems that trade in non-derived
representations, but even if we accept that this is what truly characterizes cognition,
intracranialism is hardly a quick inference to be made. Adams and Aizawa seem to help
themselves to the assumption that non-derived content must be internally produced,
without explaining precisely what the mechanism is that is responsible for such
production. They are not foolish enough to claim strict mind-brain identity, as Clark
(2008) notes, and yet, it is ―a matter of contingent historical fact‖ that such
representations are manufactured by human brains (Adams and Aizawa, 2001, my
emphasis). Is it really a fact that the brain is the only means of intrinsic content
production? Or is this the very debate we are trying to settle?
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There are several problems with the ‗special kinds of causes‘ argument as it is so
far construed. First, I have only been hypothetically granting Adams and Aizawa the
original claim that cognition is marked by non-derived content, and so, if this turns out
not to be the case, , looking for special kinds of causes solely for non-derived content is
rendered pointless. However, if their argument were to work, it would still not follow that
what goes on inside the head is the only place to look for the cause of non-derived
content. On the one hand, perhaps the entire organism plays an essential causal role in
producing these representations; in fact, one need not stop with the organism itself, but
could conceivably argue that many environmental factors actually cause intrinsic content.
This might seem to countervail the very definition of intrinsic as being entirely generated
from within, but it need not. The very question on the table is what exactly do we mean
by a cognitive system and so, if our answer rests on the notion that it must internally
produce content, then the next step must be to determine what counts as the ‗inside‘ of
the system and what counts as the ‗outside.‘ Indeed, if it turns out that
Otto+notebook=one entire cognitive system, then surely, the notebook can produce nonderived content. Nevertheless, Adams and Aizawa do not find this crucial piece of the
puzzle compelling enough to discuss. They simply assume that the whole of cognition is
captured by a technological virgin human body, and in their more extreme moments, a
naked brain.
But let‘s suppose that we grant them the weaker claim, namely, that cognitive
processes must involve at least some operations whose content is intrinsic. It becomes
immediately clear that this only hurts their case, as we no longer know precisely how
much of the system must trade in these non-derived representations, how often, and to
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what extent. Determining the law-like causal nature of a system we don‘t fully
understand seems a rather arduous task. Besides, if we open the door to allow that some
derived or even socially constructed content might actually constitute certain cognitive
processes, then intracranialism is not only a difficult inference to make, but a foolish one.
Perhaps Otto and his notebook constitute a cognitive system and to be sure, Otto has
some intrinsic content, such as the standing belief that the notebook is trustworthy, that if
he desires to go somewhere, he ought to consult it, etc. But then the occurent belief, that
the museum is at such and such location, which is content that surely features as a proper
part of the cognitive process, is a matter of socially contrived symbols and scribbles in
notebook. So, Adams and Aizawa are faced with the dilemma of either having to stick to
their original guns, thereby begging the entire question concerning the what and where of
cognition, or they retract and then must deal with the consequences of allowing that
cognition is hybridized and often causally dependant on extrinsic content.
Suppose Adams and Aizawa did concede the second horn of this dilemma and
accepted that at least some of the time, cognition is constituted by more than mere neural
activity and can include coupled systems such as Otto and his notebook. The worry
remains for them and for Rupert (2004) however, that there would be no end to the odd
couplings we might consider to be cognitive and hence the laws governing such systems
will grow increasingly complex and unwieldy. In the name of parsimony therefore, we
should assume that cognition is bound to the human organism, or maintain a hypothesis
of Human Embedded Cognition (HEMC). While coupled systems might in fact facilitate
cognitive processes, the actual cognitive process itself remains embedded within the
organism, such that cognitive science remains holistic and intact, its subject matter
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simply being the human brain or perhaps the entire human organism.
While it should be granted that a science of mind should have a unified set of
processes it studies, this demand in no way proves that the causes subtending such
processes are entirely within the organism. For one thing, by insisting that we look for
specific kinds of causes for cognitive processes, Rupert tacitly sneaks in the notion that
the effects, the cognitive processes themselves, have been comprehensively catalogued
and comprise a unified set. To be sure, we have some very coarse-grained mental types—
MEMORY, BELIEF, HUNGER, etc., but these cognitive kinds 1) are not the only types
of cognitive processes that make up ‗cognition‘ generally, and 2) many of them were not
at all discovered by examining brains or even entire organisms for that matter. Surely,
memory, belief and hunger were psychological phenomena long before we had any idea
that the brain even played a role whatsoever in any of these events. Take depression, for
example. While we can identify dopamine levels as indicative of emotional states, this is
at once only a recent discovery and furthermore, as any critical philosopher of science
will attest, brain chemistry is at best strongly correlated with more complex
psychological states. So how did we go about determining that persons can be in a
cognitive state of sadness over long periods of time before we had neuroscience? It seems
that observable behavior – lack of eating, sleeping, loss of interest, and quite simply,
verbal reporting – is a large part of how we come to understand that there is a type of
mental state called depression. To be sure, behavior is belongs to an organism, but often,
it is generated by organism-environment interactions, which extend well beyond the
scope of processes internal to our brains or bodies. If we are using such broad descriptors
to define the suitable types of processes to be studied by cognitive science, then, as Clark
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(2008) asks, what principled reason do we have for rejecting the idea that the ‗science of
mind‘ will eventually concern itself with a ―motley crew of mechanisms‖? The flaw of
the argument for scientific kinds, he claims, resides in ―its assessment of the potential for
some form of higher level unification despite mechanistic differences‖ (96). So, on the
one hand, our coarse-grained psychological types are hardly unified or agreed upon in the
first place and thus, it is a bit hasty to go looking for their causes, meanwhile delimiting
those causes to the skin and skull barrier; on the other hand, even if we do have a
common sense understanding of what sorts of processes are to count as types of
cognition, such understanding is so often on the human + her tools, the human + her
environment, or the human + her culture, and not the isolated and encapsulated brain.
Another worry that is implicit in Clark‘s responses, but one he perhaps does not
spend enough time discussing, is that by insisting that 1) cognitive science should study
only natural kinds, we must also accept the corollary argument which is 2) that only
natural kinds can have causal regularities. This further suggests 3) an assumption that we
have some principled way to distinguish between natural and non-natural types of
processes. In turn, this often leads one to suppose that 4) ‗the mind‘ will eventually be
shown to be a natural kind. Regarding 1), this is an assumption made by nearly all natural
science, hence the term natural modifying science, and yet, why should we believe that
cognitive science is necessarily a natural science? As Gallagher and Zahavi (2008) define
it, cognitive science is already an assortment of other sciences: neuroscience, psychology,
linguistics, and even philosophy, the last of which could hardly be said to only study
naturally occurring kinds of processes. If cognitive science is itself not entirely concerned
with natural kinds, then perhaps part of its reaches go beyond law-like regularities. Even

69

if the case were made successfully that cognitive science, like any other science, must
proceed by discovering causal regularities, nowhere in any of this reasoning is the further
entailment that what we might call a non-natural process could not have law-like
regularity of which we could easily discover and record. A paradigm case of a nonnatural kind would be computers, as they are prototypical human artifacts. Nevertheless,
such artifacts – technological memory-enhancements, calculating devices, and word
processors – are surely describable in terms of causal regularity, hence we have
‗computer science.‘ What we are interested in describing in computer science is
computation, and is generally not whether that computation takes place in a Mac or a PC.
In other words, the causal regularities studied in science are often functional roles and
have little to do with the realizers of those processes.
So, on the one hand, we might think that the distinction between natural and nonnatural kinds is of no use insofar as both natural and non-natural kinds of stuff can still
realize the same processes of which we are interested in studying in natural science. The
very simple point Kim (1992) makes concerning the non-naturalness of Jade applies here.
Jade can be said to be a composite, itself not being a natural kind, but instead composed
of two naturally occurring kinds of minerals, jadeite and nephrite. Nevertheless, we treat
jade as one jewel, much like we treat a cake as one object, and one ‗natural‘ object at
that. To be sure, cakes are composed of other ingredients, but we don‘t typically say that
a cake is unnatural simply because it is made of flour, milk, eggs, and so forth.
Furthermore, cakes have specific causal regularities governing them. They burn if baked
at too high of a temperature, they grow mold if left out for too long, and they have certain
saturation thresholds. Thus, what we typically assume to be naturally occurring ‗wholes,‘
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including the human organism or the brain for that matter, arguably decompose into
parts, some of which are not entirely biological themselves. A brain has no meaning or
function if not to control a body and hence, many people now speak of the brain and the
central nervous system as one thing. Likewise, we typically mark off bodies by virtue of
referring to the skin barrier that seems to provide a boundary from environmental
outsiders, and yet, the body remains constantly penetrated by these external factors,
especially in the case of technologically enhanced bodies transformed by prostheses and
implants. Nevertheless, we would like to think that ‗humans‘ represent one kind of
specie, regardless of their penetrative and alterative qualities. Hence, the lesson to be
learned from these ‗cyborgs‘ as Clark (2003) calls us, is that the biological matter of
which we are composed is not what makes us natural kinds. If we are natural kinds at all,
it is only by our being consistently ‗non-natural‘ – plugged in, wired up, and
technologically modified – that we achieve our status as human kinds. Hence, Clark‘s
peculiar verbiage, ―natural-born cyborgs.‖
Another point to consider regarding natural kinds and causality is that even if we
were forced to admit that causal regularities are the means by which we discover natural
kinds, it does not follow that cognition is itself a natural kind. Indeed, as the previous
discussion indicates, we have plenty of reasons for thinking that cognitive processes are
caused by a whole array of phenomena, from biological to technological and hence, lawlike regularity regarding such a diverse set of causes seems dubious at best. As Levy
(2007) suggests, ―if it is true that causal regularities pick out natural kinds, then the mind
is not a natural kind. It is a compound entity comprised of at least two (and probably
many) natural kinds‖ (51).
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We can summarize the implications of the discussion above as follows: Science
deals in kinds. If it only deals in natural kinds then if cognition is a natural kind, we
should expect causal regularities governing it that we can pick out and study. It is
possible that these nomic structures exist even if cognition does not occur entirely within
the organism. Hence, the claim that EC violates the ‗natural kinds‘ principle of science
fails. On the other hand, if science simply deals in ‗kinds‘ then if cognition turns out to be
a non-natural kind, it still can be the subject of cognitive science. In other words,
something can have law-like regularity and still not be considered natural, such as an
extended mind. The larger point here seems to me to be that it is arbitrary whether we call
something natural or non-natural in science. What matters is whether sufficient law-like
regularity is present so as to study the entity or process in question. Extended cognition,
be it natural or not, passes this litmus test, despite Rupert‘s protests.
So much for relying on natural kinds of causal processes as a means for marking
off cognitive from non-cognitive phenomena; nevertheless, a worry remains, namely that
without causal regularities we cannot identify with any regularity, the cognitive agent,
which is of course, the real subject of cog sci. To be sure, there is a sense in which
accepting HEC entails some difficulty in setting boundaries on what the phrase ‗cognitive
agent‘ denotes. Is this a worry specific to HEC however? It would hardly seem so and
here is why. The problem as I see it, according to Rupert, Adams and Aizawa, et al, is
that without the ability to reference regularly occurring causal kinds, there will be no way
to effectively decide what is the proper subject of cognitive science and what is not.
Traditionally, they claim, the human mind, or more broadly, the human, is the what
cognitive science studies and if we begin extending what it means to have a mind or to be
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a cognitive agent too far, we will thereby relinquish the entire science that concerns itself
with otherwise regularly occurring natural phenomena. While I concede that humans are
regularly occurring phenomena, this by no means suggests that limiting the study of their
cognition to what goes on inside their heads will magically make clear what it means to
be cognitive agent. If Rupert is so worried about the loss of unified personhood in the
wake of HEC, he might do well to consider that this problem is not specific to HEC.
Indeed, as far back at least as Hume we are forced to realize that defining a person is
treacherous business, and this lineage continues with Parfit (1971), Perry (1975) and
others, who remind us that even referring to a body as the bounds of personhood will
never be a sufficient criterion for marking of one agent from another, nor will memories,
personality traits, or phenomenological descriptions. Thus, pointing the finger at HEC
and charging it with dissipating the subject of cognitive science merely distracts one from
recognizing the same inherent difficulty of HEMC or any other theory in which ‗the
cognitive agent‘ is the central focus of discussion.
It would seem therefore that Rupert (2004) conflates two worries that he thinks
are endemic to HEC: 1) the dissipation of the cognitive agent and thus, the subject matter
of cognitive science and 2) the over-saturation of the mental into an otherwise endless
purview of coupled systems, or what he terms ―cognitive bloat.‖ As to 1), this problem is
better left to another project altogether. As we have seen, the issue arises with or without
extended cognition and furthermore, it is a separate concern that we need to define and
delimit cognitive agents as opposed to cognitive processes. Regarding 2), this appears to
be the chief concern underpinning all criticism levied against HEC. Thus, Clark (2007,
2008, in press) has recently presented a more modest view, Organism-Centered
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Cognition (HOC), in an effort to assuage some of the paranoia which accompanies
envisaging a world bloated by cognition.

2.4 HOC: Moderate Resolution or Hasty Retreat?
The only real danger of HEC, Clark (2008) argues, ―is that it may blind us to the
genuine extent to which human cognition, though not organism bound, remains
importantly organism centered‖ (138-9). The hypothesis is that at times, cognitive
processes might in fact reach beyond the skin and skull barrier of the human organism;
nevertheless, the organism and in particular the brain/central nervous system, remain the
core constituents of human cognition. Thus, Organism-Centered Cognition (HOC)
represents somewhat of a withdrawal from the original thesis of HEC, as it places the
human organism in the role of a ―senior partner‖ in constituting cognition. Although
Clark (2008) still thinks HEC can be maintained and hence, HOC is merely a
modification of it, in some sense, HOC places constraints, sets boundaries as it were, on
an otherwise unruly HEC. The worry expressed by Adams and Aizawa‘s (2010)
mathematician+pencil coupling, for example, seems to center on HEC as providing no
such bounds and hence allowing more for an ―equal partner‖ thesis,18 such that the
human and the pencil both share to the same extent in the cognitive process. Clark‘s
reformulation ameliorates this concern by reminding us that the brain, although not the
only component involved in cognitive processes, remains the chief executor of them.
Has the worry entirely subsided? The HOC still suffers from the inability to
specifically mark cognitive processes from non-cognitive ones, insofar as the only claim

18

The senior partner/equal partner description is borrowed from Dan Hutto, personal communication.
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being made is that the human organism is a necessary component of cognition. Surely,
having a human body or brain will not suffice for cognition all by itself. Furthermore,
EXTENDED, as Clark (2008) now calls it, still governs the overall picture we should
have of minds; namely, that while organism-centered, mental processes are not always
bound to the organism. Thus, the question remains, just how far do they reach? Is it
possible, as Clark and Chalmers (1998) suggest that a belief about what time a meeting is
to be held can be constituted by a coupled system involving two organisms, one of whom
is an absent-minded business person, the other being her secretary? Clark‘s (2008) appeal
to what Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson (2007) term ‗common-sense functionalism,‘ or the
idea that a functional description of cognitive processes should allow some degree of
multiple realizability, even across various physical substrates, does little work here.
Common-sense functionalism would seem not to extend so far as to include couplings
such as literally coupled people; if I cannot ever seem to remember where the theater is,
but my spouse can and, upon driving to a show, I depend on his memory to get me there,
it hardly seems like something the everyday functionalist would endorse as a singular
cognitive process. Moreover, it would be difficult to determine whose mind is extending
in such a scenario. We might appeal to a senior partner thesis once again, such that
whoever is actually driving the cognitive process along most robustly would around
whom we would say cognition is centered. Indeed, if I have a faulty memory and my
spouse is responsible for remembering how to get to the theater, in some sense, ‗I‘ don‘t
play an extremely important role in achieving this part of the equation. However, it would
not quite be right to say of my spouse and me, if we both arrive at the theater on time,
that only one of us was thinking. Based on HOC, of course, we both have brains and
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under normal circumstances, would be considered separate and distinct organisms.
Hence, if cognition is organism-centered, then the coupling of two organisms seems to
muddy the waters.
On the other hand, if what is meant by ‗organism‘ is itself not entirely based on
biology, but instead admits to degrees of flesh-machine or even person-person couplings,
then perhaps the common sense functionalist need not be concerned. However, Rupert‘s
(2004) worry about the HEC, namely that it suffers from cognitive bloat, wherein the
whole world is potentially imbued with cognition, is only that much more exacerbated by
this revised version of ‗organism.‘ If we begin counting two persons as one organism, a
corollary organism bloat – counting any and all organism-like configurations as
organisms, seems to follow. Even Clark (2003) recognizes in great detail how much of
embodiment is infiltrated by technology as well as by the ‗ultimate artifact‘ – language,
and hence, so much of the world actually gets incorporated into our bodies and likewise,
our bodies are constantly being pushed beyond their usual biological barriers. To be sure,
the biological body, by definition can only include what has already been deemed
biological kinds of processes but the human body with its plastic hearts, its cochlear
implants, and its prostheses, is hardly limited to strictly biological parts.
A further complication arises when we consider the possibility of disembodiment
that is often afforded at the intersection of bodily subjectivity and technological
enhancements, such as those found in virtual worlds. For example, consider Microsoft‘s
new gaming console, Natal, in which the controlling device is neither a joystick nor a
remote motion mechanism (such as that used in Nintendo‘s Wii) but is instead the
player‘s body itself. Mounted cameras and motion detectors capture the player‘s bodily
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frame and kinesthetic movement in order to produce a real-time avatar on the screen, one
which the player then controls with her body. If one were playing a wakeboarding game,
the player‘s body would therefore go through most of the range of motion that would
accompany being towed behind a live boat and maneuvering through real water. In a
scenario like this, while the organism is indeed an integral part of the overall gameplay,
where the player experiences herself is arguably not anywhere near that biological mass
of cells, but rather, ‗she‘ is on the screen, participating in a highly intense sporting
activity and can arguably be said to have left her body in some capacity. This is not to say
that a person playing Natal is experiencing anything like a genuine Out-of-Body
Experience (cf. Blanke & Metzinger, 2009), as the body remains integral to the gameplay
and is never taken as a separate object to behold in the way patients who have suffered
from OBEs often claim to have been floating above their bodies looking down upon
them. Nevertheless, there is a sense in which a person participating in a highly realistic
virtual world has displaced his or her self from the center, such that organismcenteredness does not hold up so well. While the brain may still play a role in driving the
processes behind the control of the body, the feedback from the game itself must also
play an important if not essential role. Not only this, but when asking where the action is
happening in this situation, one need only observe a crowd of video-gamers, in particular
an audience of them, to see that no one cares what is going on with the controllers (even
if those controllers turn out to be embodied subjects) but their eyes are, like the player in
the game, glued to the screen.
What this small digression illustrates is that the worry Rupert has raised about
locating a cognitive subject for the purposes of fruitful cognitive science is a serious
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concern, one that is not ameliorated by claiming that cognition is organism-centered. This
is because what Rupert has touched upon is not simply the task of marking off one
biological body from another. Given current definitions of organisms in biology, this
should be relatively straightforward. Rather, Rupert has charged HEC with the inability
to mark off one human from another. In other words, he has claimed that if we don‘t keep
cognition ‗in the head‘ then we will have no other way of understanding how anything
like subjectivity in general is possible.

2.5 Conclusion: Problematizing Subjectivity is Everybody’s Concern
To a large extent, Rupert is absolutely correct – defining and delimiting cognitive
subjects is difficult. Where he goes wrong however, is in assuming that this task is made
more challenging by assuming that cognitive processes are dynamically distributed over
brains, organisms, and external tools. It would seem, with a quick scan of the entire
history of philosophy that no one has yet to pin down precisely how subjectivity is
experienced, and this has certainly not yet been accomplished by reducing subjecthood to
biological processes. Thus, to point to finger at HEC for its impotence in solving the
mystery of subjectivity is only to accuse any theory, intracranial or otherwise, of the same
failure. To be sure, Rupert is concerned specifically with defining ‗cognitive subject‘ for
the purposes of engaging in scientific study of persons, psychologically, cognitively, and
linguistically, and hence, he might rightly point out that an entire account of subjectivity
is not needed for such endeavors. Cognitive science can and has indeed been conducted
in the absence of a suitable theory of how ‗persons‘ are constituted, and relies heavily
upon the one-body = one-person model for its purposes. Again, this is where Clark will
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agree that the organism plays an key part in locating cognitive experience, but to think
that human bodies themselves are sufficient for understanding all of cognition,
psychology, and subjectivity in general, is a huge oversimplification, one to which even
Rupert will not likely assent. Surely, when someone is engaged in scientific study of a
‗cognitive subject‘ they are examining behaviors, past histories, relationships,
interactions, and transactions with the world; hence, cognitive science must somehow
include all of these external ‗props‘ if we are truly to comprehend the cognitive subject.
The brain may not be sufficient for such a vast array of experience, but then, is the
body enough? Rupert wants to keep cognition confined and embedded and his HEMC
proposal attempts to rein it in once and for all. Likewise, Clark, although allowing for
cognitive processes to extend beyond the bodily boundary, insists that the body is ‗where
it‘s at‘ for the most part. However, the body is not so easily tracked with its implants and
prostheses, along with the experiential domain which often has persons feeling as though
parts or all of their bodies are not even their own. It will be worthwhile therefore, to
examine problematic embodiment in some detail in order to see why neither HEMC nor
HOC are entirely suitable answers to the question ‗where am I?‘ By embodiment
however, I will not be referring strictly to ‗the body‘ as it is conceived in biology or in
any other science in which it is an object, relatively static, and highly constrained by
genetic, chromosomal, and cellular processes. Embodiment includes ‗the body‘ but also
denotes the way that body is experienced. This phenomenological consideration and the
juxtaposition it affords us between ‗bodies‘ and ‗embodied subjects‘ is I think crucial to
understanding first, why the experiential domain properly understood must be distributed
over more than mere biological bodies, but also, that when we understand just how
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problematic embodiment is, we will begin to see why subjectivity itself, the very element
Rupert thinks he can locate in ‗the body,‘ is a fluid, dynamic, and distributed web of
interactions. Much like I will argue that embodiment is not reducible to bodies, I will
push this argument further to suggest that cognitive subjects are never wholly contained
within that skin-skull barrier. In other words, by properly problematizing embodiment
and subjectivity, something I think Clark and the externalists have failed to do thus far, I
will be able to marshal an even stronger case against their intracranial opponents.
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Chapter 3
Not Just Anybody: Bodies, Embodiment, Embodied Subjectivity
But because I who am a man have seen the cadavers of men dissected, because I have
read articles on physiology, I conclude that my body is constituted exactly like all those
which have been shown to me on the dissection table or of which I have seen colored
drawings in books [Sartre, 1956; 401]

3.1 Introduction
In Being and Nothingness, Jean-Paul Sartre spends a great deal of time
distinguishing between the ‗for itself‘ and the ‗in itself‘ (por soi and en soi) and often
applies this distinction to the experience of the body. While the body, taken as a ―this
among other thises,‖ can quite conceivably be a thing - an object for science and
medicine to investigate – if we try to understand our own peculiar existence solely in
terms of the body, in itself, we shall always come up short. The way my body shows up
for me, he argues, cannot be grasped by trying to unite my consciousness with ―the body
of others,‖ much as in the way the quote above suggests we often do. Sartre is in some
sense, therefore, prefiguring the anti-reductionist response to claims regarding the
‗Neural Correlate of Consciousness‘ (NCC), and the purported ability to understand, once
and for all, the ‗mystery‘ of conscious experience entirely by an objective neuroscience.
He is also highlighting a crucial difference between how we might experience our own
embodiment in ways indescribable by objective accounts of bodies. In other words, when
I experience my body, I do not do so in the same way I experience the bodies of others,
nor do I experience it like any other object, such as the cadaver on the operating table
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Sartre mentions. I might be able to conceive of having a body like all the others out there
in the world, but I achieve this only through my body and hence, my body is also my
being.
Recalling that, as Rupert (2004) argues, in order to be a meaningful and
worthwhile pursuit, a science of cognition must ‗locate‘ cognitive subjects,‗the body‘
might provide just such a point of reference. Indeed, as we have seen in the previous
chapter, based on parsimony, thinkers like Rupert argue for something very much like a
reduction of cognitive subjectivity to an objective body-object, be it the whole body or
perhaps even just a specific part of it, namely, the brain (cf. Adams and Aizawa, 2010).
Thus, the reductionist idea that cognitive processes are always contained in a body-object
is at least a working theory worth consideration. Even if, as Clark suggests, we allow that
cognitive processes are not bound to the body, but are instead typically centered on it, the
question remains: what precisely are the limits of this body? In other words, given bodily
malleability, it is not a straightforwardly simple task to definitely state where the body
ends and the rest of the world begins. In turn, marking off cognitive subjects is a tricky
business because ‗my‘ cognitive experience might at one moment be centered on more
than just my biological body and may even, as the CEO-secretary example from Chapter
2 illustrates, center on two or more such bodies. As it turns out, this question of
embodiment, or, the question of how I live through my body, is problematic for
intracranialists and externalists alike. In what follows, I intend to expose some of the
difficulties in pinning down ‗bodies‘ as proper ‗objects‘ for cognitive science. As I hope
we shall see, given some of the strange ways in which ‗my body‘ is not always
experienced in the way science would deem that it ought to be, there is often a disconnect
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between the objective ‗organismic‘ view of where we are and the subjective
phenomenological account of where I find myself.

3.2 Having AnyBody, Being Somebody
What it means to have a body is not as straightforward is it may seem. The very
utterance I have a body is enigmatic insofar as it sets the subject, I, in opposition to the
body, as an object for me. The history of this problem is long and complex and I shall not
attempt to sketch it in detail, but will instead jump immediately into contemporary
discussion. Indeed, by doing so, one can see the same thematic difficulties that have
persisted for centuries continually resurface, as nearly all language surrounding
ownership of the body, both in philosophical and scientific quarters, channels the
Cartesianism these disciplines have sought for so long to disavow. The paradox of bodily
having, or the idea that the body is something owned by me, is what I seek to further
clarify in this section.
To begin, consider human bodies from a post-neuroscientific revolution vantage
point. For the ‗brain-obsessed,‘ the rest of the body is treated more like an extremity to
the brain. When it comes to something like mind-reading, the ability to infer what
someone is thinking or feeling, for example, it is assumed that this ability is localized in
the brain, possibly in the mirror neuron system (Goldman & Gallese, 1998) or distributed
among several systems. The debate between simulationists (e.g., Goldman, 2006) and
theory-theorists (e.g., Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997; Perner, 1991), is about how the process
is carried out, not about where the process takes place. It is an unspecified preconception
that the execution of mindreading is a brain-event. Even in hybrid theories (e.g., Nichols
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and Stich, 2004), although Fodorian (1983) anti-localization modularity talk pervades the
discussion, the idea that the substrate of these activities, whether we want to call them
modules or mechanisms, is the brain and the brain only.
Brain-centered cognitive science and philosophy of mind is perhaps most fervent
when it comes to the question of how conscious experience in general is made possible.
The hypothesized answer – the Neural Correlate of Consciousness (NCC) – has yet to be
found, but the assumption that consciousness can be reduced to a brain process or set of
processes is certainly guiding the research (e.g., Koch, 2004). Subsequently, proposals
such as Manzotti‘s (2006), that conscious experience might better be explained under an
externalist framework, are rarely taken seriously and thus represent the ‗fringe‘ of
consciousness studies.
The very idea that the NCC is presupposed as existing is telling. It is not a general
bodily correlate of consciousness, but a specifically neural one. Embodiment has
purposefully and systematically been left out. To be sure, a brain is a body, or part of a
body, but ‗scientists of consciousness‘ often treat brains as if they were isolatable bodies
that retain their functioning, meaning, and significance with or without the rest of ‗us.‘
This is not an entirely fair assessment, given that it is obviously presupposed in studies of
say, vision, that eyes are a necessary component and the recent focus on saccades and
microsaccades (cf. Martinez-Conde, 2008, 20072009; Martinez-Conde, et al, 2009) is a
testament to such awareness. Furthermore, we might consider that a person needs, in
addition to eyes, the extra-ocular muscular system and good control over head posture
and movement in order for the eyes – and the saccading they perform – to function
properly. These things depend further on the vestibular and proprioceptive systems for

84

general body control. In other words, neither eyes nor brains float around detached and
disembodied whilst realizing visual and cognitive awareness, and yet, for the many of the
NCC investigators, the brain represents the sin qua non of answering the ‗where‘
question about mentality.
If we therefore ask a brain-centered NCC investigator what it means to have a
body, the answer might go something like this: ‗having a body consists in being aware of
oneself as situated in this or that particular biological organism, one that is controlled and
recognized by the brain to which it is attached.‘ In other words, given that the correlate of
awareness is supposed to be ‗in the head,‘ then the brain is where we should expect to
find that sense of ownership, that consciousness of oneself as embodied. But notice how
such a view homuncularizes the ‗owner‘ of the body, such that we imagine the brain as a
sort of comptroller executive ‗self‘ in charge of the rest of the body. Therefore, to
understand what it means to ‗have a body‘ is simply to take stock of this very
relationship, one in which the balance of power is in the hands of a senior partner,
namely, the brain. The idea of distributed control among brain and body, or even brain,
body and world is often ignored or dismissed, as is of course, the more radical view that
brains and bodies and environments are all ‗equal partners‘ (cf. Hutto, 2006).
There is a similitude between the senior partner view of the brain and the
immaterial Cartesian soul, that disembodied ego which Husserl (1960; 1931) later
referred to as the I-pole of experience. Even though the brain-centered theorists of the
late twentieth century claim to be denouncing any form of dualism, a persistent form of it
remains nonetheless. There is one ‗I‘ who is in ‗my brain‘ that owns the rest of ‗my
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body.‘ Likewise, for Husserl, in the Cartesian Meditations and elsewhere,19 the ‗I‘ who
stands over and above the body, who takes his or her body as an object for this or that
intentional thought, is that ―pure I‖ which is responsible for the mode of having in the
first place.20 Owning the body for the physicalist and phenomenologist alike therefore
amounts to admitting somewhat of a dual-natured self. Even in the naturalistic world
consisting solely of physical objects and processes, the utterance ‗I have a body‘
mysteriously splits my self into both a subject of my experiences and an object for me.
The difference between physicalism and phenomenology regarding this split between the
body-as subject and the body-as-object is that while the former tends to brush the
problem aside, the latter takes it as an issue worth exploring and indeed ‗incorporating‘
into discussions of cognition and embodiment (e.g. Legrand, 2006). Physicalists, for
example, often attempt to explain the apparent fissure by suggesting that ‗I have a body‘
really means ‗I am a body‘– in other words, whatever dualism is present is simply a
grammatical consequence (e.g. Ryle, 1945). Nevertheless, it is not simply a matter of
linguistic convention that motivates proponents of the NCC to think that the brain is
somehow the ‗comptroller,‘ indeed, the ‗owner‘ of the rest of the body. Even though it is
not a substance dualism, like the Cartesian picture of bodily-having, the ‗captain in the
ship,‘ as it were, has been identified as the brain (the captain) and the rest of the body, a
mere vessel. Of course, any good physicalist will renounce the idea that the brain and the
body are ontologically distinct and can thus avoid the pitfalls of Cartesianism and yet,
19

Cf. Ideas, but see also in Rudolf Bernet‘s collections of Bernet, et al., 2005, for critical commentary and
various other translated fragments from the archives in Leuven, esp. 1964.
20
Husserl, albeit at times quite Cartesian, is not always as strongly so. He expresses a different conception
in Ideen II where he sets out his view of the lived body and something akin to an enactive view – all of
which influenced Merleau-Ponty. Also, the transcendental ego was not regarded as a spiritual substance in
the Cartesian way.
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when it comes to explaining the problematic nature of having a sense of ownership of my
body while simultaneously being that body, little more than hand-waving typically
results. It is taken for granted by Koch (2004) and others that this supposed body-assubject/body-as-object split, like consciousness more generally, will be eventually be
describable in strict neurobiological terms. These assumptions are not the basis of the
phenomenological method and, as we shall see, not only does the sense of ownership
over one‘s body matter to the phenomenology of mind, but according to many (MerleauPonty, 1962; Gallagher, 2005; Zahavi, 2006), problematizing and describing this
relationship ‗I‘ have to my body is necessary if we are to attain a comprehensive account
of cognition.
As we have seen so far, not everyone in cognitive science and philosophy of mind
has reacted to the neuroscientific revolution in the way reductive physicalists have. While
the brain remains an important source of thought, Gibson‘s (1967) theory of an
‗ecological body‘ has resulted in other thinkers (cf. Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, 1991;
Haugeland, 1998; Gallagher, 2005) stopping to reconsider the role the ‗body-whole‘
plays in cognition. The Gibsonian tradition invites serious discussion, for example, about
proprioception and its contribution to cognition. Where the body is in relation to other
objects is ascertained via a concatenation of all the sensory modalities, and has been
argued by some to provide us with the basis for experiencing the ‗whole body.‘
Proprioceptive awareness can be further analyzed, as Gallagher (2005) suggests, into the
different roles it plays in what he calls a body image and a body schema. The former
draws on multiple (including sensory and emotional) inputs to create an explicit
representation of ‗the body‘ as an object that is uniquely tied to ‗me,‘ while the latter,
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which primarily serves the demands of motor control, involves a much more tacit
awareness of the body and its situatedness in the world. If I think about my body and
decide it is out of shape, I am conjuring an image, or if I participate in an unfamiliar
activity like learning to dance the tango for the first time, I will benefit from paying very
close attention to my feet, my posture, and the position of my arms, which means I will
be employing a body image. Contrast these examples with waking in the middle of the
night to obtain a glass of water or putting on clothes while simultaneously watching
television. When action is habitual or automatic, there is no need to take the body as an
object for movement. For example, I do not need to pay attention to what my fingers are
doing as it buttons my shirt; rather, the body itself provides a schema for action such that
in a way, it knows what it‘s doing whether or not ‗I‘ am explicitly aware of it. Thus, in
normal and familiar action, Gallagher argues, the body schema plays a crucial role. In
cases of body schema breakdown, such as in the case of Ian Waterman (henceforth, IW),
for instance, who, as a result of a viral infection and subsequent mylenated nerve fiber
damage, which resulted in the loss of proprioception and tactile sense below the neck, is
unable to perform everyday tasks with the automaticity most of us are accustomed to, the
body is no longer a transparent lived-through medium. Rather, the body, as Gallagher
suggests, must be used as a tool, its image manipulated and controlled to produce the
desired action. More will be said about IW and other embodiment abnormalities later, but
it suffices at this point to note that there seem to be two modes of bodily having; one in
which ‗our bodies‘ are not explicitly ‗for us,‘ but really seem to ‗be us,‘ and the other in
which we do explicitly take our bodies as representational images, objects to behold,
manipulated, and ‗owned.‘ This distinction was made explicit in Merleau-Ponty‘s
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Phenomenology of Perception (1962) when he discusses the ways in which perception
involves motor skills and is not reducible to simply experiencing an array of sensory data.
His example, that of touching silk, is one that begins as a confused sensory state, but with
practice, transforms into an automatic and immediate recognition, one that it is nearly
impossible to explain. In such processes, Merleau-Ponty claims that our bodies do not
appear to us as objects to manipulate, nor do our senses present us with heterogeneous
information; rather, if I am skilled at something, such as recognizing silk, my body is ―a
ready-made system of equivalents and transpositions from one sense to another‖ (235).
Dreyfus (2001; 1990) furthers this idea by suggesting, in what he calls ―skillful coping,‖
that such as occurs when we go from awkwardly splashing and nearly-drowning to
smoothly gliding across the water in an effortless swimming stroke, we have acquired the
requisite ―muscular gestalt‖ which allows our bodies to drift into the experiential
background. The objects of our perception are therefore no longer bodily movements or
specific body parts, but instead are the tasks in front of us (249).
In addition to Gibson, the phenomenological tradition has greatly influenced
thinkers like Gallagher (2005), when it comes to bodily having; but also, thinkers like
Clark (1998, 2003, 2008), Haugeland (1998) and Zahavi (2003, 2007) have all taken cues
from phenomenological investigations when attempting to understand a mind that is
embodied and embedded in a world. Similarly, Heidegger (1962) and Scheler (see Zahavi
2003) who in turn influenced thinkers such as Merleau-Ponty (1964) and Sartre (1966),
set their phenomenological sights more towards being embodied, and being-in-the-world
(and, as we‘ll see, in a way that is always already imbued with the ‗mark‘ of cognition).
As Heidegger (1927) notes, the world is not wholly other to me, but I am always involved
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it and because of this pervasive involvement, I often fail to notice the primary
relationship between me and my body, my tools, and even language, because for the
most part, that relationship is invisible to me. I will return to phenomenological
descriptions as a means to complement and add to the discussion of embodiment in
cognitive science in a later section however, as I think getting clear on precisely what the
current trends are with respects to bodily having is where one should start. Rather than
engage in a standard historical project in which the origins of or influences on current
theories is somehow unearthed, I think by beginning with the varying viewpoints on
embodiment and then examining the ways in which phenomenological descriptions are
employed, either implicitly or explicitly will illuminate the historical underpinnings in a
much more interesting manner.
An analogy can be drawn between Gallagher‘s body image/body schema
distinction and the distinction Heidegger (1927) draws between the present-athandedness (Vorhandenheit) and ready-to-handedness (Zuhandenheit) with which objects
show up to us. The well-known hammer example is intended to point out that in most
cases, the tools we use are barely noticeable; when using a hammer for example, one
does not focus on the hammer itself but more on the hammering and in this sense our
tools are often more like extensions of our bodies – thereby becoming part of the body
schema. In cases of breakdown, malfunction, or in moments of theoretical reflection
however, the hammer becomes present-at-hand, an object we consciously think about and
see as distinct from ourselves. As Gallagher points out, our bodies can similarly be
thematized and reified, such that ‗I‘ might feel a bit distanced from ‗my body,‘ and can
therefore take it as an object, or even a tool for my use, and thus treat it as present-at-
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hand (as– in the form of a body image). For the most part, however, we walk, talk, move
around, and interact with one another in a much more holistic and unreflective way. In
other words, our body is most often ready-to-hand, because we are most often operating
with what Gallagher terms a body-schema. This analogy between the way tools appear to
us and the way our own bodies are lived-through and represented is not perfect of course,
because we don‘t typically think of our bodies as tools, nor do we think of tools as
inherently attached to our bodies. Nevertheless, in some cases, our bodies do feature
more like present-at-hand tools, when, for example, we feel detached, dysphoric, or just
simply clumsy and awkward, such as in the case of taking a ballet class for the first time.
Likewise, as the overarching aim of this project is intended to argue, the ready-to-hand
feature of tools we are most often accustomed to experiencing, means that our body
schema can actually ‗incorporate‘ otherwise external objects into itself, thereby extending
the limits of what is understood to be ‗my body.‘
The idea that my body can at times fade into the background and at other times, it
is more like an explicit object I must manipulate, is phenomenologically uncontroversial.
Contention arises, however, when we attempt to take this phenomenological description
and utilize it in a philosophical or scientific explanation about cognition generally. As the
previous paragraph suggested, we can experience ourselves as if detached from our
bodies, or so at least it seems. It is an interesting question to pursue therefore, if we ask,
just how severe can this feeling of detachment be? Answering this question would point
towards a more general answer to the question, how much does our cognitive experience
depend on our being attached to a body? Moreover, by examining the phenomenology of
embodiment, we can begin seriously to ask to what extent is the body schema plastic and
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extendable, such that tools and other external objects might become part of the bodywhole. If it turns out that embodiment, even in cases of what I will collectively term
‗body dysphorias,‘ is essential for cognition, but it also can be shown that this
embodiment is malleable, then it would have to follow that cognition is better understood
in terms of a ―shifting coalition of tools‖ rather than a singular, unchanging, and unified
body.
As is the case in much of cognitive science, one way to approach the question
concerning ‗normal‘ embodiment and cognition, is to examine ‗abnormal‘ or pathological
cases in order to see what sorts of breakdowns are occurring. These breakdowns typically
highlight what, in non-pathological scenarios, is at play. There are hosts of possible
‗abnormal embodiments‘ to consider, but I will limit the discussion to five, as each
highlights a unique dissociation between the objective body and subjectively livedthrough embodiment, and provides clues for understanding how embodiment plays a role
in cognition and action. In particular, by looking at the levels of experienced dissociation,
we can approach an answer to the question concerning how much cognition is dependent
upon a feeling of attachment or unity with one‘s body. Thus, I will begin with the rare
case of Ian Waterman, who suffered deafferentation, and will then proceed to discuss
aplasic phantoms, somatoparaphrenia, alien hand syndrome, and Möbius syndrome.

3.3 Bodily Breakdowns
The following examples of abnormal embodiment are found regularly throughout
the literature, from cognitive science to gender studies and from philosophy of mind all
the way back to classic phenomenology (e.g. Merleau-Ponty, 1962). Despite the
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regularity with which cases such as phantom limbs or Somatoparaphrenia are simply
explicated, once beyond simple description, the interpretations vary wildly. Nativists,
intracranialists, externalists, essentialists, and post-modernists have all weighed in on at
least one of the cases below, and because of such disparity, I shall proceed first by simply
citing evidence and exemplars from each category of bodily breakdown. Then, in the next
section, a closer look at the supposed philosophical implications of each will be
undertaken.

3.3.1 Deafferentation: The Story of Ian Waterman
Ian Waterman (IW) is by far the most discussed single patient in the
contemporary literature on proprioception. This is because his condition is extremely rare
and intriguing, as he suffered damage to the large myelinated nerve fibers in his
peripheral nervous system, which are normally responsible for proprioceptive awareness
and the sense of touch. The damage resulted in his loss of automatic motor control below
the neck. Speech, facial expressions, and head movement remained normal. However, his
implicit proprioceptive awareness – a feature of embodiment taken for granted by most of
us – has been lost. In normal bodily action I am able to engage in the smooth coping that
Dreyfus describes; I‘m able to move around the world and engage in instrumental action
often without thinking about my body or having my limbs in my visual field. For IW,
however, to move about, dress himself, or do anything normal-functioning persons can
do automatically, he must instead concentrate with great intensity on the task at hand.
Indeed, he must maintain whatever part of his body he wishes to manipulate within his
visual field in order to achieve the desired action. Therefore, performing multiple tasks at
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once, such as walking while talking on the cell phone – abilities often taken for granted
by those who engage in them routinely – are difficult for IW. He has no trouble talking,
since the proprioceptive loss is from the neck down, but the amount of concentration he
requires to walk distracts him from the conversation.
Gallagher (2005) explains IW‘s case in terms of a distinction between his use of
body image and body schema, the former being the explicit representation of one‘s body,
while the later is the more pre-reflective sense of bodily location and relation to objects
outside of it. In other words, for most of us, buttoning our shirts while slipping on shoes
is mundane everyday activity because we don‘t have to stop to consider ‗where we are,‘
how far each of our limbs are from one another, from external objects, and so on. In
normal functioning, the body schema provides the control needed to sit upright, walk
straight, and touch one‘s hand to one‘s head, even while carrying on a conversation about
Sunday‘s game. In IW‘s case however, he must manipulate an explicit image of himself,
concentrating with great intensity on posture and his arm as it moves to grasp an object,
or his legs as he places one in front of the other as he walks across uneven surfaces.
Practice does not make his movements any more automatic; each time he reaches to grasp
something, for example, he has to think through the action. Only a few aspects of his
locomotive movement have come close to being automatic – namely, certain aspects of
his leg movements while walking, and this is the case only on relatively smooth surfaces.
IW is able to drive an automobile, but he will never be able to drive while talking on the
cell phone.
IW‘s case, interesting in its own right, also sheds light on what is normally the
case in non-impaired persons. As Gallagher (2005) and Noё (2004), for instance, have
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emphasized, when we interact with the environment, vision, sensorimotor control, and
proprioceptive awareness usually work seamlessly together, such that we hardly ever
notice them as distinct systems. Nevertheless, even in non-pathological experience, we
are often confronted with tasks in which we don‘t feel so ‗at home‘ in our bodies. An
example Dreyfus (1972) cites in this regard is driving, It is safe to assume that every
person who has ever learned to drive a car, despite how quickly and easily they may have
picked up the skill, went through a phase in which all of the discrete components of the
task – the steering wheel, the brakes, the gears, and so forth – were individualized and
consciously reflected upon. As we become more accustomed to the rhythm of checking
the road, accelerating and decelerating, and gauging the sharpness of upcoming turns
however, the need to ‗think about‘ driving diminishes until finally, we find ourselves
talking on a cell-phone, smoking a cigarette, and adjusting the temperature, all while
speeding down the highway and zipping in and out of traffic.
Although Dreyfus‘s example is helpful, a possible rejoinder to the idea that the
beginning stage of driving is somehow analogous to IW‘s lack of control would be to
argue that even in clumsy and inefficient driving, our ability to move our limbs in space,
to unreflectively control our bodies, and to execute actions without explicit visual
imagery remains. In other words, the reason a task like driving begins so awkwardly is
not a feature of our embodiment per se, but is rather a lack of mastery over our tools. We
have not ‗skillfully coped‘ with our environment. In the following chapters, I will attempt
to show that this difference in coping with one‘s body versus coping with one‘s tools is
really a distinction without a genuine difference; however, even if it is the case that the
driving example is insufficient to demonstrate that in non-pathological actions, we can
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experience something similar to IW‘s condition, I think there are other examples that do
succeed. If I am accustomed to jogging along a particular path, I might very well engage
in a conversation with my running partner or if I am alone, it might even be the case that I
entirely ‗zone out,‘ such that after completing the trail, I have little to no recollection of
the jog itself, but instead have outlined a paper or planned a party. Contrast this familiar
experience with jogging on a path that is entirely new, one that contains many unknown
obstacles such as rocks, tree roots, and fluctuating topography. Quite literally in this
scenario, if I don‘t maintain my feet within my visual field, I could fall over, much like
the way in which Ian must watch what his feet are doing at all times. Add to this of
course, the fact that if Ian or I, in our respective situations, don‘t also monitor what is
going on at eye level, we might smack into a tree, another person, or a building. For me,
but not for IW, over time, the manipulation of discrete body parts, calculated movements,
and detailed planning become more automatic. I can eventually ‗lose sight‘ of this
monitoring and hence, my movements don‘t just appear automatic; they genuinely are,
and I no longer represent my body to myself as a manipulable object. On the other hand,
although he might be able to ‗pass‘ as normal to an outside observer, his movements
seeming automatic, to Ian, the maintaining a visual awareness of his body and utilizing
his body image remains a constant necessity and hence, the body schema with which
genuine automaticity is achieved in non-pathological cases, is not part of Ian‘s
experiential framework.21
What we can glean from this discussion of IW, as well as the comparisons
between his case and non-pathological embodiment is two-fold. First, we learn that in
21

It is worth noting as well that Ian‘s walking never truly looks normal, while he has mastered fairly
normal-looking grasping and reaching.
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normal, everyday andfamiliar actions, there is no need to consciously monitor sensory
input, motor action, vision, and prorprioception. At the pre-reflective level of bodily
experience, ‗my body‘ and ‗I‘ really are one. In other words, I do not experience any
dissociation with my body; it is not an object for me when I am say, walking through my
house while talking on the phone. It is also not the case that I feel uncomfortable in my
own skin in these familiar modes of embodiment. IW‘s case however, shows us that this
at-homeness can be disrupted to the point that in order to engage in otherwise simple
tasks, taking the body as an object for me is absolutely essential. Hence, the second thing
we learn is that there are non-pathological experiences in which I can become more
distanced from my body; indeed, it is helpful to do so in some cases, such as learning a
new skill. A question mark hangs over these phenomenological findings however: when
one takes one‘s body as an object, exactly where is the control? Who is the controller?
More importantly, have we not resurrected a troublesome dualism by suggesting that not
only in pathological cases, but in everyday uncomfortable or awkward actions, we can
tease ourselves apart from our bodies? In order to answer these questions, I will turn to
several other examples of ‗abnormal embodiment‘ to gain more insight into this supposed
fracturing of the cognizer from his or her body. As I will continue to highlight throughout
these cases however, there appears to be a need to distinguish between a pre-reflective
and reflective level of awareness when discussing automatic versus non-automatic action.
Herein, I think, will be the key to understanding from whence bodily dissociation, in all
its various forms, arises.
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3.3.2 Phantom Limbs
While cases such as IW‘s are extremely rare, another form of bodily breakdown
involving loss of one or more limbs is not so uncommon. Amputations in the U.S. are
estimated to affect one in every 200 persons (Adams, et al, 1999) with reasons for the
surgery ranging from injury, to cancer, to dysvascular complications, the latter being the
most common and increasingly prevalent cause.22 The typically accompanying phantom
limb syndrome has fascinated philosophers, psychologists, and doctors alike for ages.
Sensations felt in parts of the body no longer present led Descartes, for instance, in a fit
of radical skepticism, to doubt that we can really ever trust our senses and that all bodily
knowledge is dubious. Even more astonishing is that persons born without one or more
limbs (aplasic) often claim to experience phantom sensations in the missing limb. Aplasic
phantoms affect a much smaller percentage 23 of the population, but nonetheless, their
existence has suggested to many (Melzack, et al, 1997; Ramachadran & Hirstein, 1998)
that ‗the body‘ is an innately specified boundary, such that we are born with a
representation of the ‗body-whole‘ encoded in our brains.
Although the symptomology is not entirely agreed upon in the medical
community, the received view (cf. Simmel, 1958) about phantom limbs has been that
they are only experienced in patients who have had amputations late enough in life so as
to be able to ‗remember‘ once having the now missing appendage. However,
countervailing evidence obtained by Weinstein and Sersen (1961) shows that a
significant number of persons born without a limb do experience phantom symptoms.
Despite the phenomenological accounts of aplasic phantoms, several theorists (Melzack,
22

Fact sheet for U.S. amputations, National Limb Loss Center, 2008.
Cf. Wilkins, et al. (1998), in which it is estimated that only 7.6% of persons with congenitally missing
limbs experience phantom sensations.
23
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1990; Merleau-Ponty, 1962; Poeck, 1964) have argued that the phenomenon of
forgetting, which is present only in amputees, makes a big difference as to how we ought
to interpret the role of body schema in shaping the experience of the missing limb; in
other words, the phantom symptoms of an amputee and an aplasic are markedly different
and hence ought to be referred to as distinct phenomena. ―Forgetting‖ is the phenomenon
in which amputees who otherwise are fully aware that their limb is missing, will still act
as though it were present in an attempt to use it. Examples from Poeck (1964) such as leg
amputees who continue to attempt to walk with both legs, suggest, according to
Gallagher (2005), that ―the missing limb continues to function schematically in motor
behavior for an indefinite time. It continues to play a part in the organization of
instrumental or locomotive actions. Its absence is not taken into account‖ (90). Put
another way, amputees experience their phantoms representationally – at the body image
level – to be sure, as they claim to have kinesthetic experiences of pain, itching, and so
forth in the missing limb. But they also experience their phantoms pre-reflectively, as part
of their body schema, and hence in automatic, sensorimotor action, there is no sense of
loss. They simply forget what they already ‗know‘ about themselves.
Gallagher goes on to argue that even in cases of aplasic phantoms, there must be
an innate body schema. While the debate concerning nativism is far beyond the scope of
this project, it is interesting to see how assumptions concerning the ‗hardwiring‘ of the
body schema shape his discussion of phantom sensations. First of all, as he argues
concerning amputees and forgetfulness:
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The phenomenon of forgetting is actually a normal part of normal motor action.
Movement in general and specifically the continued functioning of a phantom part
in movement, does not depend on a vivid representation or percept of the body, or
specifically of the missing limb. Rather, forgetting is normal and possible
precisely because motor behavior does not ordinarily require that my limbs be
included in my perceptual awareness. [2005, 91]

Likewise, therefore, persons with congenitally missing limbs do not represent the limb to
themselves in normal motor action. So, does their ‗non-forgetfulness‘ necessarily imply
that their body schema innately includes or does not include the missing limb? Hardly so,
and it is just as conceivable that forgetfulness and non-forgetfulness alike are products of
learned behavior, or what Merleau-Ponty (1962) calls the ―habitual body.‖ As we have
seen in chapter two, ‗where‘ memories are actually stored is nowhere near a settled issue.
To be sure, a pattern of neural activation might in fact be what subtends many of our
memories, but as the Otto case, and pretty much any human who is highly dependent on
an external device such as a day planner can attest, a lot of our memories seem to be out
of our heads. If so, then why would it be such a stretch to claim that the phenomenon of
forgetting might also be the result of bodily encoded behavioral memories, memories that
extend beyond the brain and into the rest of the body which also learned at one point to
interact with the now missing limb? Even more along the lines of an externalized
explanation of phantom phenomena would be to take what Meuse (1996) asks us to
consider, which is that body images are often culturally informed and highly dependent
on social practice, and to then conceive of the source for aplasic phantoms as entirely
socially derived. This proposal, which could be put in terms of shaping our own body
image in terms of others‘ bodies, is a viable alternative to the theory about an innate body
schema (see, e.g., Brügger, who suggests the involvement of mirror neurons).
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Whether the mind is endowed with innate representations, of one‘s body or of any
other information for that matter, is, once again, beyond the scope of this project, and
furthermore, is arguably an intractable debate, especially when it comes to aplasic
phantoms. There is no evidence of the phenomenon until late childhood and by then, a
vast array of motor, linguistic, and cognitive skills have been acquired, not to mention, a
large amount of social information has been absorbed by the child. Determining if the
experience of a phantom limb is entirely the result of an innate bodily representation,
deeply embedded social ideals about the body, or some combination of the two would
require first, that the neuroscientific accounts were conclusive and second, that the
phenomenology of aplasic phantoms were somehow unified and systematic. Although
embryonic studies have been undertaken (cf. Hepper, et al. 1998) in order to determine at
what point lateralization of the left and right limbs occurs, they have been interpreted
both as providing evidence for innate bodily representations (Ramachadran & Hirstein,
1998) and for the necessity of environmental interactions beyond what goes in utero for
the phantoms to occur (Price, in press). Moreover, some congenital para- and
quaraplegics claim to have experienced phantom symptoms ―for as long as they can
remember‖ while others only begin to have sensations in the absent limbs later in
development. Given all of this disparity, it would appear fruitless to try and determine,
from the occurrence of aplasic phantoms alone, whether something as complex as ‗my
body‘ could ever be encoded innately in the brain.
What does present itself as plausible, however, is that we could investigate further
the phenomenological descriptions of phantoms, both reported by the aplasics
themselves, and the third-person accounts given by doctors, scientists, and philosophers.

101

What sorts of sensations are felt in the missing limbs, for what duration, and with what
frequency? When engaging in everyday actions such as dressing, walking about, or
cleaning the house, are the patients aware of the limb as missing, or is it more that the
proprioceptive awareness had by aplasics seems to include the missing limb as if it were
really there, when one is acting automatically, at what Gallagher (2005) would refer to as
body schematic level of pre-reflective bodily know-how? In other words, dividing
experience into the two levels of explicit body image versus tacit bodily action might
prove beneficial in determining at what stage of body-world interaction the phantom is
prevalent. As Gallagher argues concerning amputees and phantom limb syndrome, the
body schema is predisposed to ‗re-member‘ – either due to training or by some innately
specified predisposition – and hence, when we observe someone ‗forgetting‘ that they are
missing a limb (trying to walk on an absent leg, e.g.), what is actually happening is that
the body schema is simply producing the sorts of movements we would expect to occur
for anyone pre-reflectively. The same is true of aplasic phantoms insofar as prereflectively, the limb shows up as really there, and hence, before there is even time to
pause and consider the nature of the sensation, my proprioceptive awareness tells me that
there is pain in my left arm. It is only in reflective experience that persons experiencing
phantoms will state that they are aware that the limb is actually non-existent. Aplasic
phantoms and standard phantoms alike illustrate that embodiment is experienced prereflectively as unified, undifferentiated, and for the most part, without awareness of its
discrete parts. In this sense, we need not worry about whether the body schema is
innately specified to encode four limbs or whether aplasic phantoms result from some
psychological response to perceived norms of embodiment. Those questions miss the
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point that at the schematic level, something like ‗four limbs‘ could not really be properly
understood, as this is to already attribute too much reflective ability to a system which is
by definition, pre-reflective. It would seem therefore that whether in pathological or nonpathological cases, if fully functional, the body schema operates as a unified and nondissociating whole.

3.3.3 Somatoparaphrenia
While aplasic phantoms represent a case in which the holistic nature of the
schema can result in a pre-reflective sense of owning more limbs than one actually has,
on the other end of the spectrum, the somatoparaphrenic renounces ownership of one or
more appendages that really do exist. In extreme cases, denial of an entire side of the
body occurs. Technically, somatoparaphrenics are not simply asomatognosic, meaning
they do not just deny ownership of a body part, but they also attribute it as belonging to
someone else, often claiming it must belong to a previous patient in the doctor‘s office, or
a relative, etc. Nevertheless, patients with somatoparaphrenia are born with ‗normal‘
bodies, and as such, phenomena surrounding the disorder are much the inverse of those
accompanying aplasic phantoms. Where the former is deluded into thinking the limb
actually attached to his or her body is in fact not part of the body-whole, the latter
experiences sensations in limbs that are not even present.
While little is known about somatoparaphrenia, it is generally characterized as
one of the many sub-versions of the more general delusion, anosognosia, which is the
denial of an illness or injury. This is because in most cases of somatoparaphrenia, the
patient has suffered a stroke resulting in right hemisphere damage with
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hemiparesis/plegia. The refusal to accept the brain damage is translated into some form of
disregard for the correlated paretic or plegic limb; in other words, from the patient‘s
perspective, the source of the problem is not in his or her head, but instead resides with
the troubled appendage. The problems are not limited to denial of ownership of body
parts, which is in fact labeled asomatognosia, but, according to a questionnaire given to
hemiparetic stroke patients by Baier and Karnach (2005), anosognosia is further
subdivided into somatoparaphrenia, or the attribution of ownership of one‘s limbs to
someone else, anasodiaphoria, or a lack of concern/notice of the limb, misoplegia, which
involves a specifically negative attitude towards the limb, personification, or the naming
and/or anthropomorphizing the limb, kinetic hallucinations, or the feeling that the limb is
moving of its own volition, and perhaps most striking, patients may claim that the limb
simply appeared, as if by magic, a condition known as supernumerary phantom limb
syndrome.
The above catalog of syndromes highlights the nuanced pathologies that
accompany specific brain damage. Although it might be said of all the various forms of
anasognosia, that they are of common origin, namely, a hemiparetic stroke, simply
relying on the neuropathology as an explanation of the varied psychopathologies is not
very illuminating. Thus, in a later section, we will investigate the various modes of
ownership and agency operative in these forms of anasognosia, paying particular
attention to somatoparaphrenia, as it shares some similar phenomenology with various
other pathologies that have hitherto been otherwise ignored. Examining cases of bodily
pathology, such as somatoparaphrenia, shows not only that we can and often do become
dissociated from all or parts of our bodies, but also, that there is an important difference
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between the way the dissociation shows up to us in conscious experience as opposed to
how it is realized neurobiologically. For example, in IW‘s case, the neuropathology alone
would suggest a permanent loss of his ability to find his bodily place in the world and yet,
through a manipulation of his body-image, he is able to override the otherwise disabled
system. Likewise, in somatoparaphrenic patients, it is quite possibly the case that brain
damage alone is insufficient to describe what it‘s like to experience a limb as foreign or
unowned. For instance, Katerina Fotopoulou, at the University of London, reports an
interesting case. Fotopoulou has a post-stroke patient with somatoparaphrenia. Her left
arm (paralyzed and without proprioception or sensation), she claims, belongs to her
granddaughter. This is her response when she is asked about her arm and made to look at
it. But when she is shown her full image in a mirror, and asked about her left arm as it
appears in the mirror, she correctly identifies it as her own. When asked about her
granddaughter‘s arm she looks down, directly at her left arm. Whenever she looks
directly at her arm, she identifies it as her granddaughter‘s; whenever she looks at it in
the mirror she identifies it as her own.24 This suggests that there may be different kinds
of perception of body-as-object, as Gallagher (2010) suggests. But it also suggests that
this cannot be explained purely in terms of damaged brain areas. Nothing changes in the
damaged brain areas when the woman looks into the mirror and re-establishes her body
image on the basis of a visual and literal image in the mirror. The brain, damaged as it is,
plus the body, paralyzed as it is, cannot provide an explanation of this re-established
image. To the brain and the body, one needs to add a particular instrument in the world,
the mirror, to explain this re-established unity. This renewed body image is thus not

24

A similar phenomenon of mirror correction has been found to cause immediate recovery from
anosognosia for hemiplegia (Fotopoulou et al. 2009).
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reducible to brain processes; it extends to processes that include engagement with the
environment beyond the body.

3.3.4 Anarchic Hand (or Limb) Syndrome
One such condition that receives relatively little attention from philosophers
concerned with agency and freedom of the will is Anarchic Limb Syndrome (ALS).
Typically affecting a hand or arm, patients with ALS experience a loss of control over a
part of their bodies such that one hand will reach out and grab objects, repeatedly touch
things, and perhaps violently strike other persons or even the person to whom the rogue
extremity belongs. Because it is a syndrome, this means that little is known about the
precise cause of the disorder. Neurologically, ALS has been shown to occur after strokes
or brain trauma; in particular, damage to the basal frontal lobes and the corpus callosum
is often correlated with the occurrence of the syndrome (Josephs and Roessler, 2001).
Nevertheless, there exist a large number of subtypes of ALS, ranging from a ‗levitating
hand‘ which is thought to result from posterior parietal lobe damage, to a more complex
phenomena often termed ‗intermanual conflict,‘ in which patients, typically those who
have had a corpus collascotomy, will actually ‗self-diagnose‘ the actions of one limb as
opposed to the other, as if the two originated from distinct cognitive agents with distinct
intentions (cf. Nishikawa, et al., 2001).
As this quick survey suggests, the disorder is far from a unified pathology and
thus has no cure. Likewise, the phenomenology behind ALS is rife with inconsistency
and variation. One constant that seems to emerge however, is that patients with any form
of ALS report a lack of control (a lack of a sense of agency) over their rogue limb either
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some or all of the time. This fact will be of key importance when we attempt to tie
together all these various modes of ‗abnormal embodiment‘ into one very general
phenomenological story.

3.3.5 Möbius Syndrome
Another way persons might feel detached from or not in possession of their
bodies is found in patients with Möbius syndrome. An extremely rare syndrome,
affecting approximately .002% of live births per year,25 it results from underdeveloped
cranial nerves, the nerves emerging immediately below the brain stem. In particular,
numbers VI and VII are most often the affected nerve pairs, as these two, which are
motor and sensorimotor respectively, control movement of the eyes and facial
expressions, particularly oral movements involving smiling, frowning, pursing of lips,
and even chewing and saliva regulation. With these nerves impaired, Möbius patients are
expressionless, and babies often have trouble nursing, often uncontrollably drooling, a
problem that persists into adulthood if not corrected. Möbius patients however, are
typically otherwise unimpaired, having normal intellectual and physical development.
Socially, on the other hand, they struggle with conveying and recognizing emotions. In
other words, their social cognition is impaired – the ability to gauge others‘ intentions,
thoughts, and feelings, as well as effectively communicate their own in a non-verbal
manner – and as a result, they are often mislabeled as either autistic or even mentally
disabled. (Cole, 2000; Cole and Spalding, 2008)

25

Verzijl, et al (2000)
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Because Möbius syndrome is congenital, like aplasic phantom syndrome it raises
some interesting questions about innate body representations, albeit in importantly
different ways. Simulation theorists (cf. Goldman, 2006; Proust, 2002) and Theory of
Mind Theorists (cf. Stich, 2007; Baren-Cohen et al., 2000) alike have argued that social
cognition, which is largely dependent upon facial recognition, is an innate ability, one
that is impaired when certain parts of the body are underdeveloped or damaged at birth.
Nevertheless, cases such as Möbius syndrome, as frequently happens in the cognitive
sciences, often yield wildly varying interpretations as to what the mechanism behind
learning to understand others‘ mental states is. Once again, this is a debate that is outside
the scope of the present discussion, and yet when persons with impairments are used as
illustrations of what ‗normal‘ social learning must be like and decisive agreement is all
but missing, such disparity suggests that not enough careful consideration is truly being
given to what it‘s actually like to experience such bodily and emotional dysphoria. If we
think of a Möbius patient as simply lacking the appropriate theory of mind or simulation
skills, then the actual experiences of the patients are often overlooked, leading to an
overintellecutalized (―in the head‖) understanding of emotion, which is not readily
available for translation in ‗normal‘ expression. As James, a patient of Jonathan Cole
(2000) explains:
I do think I get trapped in my mind or my head. I sort of think happy or I think
sad, not really saying or recognizing actually feeling happy or feeling sad.
Perhaps I have had a difficulty in recognizing that which I‘m putting a name to is
not a thought at all but it is a feeling, maybe I have to intellectualize mood. I
have to say this thought is a happy thought and therefore I am happy. (p.254)
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3.4 Toward a Phenomenology of Bodily Having
In this section, I will attempt to bring together the bodily pathologies discussed in
3.2 by highlighting some similar features found in the phenomenological descriptions
from both the patients and those who study them. As it turns out, there are some
persistent ‗phenomenological pathologies‘ to be found lurking in such descriptions,
which often paradoxically bespeak a Cartesian ideology about the body as a mere vessel
for one‘s ‗true self‘, while simultaneously endorsing a psychophysical reductive
explanation about who and what ‗I truly am,‘ which is to say, a physical body. By taking
a closer look at the body image/body schema distinction and the sense of ownership and
sense of agency one has over one‘s body (Gallagher, 2005) as well as the important
lessons we can learn from experiences and experiments in what I collectively term ‗body
bending,‘ I think such confused accounts of subjective experience can be better
understood.
If, as Gallagher and Zahavi (2008) have argued recently, the phenomenological
method is not pure introspection – or simply a collection of subjective descriptions of
experiences – but is rather an account of how those subjective experiences are made
possible in the first place, then we can begin to uncover how the body may in fact show
itself to an individual subject as ‗other‘ or as the ‗container‘ (and quite often the
obstructer) of that person‘s true self. While it is important to take seriously these
subjective descriptions of embodiment, a phenomenology that remains faithful to
Husserl‘s (cf. 1910; 1965) original insights must attempt to reconcile what we might
discover in terms of the eidetic or essential structures of experience on the one hand and
the ways in which objects (and the subject‘s own body) might appear in various modes of
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experience. In this regard, I will suggest that once again, a look at the pre-reflective and
reflective levels of awareness might provide just such reconciliation. Rather than
assuming that individual and subjective descriptions of experience are contradictory to
current empirical science, it is more defensible to think of the two modes of explanation
as operating on different levels. While neuroscience may indeed inform us about some of
these essential structures of experience – those that phenomenologists would argue are
the proper parts of an overall account of subjective experience generally – there are
important lessons to be learned from the level of reflective awareness as well, such as the
fact that in reflection, one can often become detached from oneself and hence, will come
to think of one‘s embodiment in ways that run counter to the supposed ‗facts‘ found in
neuroscience.

3.5 Ownership and Agency at the Reflective and Pre-Reflective Levels
We need not simply assume that body image can affect body schema if we
consider IW once again. In IW‘s case, his body schema was effectively destroyed and
because of this, even maintaining an upright position in a chair was at first impossible for
him. Through careful manipulation and perceptual focus on certain areas of his body, he
has been able to achieve more controlled movements, however, so much so that he has
sort of recreated a body schema, as Gallagher and Cole (1996) suggest, a virtual one.
However, he will never regain genuine somatic proprioception, as the nerves that subtend
it are forever destroyed. Thus, when Gallagher, Cole and McNeill (2001) experimented
with IW‘s ability to gesture, they found that even when his hands were occluded from his
visual field, he was still able to gesture, although he lacked the topokinetic control that
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would normally occur when someone‘s body schema was intact. This lends support to
the argument that he creates a sort of virtual body schema, facilitated by linguistic and
communicative processes. As long as his hands are in his visual field, he maintains
topokinetic control over them and can appear to gesture as automatically as someone with
a fully intact body schema; but when his hands are not within visual proximity, this
ability is lost. Thus, if the interpretations of phantoms and IW lend credence to the
argument that the body schema is susceptible to manipulation or substitution,
respectively, by the body image, the question concerning the nativity of the body schema
mentioned earlier can be replaced by a the more relevant question having to do with
plasticity and hard-wiredness. Just how malleable is the body schema? It would seem,
regardless of its innateness or whether or not it is neurally locatable, that it must be
somehow ‗more hardwired‘ than the body image, at least insofar as it is the means by
which regular motor action is made possible and in most cases, it is prior to an explicit
body image. However, it might make sense to think of both schema and image as being
partially hardwired and partially ‗soft assembled.‘ If there are cases in which the schema
can be shown to be malleable and likewise, if there are cases in which body image is
arguably more hardwired than we might have guessed, these would be sufficient
counterexamples to the claim that the one is more ‗innate‘ or prespecified than the other.
In order to explore this option, I will look in further detail at the sense of ownership/sense
of agency distinction as it occurs in abnormal, manipulated, and normal embodied
actions. The aim is to show that how I experience myself as the owner and/or author of
my actions as well as my body, is a function of both schematic and imagistic levels of
awareness. If both of these can be shown to be equally composed of hardwired and
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manipulable components, then it would seem that embodiment generally is soft
assembled, constituted by biologically hardwired features as well as coalitions of tools,
social roles, and interpersonal relationships. ‗The body,‘ albeit a necessary component of
cognition, is essentially a self-organizing system, open to environmental influence,
machine interfacing, and a vast array of soft-assemblages. Thus, while we might be able
to say that there are facts about bodily systems or sub-systems that are ‗hard-wired,‘ the
rigidity of this wiring seems to be contingent upon very specific developmental and
environmental interactions. In other words, expose the body to very different stimuli and
it will follow suit, changing and molding to its situation, thereby allowing for ‗rewiring.‘
The image/schema distinction however, is only part of the story. Embodiment is
not just about schematic processes underpinning action and imagistic awareness of one‘s
body for the purposes of manipulating it and acting with it. To be sure, in cases of
abnormal embodiment like IW‘s we can clearly see a disruption of the former, which
thereby forces the burden of executing actions onto the body image, a feature that, as we
learn in normal everyday action, is not readily utilized for such purposes. But what is
missing in this account is an understanding of the ‗executor‘ part of action. In other
words, as an embodied subject, I also experience a sense of ownership of my body – it is
mine and does not belong to any other subject – and a sense that ‗I‘ am the one causing
the actions it performs. Unless external forces act upon me, I have a sense of agency over
my body when I go to pick up an object, take a walk, or feed the cat.
In the cases we have looked at concerning abnormal embodiment, some or all of
this sense that I am the executor of my actions is absent. Perhaps most salient among the
cases is ALS, as the patients with this syndrome almost uniformly report not having

112

control over the alien limb. The alienation one experiences between themselves and their
rogue limb might not just be an issue of control however; indeed, the hand might be so
anarchic that if fails to be seen as a proper part of one‘s body. One can lose a sense of
ownership of his or her body or its parts as well. Clearly, this is the case in
somatoparaphrenic patients who literally denounce ownership of an extremity or limb.
But, as Gallagher (2005) notes, ―sense of ownership does not require an explicit or
observational consciousness of the body, an ideational, third-person stance in which I
take my body as an object. Rather, it may depend on a non-observational access that I
have to my actions, an access that is most commonly associated with a first-person
relationship to myself‖ (29). Thus, in normal embodiment, we don‘t stop to question, as
we go to pick up a glass of milk for instance, ‗is this my hand picking up this object?‘ It is
simply that we have a reflexive and seamless relationship with ourselves, one that is
typically unnoticed, automatic, and below the radar of conscious representation.
Much like Heidegger‘s hammer however, when the tool we are so accustomed to
using breaks down, we can and do stop to reflect upon the relationship between ‗I‘ as the
subject, author, and owner of all these bodily actions and ‗the body-object‘ that performs
them. I like to think of my countless experiences as a ballet dancer trying to perfect a
pirouette and exclaiming in frustration that I just could not seem to get my belly to stay in
and my spine to be straight and that my arms were ‗in a world of their own.‘ Cases of
dissociation such as these are fairly common, but they do not signal any sort of pathology
or disorder in the way that an ALS or Möbius Syndrome patient would.
The pathological cases do however, highlight the ways in which ownership and
agency are often highly conjoined experiential domains, but can also be teased apart. The
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somatoparaphrenic might still feel as though she can control her limb, it is a result of its
simply being attached to the rest of her body, but that the limb itself is not in fact her
own. On the other hand, IW might have never lost the sense that he owned his body, but
during the initial stages of his illness, he certainly lost all sense of agency over it.
Gallagher suggests that such teasing apart of ownership and agency can also occur in
normal embodiment when external forces are at work, such as in the case of someone
knocking you down by surprise. If I get pushed by a reckless football fan at the game and
go tumbling down the bleachers, I will certainly not think that I was the author of this
fall, but, Gallagher suggests, it is still I who am falling. Again, the point is that while in
extreme cases of dissociation, the feeling of lacking agency or ownership or both might
be persistent and hence, pathological, in normal everyday embodied action, we rarely, if
ever, experience this ‗dysphoria.‘
The point of highlighting the ways in which agency and ownership can be
disrupted in both pathological and non-pathological cases is to allow a space in which to
ask the more pressing question: exactly what should we make of the phenomenological
fact that ‗I‘ can sometimes be dissociated from ‗my‘ body? In other words, have we not
simply spun our wheels describing and trying to understand all these bodily breakdowns
only to come to the conclusion that the subjective accounts given by those experiencing
them are simply at odds with a more objective or scientific understanding of
embodiment? While it might seem that this is the case, another look at the levels at which
dysphoria might be experienced indicates that the I-taking-myself-as-object seems to only
occur reflectively. Consider as an example, someone with unilateral neglect. To be sure,
upon speaking to a person with this condition, we learn that a sense of ownership is
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missing, but, we might wonder, is this loss of ownership present all the time? If a person
with unilateral neglect is walking down the street while talking to a friend and window
shopping, the parts of the body otherwise neglected by the brain, are functioning
normally insofar as they are instrumental to the task at hand. A person with this condition
maintains agency over the disowned limb therefore at the pre-reflective level because, I
submit, the body schema is functioning as usual. However, the body schema, given that it
is inherently pre-reflective and non-imagistic, does not maintain ownership over one part
of the body, while losing it over another. In what Sartre (1956) calls the pre-reflective
unity of conscious experience, in other words, there are no divisions among parts of the
body, or experiential axes such as owning and authoring. Once the dissociation occurs,
we are already representing to ourselves the specific part or parts from which we feel
detached. It is my contestation that this is the case for all bodily dysphorias – that they
occur experientially at a body-imagistic and reflective level of awareness.
The point here is to demonstrate how often the scientific account of ‗bodies‘ is
irrelevant in determining who and where we are. The pathological cases illustrate an
extreme end of such unimportance but they shed light on the ways in which although
normal embodiment is usually subtended by the mutual interdependence of schematic
processes, ownership, agency, and a body image, even these can be disrupted in moments
of reflection or in times of externally generated loss of control.

3.6 Conclusion: Soft-Assembled Subjects
Another way to think about embodied subjectivity in light of the cases we have
discussed is to compare the way ‗the body‘ is experienced in pathologic cases and the
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way it shows up in manipulated experimental designs. One such example is the ‗Rubber
Hand Illusion‘ in which participants have one hand occluded behind a curtain. Next to
their hand, they also see a rubber hand or some such replica of a human hand. The
experimenter will then stroke both hands simultaneously with a paintbrush while the
participant stares at the rubber hand. The majority of persons in such experiments report
feeling the sensation of the brushing in the spatial location of the rubber hand and not
their actual biologically attached appendage. Thus, simply by cutting off the visual
contiguity between ‗me‘ and a specific part of my body, external parts of the world that
would otherwise not be part of my proprioceptive awareness become incorporated into
my experience, so much so that I am convinced that where my experience is being felt is
not even in my body.
What is striking about the Rubber Hand Illusion and others like it is that ‗where I
am‘ is not totally about my actual biological body, but instead, this sense of self arises by
the soft assemblage of my biological body, external props, and direct manipulation.
Turning back to pathology for a moment, it is worth noting that in treating
somatoparaphrenia, one preferred method is to place a mirror in between the two legs,
with the one that is owned occluded from view, and then allowing patients to attempt to
move their ‗owned‘ leg while looking in the mirror. The subject would move their
unaffected leg and simultaneously see in the mirror, the unaffected leg appearing as the
affected leg. This would then link the motor pattern and body schema to their conscious
awareness of the leg as theirs (cf. Ramachandran & Hirstein, 1998).
Cognition involves thinking to be sure, but it also to a large extent, involves
placing myself in space in relation to the rest of the world, a feat achieved not simply by
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an introspective account of my ‗body,‘ but by a richly endowed embodied understanding
of where that body is in space. Given our discussion so far concerning how malleable this
embodiment can be, the intracranialists should be more concerned than ever. Pointing
towards the body, or worse, the head, as the site of ‗cognitive subjectivity‘ is only one
component among a whole array of other tools we employ in order to experience
ourselves as agents, owners, and thinkers. If this chapter has not been compelling enough
as to this soft assembly argument about cognition, then it might help to consider another
important facet of embodiment that will most assuredly shape the way cognitive subjects
are constituted. For all the claims that the new wave ‗embodied cognition‘ approaches,
whether they be of the HEMC or the HOC variety, attempt to understand the ‗whole
body‘ and how it ‗shapes the mind,‘ hardly any of these scientists or philosophers of
mind have actually attempted to understand this entire organism to which they pay
homage, in which they embed cognition, and on which they center ‗the mind.‘ Perhaps
one of the most salient ways we can see embodiment actually molding mentality arises
from biological sex and the gender roles that get attached to these categories. In my
opinion, there is no better way to see the ways in which subjectivity is ‗soft assembled‘
than to peer into the construction of gender roles, sexual identity, and embodied
sexuality. In the following chapter therefore, I aim to first argue that an account of
embodied subjectivity not only must include sexed bodies as part of its story, but it must
begin with them – indeed, a viable account of ‗having and being a body,‘ I will argue, is
not possible without such a conceptualization. I will then go on to argue that the soft
assemblage of gender, which is the very basis of subjectivity itself, is always already
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constituted as a hybrid of biotechnological and sociological tools, none of which are
reducible to nor contained solely within, the biological body.
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Chapter 4
Sexing Embodiment: The Phenomenology of Gender, Sex, and Sexuality
The emotional, sexual, and psychological stereotyping of females begins when the doctor
says, "It's a girl." – Shirley Chisholm
Hence it is that the shape of something is especially meaningful. – James Gibson

4.1 Introduction
As discussed in chapter one, an important shift in thinking occurred when Gibson
(1954; 1979) introduced his theory of affordances. The ‗ecological approach‘ to
perception, as it is often called, provided an interactionist framework that rejected the
inner-outer split between mental and physical processes. The world shows up to us in
meaningful ways insofar as it affords us a range of potential actions. However, our bodies
themselves determine to a large extent just how useful an object in the world will be, a
point Merleau-Ponty (1962) stressed well before Gibson‘s theory was fully codified.
While there are marked differences between Gibson‘s and Merleau-Ponty‘s theories of
perception, the overall picture is the same: perception is a feature of humans + their
environments and cannot be conceived wholly ‗in‘ the human, as the standard view
would have it.
Because, however, Merleau-Ponty is steeped in the traditions of Husserl,
Heidegger, Scheler and others, he is less inclined to focus on the specific biological
underpinnings of embodiment and more on the experiential elements that comprise
interaction with the world. In this regard, he employs the use of the ‗lived body‘ as a
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means through which action and perception are possible. The lived body is not simply an
‗organism‘ in which we can observe perception occurring. Like Gibson, Merleau-Ponty
stresses that the dynamic interaction of our bodies with the world is what constitutes
perception. Our environment plays a crucial role in shaping what we are able to perceive
and what we can do, such as in the case of certain objects appearing ‗sittable‘ to us – in
Gibson‘s terminology, they afford us sitting opportunities – while others, like cacti, do
not. Perceiving these affordances requires interacting with the objects themselves and
hence, perception is not a matter of inwardly cognizing an externally constituted world.
Thus, both Merleau-Ponty and Gibson therefore emphasize the mutual interdependence
between ‗us‘ and the world, albeit with slightly different aims. While Gibson tends to
focus on the ways in which our physiology shapes our perception of the world – a world
in which objects have significance for us based on their physical size, shape, and ‗fit‘
with our bodies – Merleau-Ponty extends this discussion to encompass not just the ways
in which the body is lived through but how it can thought about. In particular, MerleauPonty adds to the discussion the way we form images of our bodies, images which then
come to be an important source of who and what we think we are.
These interactionist approaches fit nicely with the argument from chapter three,
that embodiment, and not simply ‗the body,‘ is the proper starting point for grasping what
cognition comprises on the one hand and what it is to be a cognitive subject on the other.
Much like the ‗lived body‘ and its environmental affordances, the phrase ‗embodiment‘ is
intended to capture the way that body+world should be the focal point of any theory of
cognition and cognitive subjectivity. There are reasons to think that simply examining the
brain, even when trying to determine the correlate of pathological embodiments such as

120

AHS, will not tell us much about what it‟s like to have this syndrome. Likewise, to talk
about ‗the organism‘ is still only to discuss an object, whereas the ‗human subject‘
involves more than skin and skull. Nevertheless, there are important ways in which the
body as a physical object delimits the range of experiences we can have. Indeed, Clark
(2008) recognizes the necessity of the brain for cognition, as he is even willing to grant it
a ‗central‘ role, and hence, there are certain biological facts about the body that must be
true in order for the kinds of cognitive experiences we generally call ‗human‘ to take
place. This chapter will therefore be an attempt to uncover some of the ways in which
bodies – those physical organisms that I argued to be only part of the story of
embodiment – shape cognition and help constitute subjectivity.
Rather than proceed by way of endless examples from vision, haptic perception,
or skeletal construction, which provide rich accounts of the way the human body is said
to constitute bodily affordances,26 I shall focus on an aspect of the body, as well as of
embodiment, that is even more fundamental to cognition, but one that is systematically
overlooked in cognitive science. To be sure, one can be an embodied subject and not
have eyes with which to see. One can also be, like IW, lacking in particular
proprioceptive abilities or perhaps, like someone suffering from a Hereditary Sensory
Autonomic Pathology (HSAP), rendering them insensitive to pain, heat or cold. The
definition of being an embodied subject cannot be essentialized by reference to skeletal
structure either. Being bipedal is a feature of most humans, but not all. And, as we have
seen, even having all limbs intact is not sufficient for experiencing them as your own or
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Besides of course, Gibson (1966), others have offered detailed accounts of the way the visual system (cf.
Martinez-Conde, 2009), haptic perception (cf. Streri & Spelke, 1989), and the body generally (cf. Varela,
Thompson, &Rosch, 1991; Noё & O‘Regan, 2001) shape the way the world shows up and likewise, the
way our bodies are molded and adapted to the world.
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maintaining control over each of them. There remains however, one element of ‗the
body‘ as yet unconsidered, but one that is more essential than any other phenotypical trait
thus far discussed. This facet is the sexed body and unlike ‗tall,‘ ‗fat,‘ ‗blind,‘ or
‗athletic‘ bodies, the descriptors marking out which sex a body is are always already at
play, even if precisely what that sex amounts to is questionable. Whenever I conceive of
myself as this or that kind of person – a professor, a dancer, a swimmer – it is always
implied that I am also female. I might not represent this fact to myself explicitly with
every action I perform, much like I don‘t always represent my body generally to myself if
I am engaged in an activity such as running, in which I need not think about my body;
rather I simply act through it. Nevertheless, much like there is a tacit knowledge of where
my body is in relationship to other objects, so too is there an always present awareness
that I am not just person, but a female person. It is one of the most fundamental forms of
identification and also one of the most universal. No matter which corner of the world or
in what linguistic group you find yourself, checking a box for ‗M‘ or ‗F‘ is crucial to
identifying who and what you are. For the most part, people can be classified as male or
female, with rare exceptions, who are collectively termed ‗intersexed,‘ and this personal
categorization is based on biological facts about the body – genitalia, chromosomes,
hormones - but just how much do these facts shape embodiment? To ask a slightly
different yet related question: If there is a body schema, a program for action that
underpins all embodiment, to what extent is this schema ‗sexed‘?
It will be my contention that for the most part, biological sex is not an inherent
feature of embodiment but is instead an artifact of science, which is itself a byproduct of
sociocultural and historical context. This is not to suggest that there are not ‗female‘ and
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‗male‘ bodies in the world, but just as it can be claimed that human ‗organism‘ is only
one description, a biological understanding in particular, of the whole ‗person,‘ female
and male bodies will only tell as a partial story about ‗gendered subjects.‘ While it will be
a matter of contention to what extent sex, in the strictly biological sense is prior to, a
result of, or reducible to gender – the way ‗I‘ show up to myself and the world as
feminine, masculine, a hybridization of the two, or some other categorization – and vice
versa, it will remain the case 1) that biological sex is only one among many facets of
gendered subjectivity, and more generally, cognitive subjectivity, and 2) that both sex
and gender have been relatively ignored in cognitive science and philosophy of mind,
thereby overlooking several crucial constituting factors subtending cognition and
embodied subjectivity In order to defend these claims, I will examine the ways that sexed
bodies actually afford the subjects who own them specific actions, perceptions, and
cognitions, but also, the ways in which the world and the objects present in it will show
up differently based on sexual identification. Such descriptions will not however, come
from the standard literature on cognition, as there really is not much from which to draw.
Instead, I will turn to feminist theory about the body and embodiment in order to provide
an account of these ‗gendered affordances.‘ In turn, by doing so, it will be my further
claim that ‗the sexed body,‘ much like ‗the body‘ in general, can often be at odds with, is
always insufficient for, and is never prior to gendered embodiment.

4.2 Lived Bodies and Life-Worlds
That our bodies are important elements in the overall understanding of how the
world shows up is deeply rooted in philosophical history. However, this idea is typically
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founded upon the more negative assumption that the body is corruptive, and the senses,
albeit the primary means by which we receive information about the world, are not to be
trusted. One need only consider Plato‘s theory of the tripartite soul (cf. Republic, II-IV)
or Descartes‘ infamous rejection of sensory knowledge in favor of ‗clear and distinct
conception,‘ to get the gist. Even the great empiricist, Hume, who thought all knowledge
must originate in sensory experience, was quick to remind us that at best, we can hope to
be fairly certain about the associations we draw from those sense impressions. What
Hume did do however, was to remind us that despite the epistemological uncertainty
which accompanies knowledge via sensory impressions, this source – the body – is our
only mode of interaction with the world. Thus, according to Hume, any notion of
disembodied egos or pure rationality detached from embodied experience was speculative
but also uninteresting. If we want to uncover the basis of human knowledge and
cognition, we must start, he claims, with sensory experience.
Consider, for example, what Husserl (1936) says of the life-world and how we
‗arrive on the scene‘ ready to actively constitute ourselves and our environment in a
shared ‗we-subjectivity:‘
In whatever way we may be conscious of the world as universal horizon, as
coherent universe of existing objects, we, each ―I-the-man‖ and all of us together,
belong to the world as living with one another in the world; and the world is our
world, valid for our consciousness as existing precisely through this ‗living
together.‘ [1936; 109]
The universal condition of humanity remains that of ‗I-the-man‘ and so we should not
expect any theories regarding bodies or embodiment to be concerned with sexual
difference, as this would be somehow after-the-fact of ‗our‘ shared living together, in
‗our‘ world.
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Merleau-Ponty (1962) makes some effort to account for ‗The Body in its Sexual
Being,‘ when he claims that ―a handless or sexless man is as inconceivable as one
without the power of thought‖ (170). In order to unpack this simply stated yet highly
dense and problematic assertion, it is helpful to consider it in the context of the rest of the
chapter. This section of A Vindication of the Rights of Women is full of insightful ways in
which sexuality indeed molds cognition, but it fails to take properly into account the way
that sex itself, the way a person is identified biologically as female or male, provides a
schema through which the world ‗shows up.‘ So, on the one hand, if Merleau-Ponty
means to suggest that ‗having a hand‘ and ‗having a sex‘ are both necessary constituents
of embodiment, he does very little to demonstrate how and why this might be the case.
Sexuality, the way Merleau-Ponty uses it in this section, refers to some sort of
conglomeration of gender identity and sexual orientation. Hence, he provides us with
examples of sexual preference – masculine males who also desire feminine females,
feminine females who prefer a masculine male, females who like other females, and so
forth. And certainly, these sexual preferences will shape the way one perceives the world.
Indeed, if I am a more masculine female but I still prefer masculine males as partners,
one can only imagine the sorts of behaviors – from everything to my dress, the activities I
engage in, ways I go about flirting and seducing the other sex, and so on – that are
contingent upon the fact that I perceive myself as a more masculinized female than most
other females, but that my sexual orientation still draws me to masculine males.
Nevertheless, these complex and socially informed categories – gender and sexuality –
are typically thought to be a level removed from ―sex‖ as a biological category. Thus, we
never really get a sense that Merleau-Ponty is interested in asking the question: how does
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the actual sexed body, prior to these gender roles and desires, inform perception, if at
all? Nevertheless, a closer look at Merleau-Ponty‘s treatment of bodily signification
might suggest that he means not to tease the two apart, such that when he does discuss the
socially informed gender roles one might take up, he is at once describing the way the
sexed body is given meaning.
To use ‗having a hand‘ as an analogy seems a bit of an odd similitude to draw, for
surely, there are important ways in which having or not having a hand will alter the way
the world appears, and Merleau-Ponty, much like Gibson, does not overlook this fact.
The book is rife with examples of the body and its relationship to the world. In The
Visible and the Invisible, we find a unique discussion of the hands in particular, and their
ability to both touch and be touched – as in the case of touching one of my hands to the
other – he is hyper-aware of the ways in which particular biological facts about our
embodiment lend themselves to very specialized ways of knowing the world, but also our
bodies. In a moment of touching one hand to another, there is a ―reversibility‖ of subject
and object, which he describes as a ―veritable touching of the touch, when my right hand
touches my left hand while it is palpating the things, where the 'touching subject' passes
over to the rank of the touched‖ (1968; 133-4). In other words, what has come to be
roughly termed ‗proprioception‘ – that sixth sense of where my body is ‗in the world‘ and
where the parts of my body are in relation to one another, is highly malleable and
contingent upon an ever shifting sense of agency and ownership of these discrete
elements. In one moment, my hand-agent, the one doing the touching, can be turned into
a hand-object, the one being touched. Likewise, as we have seen in previous chapters,
there is reason to believe this sort of reversibility between subject and object of
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perception occurs with tools as well, such as in the Rubber Hand Illusion or simply in
everyday pre-reflective body-machine incorporation.
Nevertheless, we are still left wondering just how this ―necessary‖ element of
embodiment – having a hand – is in any way like the necessity of having a sex. First, it
should be noted that Merleau-Ponty fails to even consider those who are missing a hand
or are missing both, either congenitally or due to amputation. Thus, we might wonder just
how much does perception get shaped by having a hand? Moreover, despite the lengthy
discussion of gender roles and sexual desire, there is no discussion of the ways in which
the sexed body, qua necessary constituent of the human body, molds cognition. We do
not find any sort of analogue between the highly interesting subject-object reversal made
possible by the proprioception of the hands, nor are there any insights into the ways in
which this necessary fact of human existence – that it is sexed – plays into gender roles
and sexuality. So, on the one hand, it is satisfying to find a philosopher who recognizes
that it is not just any body that is always already present to us in perception, but his or her
body; on the other, it is quite unsatisfying that the analogy between necessarily having a
hand and having a sex is never fully explained.
There is one way to interpret the passage however, that might help better relate it
to Merleau-Ponty‘s overarching project, and simultaneously, to the project in which I am
engaged. As the example of subject-object reversibility in touching the hands together
suggests, I do not conceive of my hand necessarily as a subject nor as an object. What is
necessary is that depending on the action, my hand can show up as either one. In the
Phenomenology of Perception, likewise, we find this passage concerning the ‗having of‘
a body and its constituent parts:
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There is in human existence no unconditioned possession, and yet no fortuitous
attribute. Human existence will force us to revise our usual notion of necessity
and contingence because it is the transformation of contingency into necessity by
the act of repetition [1962, 170].
If necessity of bodily-having is only made so through repetition of otherwise contingent
facets of embodiment, then we can begin to understand the ―impossibility‖ of conceiving
a handless or sexless person as a fact not so much about the biological body itself, but
instead, about the ways in which the body is utilized in action. Having hands becomes
necessary through the repeated use of them in human activity, but they are indeed
contingent, as not all persons have hands. In terms of sexed bodies, it is even more
difficult to imagine a body without a sex and yet, the reason for this ‗necessary fact‘
about bodies is shows up as necessary through the constant repeating of gender roles,
sexual desires and actions, and other socially sedimented truths about who and what
males and females are. In other words, this particular reading of Merleau-Ponty on sex
suddenly bears a strong resemblance to Butler‘s (1993) argument concerning
performativity as the chief mode of production of sexed bodies. As she suggests in
Bodies that Matter, the signification of bodies proceeds first by way of examining what
bodies do – how they perform – and thus, the lived body is always cast as a man or a
woman. The repeated performance in which we all engage as man or as woman – much
like Merleau-Ponty‘s argument runs – allows for the ‗material reality‘ of the body to be
cast as necessarily male or female.
To be sure, my interpretation is reading quite a bit into Merleau-Ponty and when
it comes to perception in general, all of the interesting differentiations he draws between
maleness and femaleness seem to disappear. Namely, we get a story about perception qua
human, as if all the differences in bodily comportment based on sex did not matter:
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In perception we do not think the object and we do not think ourselves thinking it,
we are given over to the object and we merge into this body which is better
informed than we are about the world [1962; 238].
The assumed universal humanity that merges into ‗this‘ body, supposedly contains
wisdom of which even ‗we‘ are unaware. In fact, this is precisely how Merleau-Ponty
characterizes his schema corporel, and what Gallagher (2005) translates as the body
schema, both theorists suggesting that body-knowledge normally operates whether we
consciously represent it to ourselves or not. For Merleau-Ponty and Gallagher alike, in
most of our everyday actions, such as pouring ourselves a drink, or grasping an egg to
make an omelet, our body ‗knows‘ all sorts of laws of physics and dynamics, such that
when we go to explain how we were able to pick up the egg and use just the right amount
of pressure to firmly grasp it and yet not crush it in our hands, unless we are in fact
physicists, we usually cannot.
But is it true that regardless of sex, our bodies all know the same things? In other
words, do ‗we‘ all have the same comportment to the world and does the world show up
to ‗us‘ as ‗human bodies‘ in ways similar enough to discount sexual identity as any
importantly formative aspect of that embodied perception? The answer to these questions
is, I think, no. In the following section, I will explore arguments, some of which
originated contemporaneously with Merleau-Ponty, that compel us to think that how ‗we‘
are sexed changes the way the world of objects affords us action and thus, how ‗we‘ think
about and experience this world.
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4.3 Girl Bodies
In The Second Sex, Simone de Beauvoir (1949) provides a detailed account of the
‗woman‘s situation,‘ paying particular attention to the ways in which women exist in a
contradictory recognition of their humanity, on the one hand, and their objecthood, or
being-for on the other hand. While western rational discourse tends to afford men the
status of ‗pure reason‘ and a promise to transcend the confines of bodily immanence,
Beauvoir argues that in particular, because of regulative bodily functions such as
menstruation, women are never entirely free. Her body must be kept watch over,
monitored, cleaned, and adorned – tasks that deter her from being a fully transcendent
person. In other words, it is because of the sexed body itself that the norms of society,
which place women in the home, with the children, and on a pedestal as an object of
beauty, get constructed. Thus, Beauvoir contributes to an already emerging distinction –
one that traces back at least to Mary Wollstonecraft27 and one that also surfaces in the
literary works Virginia Woolf,28 Katherine Mansfield,29 and many more – between the
sexed body and the gendered person. Take, for example, what Wollstonecraft concludes
at the end of her third chapter:
In the superior ranks of life how seldom do we meet with a man with superior
abilities or even common acquirements? The reason appears to me clear, the state
they are born in was an unnatural one. The human character has ever been formed
by the employments the individual, or class, pursues; and if the faculties are not
sharpened by necessity, they must remain obtuse [1792; 56].

27

A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, 1792.
Most notably in Mrs. Dalloway (1925) is the tension between a woman‘s ‗nature‘ as a caregiver, mother,
object of beauty, etc (as is the dominant theme of party-preparation, which comprises an entire day and
subsequently the entire novel) and the author‘s own struggle to live the life of an intellectual, a tension
presented in many ways throughout the novel, in particular, the shifting nomenclature of the protagonist
from ‗Mrs. Dalloway‘ to ‗Clarissa.‘ See also A Room of One‟s Own (1929) and The Waves (1931).
29
Cf. The Garden Party, 1922.
28
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The idea here is that being born ‗male‘ does not imply that this nature includes with it
superior intelligence or any other supreme achievement. Like any other faculty,
intelligence must be acquired through learning, practice, and repetition, regardless of
one‘s sex. It just so happens, according to Wollstonecraft, that women are not generally
educated and as such, this socially contingent fact about one‘s role in society is
transferred onto the body of all females as an inherent and necessary truth. There are of
course, some interesting parallels with this account of necessity and that of MerleauPonty‘s discussed above, namely, that it is through acting, over and over again, that the
body and all its trappings begin to show up as necessarily implying this or that ability.
Likewise, Beauvoir teases apart sex and gender to expose the contingency of the
latter concealed as a necessary outcome of the former. While being a female is a given,
she claims, femininity or this ‗mysterious feminine essence‘ is entirely constructed,
contingent, and not relegated to a particular body type by any ontological necessity.
Nevertheless, it has historically been treated in precisely this way. Female bodies are
passive, receptive, regulated by cycles, and less capable of performing strenuous tasks,
and hence, female minds are incapable of robust existential freedom, that transcendence
promised by rational contemplation by an intellect unfettered by such worldly constraints.
If we try to dissolve the entailment between biological sex and gender roles however,
then the distinction opens the door for invaluable reconfigurations of women‘s roles in
society, from the home into the workplace. But, as Young (1980) points out, ―Beauvoir
tends to create the impression that it is woman‘s anatomy and physiology as such that at
least in part determine her unfree status‖ (29). This is because rather than focusing on the
ways women actually move about, occupy, and live in the world, Beauvoir takes ‗the
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female body‘ itself as the basis from which all limitations arise. While she tries to
separate the one from the other – biological sex as the ‗given‘ and gender identity as
constructed – Young argues that Beauvoir still insists that it is a feature of the female sex
itself which gives rise to the common historical and societal understanding of gender
roles and their relationship to it.
Like Young, I will eventually argue that the sexed body, as a static thing, is not
enough to explain the seemingly asymmetrical lived experiences of men and women;
rather, we must look to gender embodiment for this. Exploring gendered embodiment
will thereby lead to the conclusion that unlike Beauvoir‘s original claim that the sexed
body determines the unfree and factic nature of our lived experiences, it is often quite the
other way around. Namely, the sexed body is much more an artifact of gendered
experience and arguably does not even make sense outside of such considerations, much
like ‗the organism‘ only makes sense within a web of scientific enquiry, social contracts
concerning bodily boundaries, and an account of subjectivity that transcends those
boundaries. Nevertheless, as is the case with ‗the body‘ generally, differently sexed
bodies should afford us particular actions and perceptions to some degree, so it is worth
exploring why Beauvoir and others postulated that the ‗giveneness‘ of these bodies
should be so deterministic of their action potentials.
Young begins by examining the psychological literature about women‘s bodily
comportment, noting specifically Straus‘ (1966) descriptions of girls‘ bodies as opposed
to boys‘ bodies during activities such as throwing a ball. While the boy makes use of his
whole body and extends towards the target, almost as if to travel with the ball himself, the
girl simply swings her arm, leaving her spine, legs, and shoulders relatively still. Straus
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goes on to claim that since these differences are observed at such an early age, there must
be inherent anatomical discrepancies in female and male embodiment, such that girls are
simply born bad throwers, while boys come equipped to play baseball. However, through
extensive research, Young goes on to show that there are other bodily movements,
postures, and attitudes that arrive on the scene much later in life, all of which are mainly
attributed to feminine persons and female bodies, but none of which are necessarily the
case, based solely on biological sex. For example, women tend to keep their legs close
together or crossed when sitting, a posture little girls do not readily maintain. Likewise,
while men move freely and openly, swinging their arms and walking with large strides,
women tend to remain more closed into themselves, arms crossed over their bodies,
books held into their chests, taking shorter, more careful steps. Young even cites a
personal example from hiking with male companions; while they bounded across a
stream, she hesitantly tested out certain stones, held onto branches, and calculated her
movements. As she describes it, ―I do not believe it is easy for me, even though once I
take a committed step I am across in a flash‖ (34). Here Young expounds on Beauvoir‘s
original thesis: women experience their bodies as encumbrances, but moreover, we are
taught to be afraid of getting hurt and as such, our actions will reflect such timidity.
To be sure, not all women fit this characterization, which is why it is easy to claim
that we are taught and not born into our bodily postures and attitudes. What is more
illuminating however, is that from this account of motility rather than from a strictly
biological understanding of bodies, Young is at least able to begin bridging the gap
between experiencing one‘s body ‗as an object‘ versus living through the body as a
means to achieve desired actions. In other words, by focusing on actions themselves, we
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can begin to give a robust phenomenology of Beauvoir‘s original intuition; namely that in
performing tasks, women often must focus on their bodies as objects to be manipulated,
fragile encumbrances, and a manifestation of their awkward immanence, while at the
same time existing as human, as a free and knowing subject. Thus, women occupy the
rather tenuous space between free and unfree, human and non-human.

A similar

tension is present in Merleau-Ponty‘s account of embodiment generally. Although he was
not as concerned about the differences between the sexes, save the few problematic
passages discussed above, his account of intentionality as being rooted in embodiment
provides thinkers like Young with a much more concrete phenomenological description
of the way ‗the body‘ can be an object for me and at the same time can be a subject, one
which is me. Compared to a Husserlian I-pole, wherein a relatively disembodied ego is
always the subject of intentional consciousness or even Sartre‘s account of the ‗for itself‘
and the ‗in itself‘ – which describes consciousness, and not necessarily embodied
consciousness, as both a possible intentional object but also the subject of intentionality30
– Merleau-Ponty extends these discussions to encompass the body as both the subject and
object of experience. As he asserts, perception emerges from the interrelatedness of
situation and environment and not purely from a knowing subject. And as we have seen,
his contemporary, Gibson, puts forth a similar thesis, namely, that while the body is
important for determining the space of possible actions, the world is what affords us the
ability to discern such action potentials. Likewise, the view of enactive perception (cf.
Noё 2009; 2004; Noё & O‘Reagan, 2001; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch 1991) seeks to

30

Although Sartre is pays much more homage to the body as a constituting element of conscious
experience. Nevertheless, we do not find such a robust account of the body-as-conscious and body-asobject-of-consciousness as we do in Merleau-Ponty, nor do we find the extension of this experiencing
subject into the world of objects, such as we find with the example of a blind man and his cane.
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maintain Gibsonian currency by claiming that it is in the dynamic process of interacting
with the world that perception arises. No example better characterizes the ramifications
of these approaches than Merleau-Ponty‘s explication of a blind man using his cane to
navigate through the world. In determining where to place his next step or surveying the
terrain, the interface between the man and the world – the one that matters for the
perceptual action that is – is not his hand, which is clutching the cane. Indeed, the cane,
through which the man receives signals and perceptual cues and the end of which is
actually the point of contact with the ‗world‘ the man is navigating, is the real interface.
To put it another way, while the man is engaged actively in trying to find his way around,
the cane is not an object-for his intentional consciousness; rather, it is a that-throughwhich the world appears. This account of embodied cognition which allows for ‗the
body‘ 1) to actively constitute cognition and 2) to encompass more than just the
biological organism allows the further interpretation that the image I form of my body
when I am in the mode of taking it as an object for me might very well depend upon what
would, under other conditions, be considered ‗external to me.‘ However, Merleau-Ponty
retains the Husserlian notion of presence-in-absence, even with respect to the body. Like
any perceptual object, whose manifold of sides, aspects and profiles is always only
partially given to us, the body is never entirely an object for me, as ―it is that by which
there are objects. It is neither tangible nor visible as it is that which sees and touches‖
(92). While I can never escape my body and retreat into pure thought, I can also never
have my body in its totality as an intentional object. Its presence to me consists partially
in its absence – I am always confronted with what Noё (2009) has referred to recently as
a ―presabsence.‖ Much like I can walk around a chair and try to see it in its entirety, but
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fail to do so as the once visible sides retreat into invisibility while the others emerge into
my visual field, so too will parts of my body elude me.
Returning to the discussion of gendered embodiment, on Merleau-Ponty‘s
account, it would seem that all human existence, at least at some time or another,
occupies that contradictory location between immanence and transcendence. At a
fundamental phenomenological level, as described above, we are never entirely for
ourselves, but our embodied subjectivity does transcend ‗the body‘ itself. Nevertheless,
as Young (2005) ingeniously points out, by looking at the specific actions and social
spheres that women occupy, the tension is perhaps felt stronger by women who are
constantly expected to be both a subject and an object, rather than simply living through
their bodies. Thus, in an action such as crossing a rocky stream during hiking, I
experience an ambiguous transcendence – I must confront my own body as an object to
manipulate while at the same time acting through my body as subject of the perceived
action, an inhibited intentionality – the bodily ―I can‖ with which possibilities are opened
up for me in the world, is often replaced with a ―I cannot,‖ (or an ―I should not,‖ or ―I
can, but I have to really be careful about it‖) and a discontinuous unity – while being one
unified subject, I must also take my feet as objects unto themselves, discontinuous from
me in a sense, as I try to move myself over the treacherous terrain (35-38).
While I think extending Merleau-Ponty‘s phenomenology of embodiment into the
realm of feminist theorizing about the body is a much needed and helpful endeavor, I
want to suggest that Young‘s account is only the beginning of a successful and
comprehensive story. Besides discussing the ways in which female embodiment is
enacted in various motilities and postures, more needs to be said about the way the body
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itself shows up to me, such that this last mode – discontinuous unity – is experienced.
Young only hints at the ways I might represent my body both as a whole and as a
collection of discrete parts, and I think this is because the focus has so far been too much
on the ―Phenomenology‖ part of Merleau-Ponty‘s work, and not so much on the
―Perception‖ aspect. I now turn to perceiving the body, namely in the form of the ―body
image‖ in order to expound on Young‘s original project.
One way of accounting phenomenologically for the difference between growing
up female and growing up male would be to appeal to the way the body itself is
represented. The way I perceive my body during action is multi-dimensional; hence,
many theorists from many different arenas have cashed in on explaining the various
modes of body-representation. Merleau-Ponty‘s claim that knowledge of my body is
always already a living through my body has its roots in psychological trends prior to his
work. Elizabeth Grosz (1994), for example, concisely traces Schilder‘s development of
the ―body image‖ in order to show how it influenced Merleau-Ponty‘s conception of the
‗lived body‘ as prior to the known body. Much like Merleau-Ponty, Schilder spends a
significant amount of time discussing phantom limbs as a means to argue that the way we
experience our bodies is often different than the objective accounts we give of them.
Furthermore, the ‗image‘ I have of my body is not static and can change based on how I
am living my body. To cite again Merleau-Ponty‘s example of a blind man incorporating
a cane into his body-image such that the end of the cane and not the end of the man‘s
hand is said to be the outer-limit of his embodiment, there is a similitude between this
account and Schilder‘s idea that the body image can expand, contract, and can include
‗objects‘ that would otherwise appear foreign to it, depending on the role those objects
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play in a given action. The body image, for Schilder and Merleau-Ponty, is not an
isolated representation of the body, but instead, as Grosz argues, is a postural schema of
the body, its position and situation, and the environment. This is significant in terms of
the differences in bodily comportment among various types of persons because, as she
puts it:
The body image does not map a biological body onto a psychosocial domain,
providing a kind of translation of material into conceptual terms; rather it attests
to the necessary interconstituency of each for the other, the radical inseparability
of biological from psychical elements, the mutual dependence of the
psychological from the biological, and thus the intimate connection between the
question of sexual specificity and psychical identity [1994; 85].
I think Grosz is correct to point out this important unifying element in bodily awareness
and to suggest that it might provide the link between how my body is experienced both as
an object for me and the subject of the actions in which I engage. Indeed, if neither my
biological body nor my gendered psyche can solely constitute who I am, as both are
modes of knowing my body and are always preceded by living through my body, then
explaining the body image as a postural schema that situates me in a world, allows
objects to show up at all for me, including my own body, seems like a plausible
interpretation. Nevertheless, if we are to understand why I experience my body in the
way Beauvoir describes it, as being overlain with immanence, especially in actions
requiring me to distance myself from my body, or in cases where I face the world with an
―I cannot,‖ it might be rather hasty to conflate the notions of image and schema here. If it
can be shown that for the most part, what is meant by body-image is still itself a mode of
taking the body as an object for me, then perhaps the unifying modality is not imagistic at
all, but is more kinesthetic, enacted, schematic.
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Given what was discussed in chapter three concerning Gallagher‘s definitions of
the body image and body schema, I think there is good reason to take such empirical
findings seriously in a phenomenology of sexed and gendered embodiment. It is not
enough however, to simply apply findings in cognitive science in order to embellish
phenomenological descriptions. I intend to show as well that much of the phenomenology
surrounding ‗the lived body,‘ is actually missing or largely overlooked in cognitive
science and philosophy of mind. In particular, I think the differences described by
feminist phenomenology between male and female embodiment add to the discussion
present in Gallagher‘s body image/body schema distinction. Paying attention to these
phenomena thereby opens up new ways of broaching the subject of ‗abnormal
embodiment,‘ discussed in the previous chapter and if we go on to consider a case of
‗abnormal gendered embodiment,‘ such as Gender Identity Disorder (GID), the
distinction needed for dialogue between the two – phenomenology and cognitive science
– will be ever more clear. Let us first recount Gallagher‘s distinction.
The conceptual distinction between body image and body schema is as follows: ―a
body image consists of a system of perceptions, attitudes and beliefs pertaining to one‘s
own body. In contrast, a body schema is a system of sensory-motor capacities that
function without awareness or the necessity of perceptual monitoring‖ (2005, 24). Of
course, conceptual distinctions only go so far when trying to give a detailed description
of actual embodiment, especially a phenomenology of the gendered body. Nonetheless,
recalling Gallagher and Cole‘s rich account of IW, there is also empirical as well as
phenomenological evidence to endorse such a distinction.
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In terms of female and male embodiment then, the body image would include all
the socially constructed norms of gender attached to the sexed body. As a ‗woman,‘ I
might form an image of myself as embodied in a feminine way; for example, shorter,
weaker, and more fatty than my male counterparts, which will thereby aid in my forming
an ‗I cannot‘ attitude towards many tasks. To be sure, the ‗I cannot‘ attitude is
experienced by men as well, and it is not a universally applicable attitude for all women.
It should come as no shock that in traditionally masculine activities – including many
sporting events and other physical activities such as automobile repair – women are less
likely to feel at ease, while during activities traditionally conceived as feminine –
childcare, perhaps, or knitting – men are less likely to be comfortable. Again, there are
exceptions, but the majority of women are more concerned with their appearance,
keeping themselves safe, and avoiding harm, and as such, will be more timid and
awkward in a situation like the one Young describes of bounding across a rugged
mountainous stream. These empirical facts themselves are not as interesting as are the
modes by which they get constructed. Contrary to Straus‘ claims, it cannot be inherent in
all female bodies that they are just bad at hiking. We are taught to keep clean, to adorn
ourselves, and to avoid harm, while little boys are taught the opposite. All it takes to
refute the Strausian hypothesis is to observe a woman raised as a ‗tomboy,‘ who can outperform her male competitors, to see that much, if not all, of the attitudes we take
towards our embodied actions are learned. Even if we consider less robustly embodied
activities, such as mathematical or scientific reasoning, types of thinking that until
recently, have been dominated by men, we can see that if encouraged and properly
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trained, women can do just as well at these activities they otherwise report being
―naturally bad at.‖
The point of all this discussion is not simply to reiterate an already well-rehearsed
argument that women and men are raised to value different things. Rather, what I want to
highlight is that those very things women are taught to value help to ―cultivate
immanence,‖ as Beauvoir puts it, while the traditionally masculine activities with which
most men feel comfortable, tend to promote full subjectivity and transcendence. As
Wollstonecraft, Woolf, and other proto-feminists note, the ability to be educated, to read,
write, and participate in ‗the life of the mind,‘ has always been highly valued as a sign of
fully actualized humanity, and these activities are those from which women have been
traditionally excluded. What I want to add to this is that the very same promotion of
subjectivity and transcendence is present in the construction of the man as the more
physically adept and athletic of the two sexes. Being able to change your own oil, scale a
cliff wall, or complete a triathlon have been linked to individualism, self-sufficiency,
cleverness, and power, while, as many Marxist feminists (cf. Landry & McLean, 1993)
have noted, housekeeping, childrearing, and other traditionally feminine activities are not.
Thus, the inhibited intentionality and ambiguous transcendence which accompany so
many of women‘s attempts to engage in these activities, even today, as Young points out,
suggests that there is still very much a sense in which ‗my body‘, as a female one, is
incapable and disallowed the privileges of fully actualized subjectivity.
These examples take Gallagher‘s original notion beyond what he intended, but I
am willing to defend them as corollary components in body image deployment. Gender
might not always play a role in motility, but if it does, it most often is a function of a
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body image and not a body schema. It is malleable, subject to manipulation from
without, and is often the product of social conditioning. This is not to say that the body
image I have of myself as woman cannot alter my body schema; quite the contrary, as the
examples I have discussed so far illustrate, if I have constructed an image of myself as
fragile, in need of safe-keeping, or less physically capable than others, eventually, my
body schema will follow suit. In other words, I will automatically act as if these
contingent facts about my body image were necessary truths of my body schema.
Conversely, if the schematic processes subtending an action are already a particular way,
then the body image will alter based on the fluency of motion. We can think of IW here
yet again – his schema was essentially non-existent and as such, his body image
responded to the lack of motility and control by assuming some of the roles otherwise
attributed to the body schema. Likewise, if I have a propensity toward a certain type of
movement – for instance, if I have natural turn-out and flexibility, bodily traits which are
necessary for ballet dancing – the resulting image I have of myself will be one of
capability, but moreover, I will probably not use my body image as much as I would need
to if the actions I was performing were unfamiliar, difficult, or, as in IW‘s case, nearly
impossible.
There are two things worth noting concerning these examples of body image/body
schema influence: first, while the two are easily dissociated conceptually, they are not
always so easily dissociated at an experiential level. Perhaps the best evidence for such a
claim comes from an embodied skill such as dancing. In particular, in ballet, body image
plays a crucial role – as soon as I stop thinking about where my arms are or if my
stomach muscles are engaged, I fall over – and yet, this imagistic representation of where
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I am in space and what all the parts of my body are doing, begins to function almost
schematically, as I improve my technique. Indeed, professional ballet dancers claim to
not think about their bodies at all; however, if you ask them how they executed a specific
movement, they resort back to an explanation that utilizes the body image just as much if
not more than any automatic and unreflective schema. In more everyday examples, the
same would seem to be true. Young‘s account of crossing a stream and feeling awkward
is a case in which the body image might dominate, such that I conceive of myself as less
athletic than my male friends and such already predisposed to awkwardness, but the fact
that this conception of myself can interfere with the subconscious body schema and its
processing suggests not two separate experiential realms, but rather two distinct levels of
awareness, both of which are intimately intertwined, influencing and possibly interfering
with the other, but also potentially working as a unified system.
Second, in discussing the way image informs schema and vice versa, we easily
lose sight of the very concepts we set out to examine in relation to all of this, which was
the role of the sexed and gendered body. This is because when I describe myself in
action, I don‘t really utilize the concepts of female or feminine, so much as I do the
concepts of ‗skilled,‘ ‗athletic,‘ ‗able-bodied,‘ ‗unable,‘ ‗awkward,‘ or ‗timid.‘ To be
sure, I am tacitly aware at all times that I am a woman, and likewise, that my biological
sex is female, but the extent to which this information alters my embodied action is not
entirely clear. What is relatively clear is that in successful motor action, if I utilize an
image of myself at all, it will be a positive one, and it should not matter what sex or
gender I am. Conversely, if I feel awkward or timid when trying to climb a rock wall, I
don‘t explicitly represent to myself the fact that I am a woman and this is why it is
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difficult. I simply feel scared. I might later reflect that if only I were more like my male
friends, I could climb more confidently, but it hardly seems that I do this in the middle of
acting. What I do think is instead, ‗I can,‘ or ‗I cannot,‘ or maybe ‗I hope I can this time.‘
The superordinate categories of ‗masculine‘ and ‗feminine‘ that get attached to the ‗I can‘
and ‗I cannot‘ in various actions are therefore even more malleable than the body image
itself. Women don‘t always have an ‗I cannot‘ attitude. Of course, there are skilled
female athletes, but there is also a vast array of traditionally feminine actions – applying
cosmetics, walking in high-heels, cooking, and perhaps even flirting or specifically
feminine modes of seduction – with which the women who are skilled at them are always
in an ‗I can‘ mode of imagining. The fact that these actions are called feminine, while
fixing a car engine, becoming a physics professor, or being muscular and athletic are
most often conceived of as masculine, does not express a necessary contrast. However, as
Merleau-Ponty notes, through repetition, these otherwise contingent facts become so
ingrained and sedimented that they appear inevitable. One might wonder then, how a
larger, socially agreed upon fact such as ‗women are just better at caring for children‘
becomes encoded in the form of an individual person‘s body image, and then is so
rehearsed that it becomes an automatic and unreflective fact about the body schema. As I
stated earlier, it hardly seems to be the case that in any action, whether I am skilled at or
not, I represent the fact that I am a woman to myself while attempting to perform the
task. And yet, if the body image can and often is the product of social manipulation,
perhaps syllogism – I am a woman, and women are good at X, therefore I am good at X –
does become incorporated into my body image, which then can shape the pre-reflective
body schema. Regardless if the answer to this question is affirmative or negative, what
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remains is that the attachment of particular embodied skills to particular genders is itself
contingent upon socio-historical context and power relations, among other things, in
particular, the idea that whatever is masculine is to be praised and sought after, a
connection which is itself built upon the construct of male-dominance.
The point of the above discussion is to highlight the tenuous nature of a ‗gendered
body image.‘ On the one hand, to be a woman or a man always already implies a set of
traits, abilities, and roles, all of which are contingent upon social context. Thus, to say
that when I utilize a body image and that body image is this or that gender, what is meant
more fundamentally, is that I can, cannot, should, should not, am really good at, am
really terrible at, whatever action I am performing. Nevertheless, since the body image
can always be altered, just as much as the social context from which it arose can change,
all of these ‗truths‘ about the gendered body in action are really never essential and
certainly not necessary.
What then, of the other concept I have been until now purposefully ignoring?
How does biological sex, the part of who and what we are that appears, at least prima
facie, to be a necessary truth about our bodies? While I have argued at length that any
gendered body image we form of ourselves is the product of social construction, it
remains to be discussed whether the physiological facts of our sex shape and change a
person‘s body schema, and the extent to which biological sex figures into body image
construction and utilization. In order to answer these questions however, what must first
be examined is the relationship between ‗the gendered person‘ and ‗the sexed body.‘ As
it turns out, the two are not as separable as they may seem, nor is it as easy as one may
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think to define and delimit necessary and essential components of being a male or being
a female, as these concepts will prove to be quite malleable themselves.
To begin therefore, we will need to ask to what extent the body schema is sexed –
in other words, is there a pre-reflective motor program for males and females based on
the biological differences of the body itself? Most of the studies conducted by
researchers such as Gallagher and Cole (1995)31 are only concerned with seemingly
sexed-neutral general movements and usually those related to the arms, legs, and face.
For instance, while there is a known case of deafferentation32 in a female subject, GL,33
how her body shows up and is lived through in comparison to IW, has been relatively
ignored. Likewise, the differences between female and male Möbius syndrome patients is
not explored, although it would seem that facial expressions and emotion conveyance
would be a fascinating place to look for differences that are potentially the result of a
sexed schema. Regarding phantoms, Gallagher (2005) does mention that research has
shown that mastectomy patients often experience a phantom breast. Even phantom
penises have been reported (cf. Gallagher, 2005; 151). Of course, these phenomena imply
nothing about any innately sexed body schema, as we could just as easily explain the
phantom sexual organs in terms of a learned process of assimilation. Women get
accustomed to carrying around breasts after forty years of doing so, and when one or both

31

See also: Gallagher, Cole, & McNeill, 2002, and Gallagher, 2001.
As discussed in Chapter 3, deafferentation typically involves severe damage to the mylenated nerve
fibers generally thought to be crucial for proprioception. In IW‘s case, the damage he incurred constituted a
loss of proprioceptive awareness from the neck down, although he could still receive proprioceptive
information. He just had no idea from where such information was coming.
33
In particular, see Cole & Paillard, 1995. GL‘s damage was more severe and as such, she was paralyzed
from the chin down, rather than the just the neck. The only mention of difference between the two patients
in terms of sex or gender is that IW‘s main concerns with rehabilitation centered on walking again and
eventually going back to work, while GL was attempting to regain her ability to run a household and raise
children, differences which, according to my characterization so far, would be gendered, and not the direct
result of biological sex, per se.
32
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are suddenly removed it is hardly surprising that phantoms are experienced. Also,
considering the plasticity of the brain and body to incorporate new parts or learn to live
without lost ones, arguments about innate ‗body parts‘ and their schematic representation
can be easily deflated. But, as was suggested at the beginning of the chapter, it is an
inherent feature of bodies that they be sexed, at least insofar as there are two distinct
types of chromosomal, hormonal, and genital configurations to which nearly all humans
fit one. The chief question thus remains: how, if at all, does this essential body-fact form
part of the schematic processing subtending all embodied action, thereby potentially
shaping body image and cognitive subjectivity more generally?

4.4 Sexed Schemas?
According to Grosz and many other feminists, gender is constructed and therefore
learned behavior, and although science would have us believe that biological sex is a
given, much of recent feminist thought (cf. Lorber, 1992; Butler, 1990, 2004; Haraway,
1989) rejects this, favoring instead, the idea that the sexed body is just as much a
construct as is the gendered person. For instance, Judith Lorber (1992) argues that
―bodies differ in many ways physiologically, but they are completely transformed by
social practices to fit into the salient categories of a society, the most pervasive of which
are ‗female‘ and ‗male,‘ ‗women‘ and ‗men‘‖ (569). Arguments such as these typically
run in the following way: 1) People tend to label as ‗masculine,‘ whatever traits we find
to be dominating, active, strong, and virile and then we label those traits which are more
submissive, passive, weak, and receptive as ‗feminine.‘ 2) Science then proceeds to
confirm the hypothesis that there are two sexes by using, as a dual-assumption, a) that
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there are only two genders, and b) that those two genders map isomorphically onto two
biological sexes. 3) Science then discovers ‗male‘ and ‗female‘ chromosomes, hormones,
and phenotypic traits and concludes that there must indeed be essentially two sexes. But,
claims the critic, this reasoning assumes the very thing it is trying to prove and hence, it
is unfounded. In other words, the presupposition that ‗male‘ and ‗female‘ denote the only
two types of bodies that occur, which is itself based on the presupposition that ‗feminine‘
and ‗masculine‘ refer to an exhaustive categorization of gender, is flawed at the outset,
since we are interested in learning whether or not it is essentially true of human beings
that they must be either male or female. Anne Fausto-Sterling (1999) discusses the way
brain science is conducted in precisely this way in a chapter of her book titled Sexing the
Brain. Most of the studies attempting to discover essential differences between ‗male‘
and ‗female‘ brains, she claims, have put the cart before the horse insofar as the very
discoveries that one hopes to make – namely, that there are two distinct brain types – are
assumed at the outset and are built into the experimental methodology. Likewise, Nelly
Oudshoorn (1994) tracks a similar story regarding the history of the ‗discovery‘ of the
hormones, estrogen and progestin, wherein she describes the crucial role that gender
norms played in locating ―agents of sex‖ – one passive, submissive, penetrable, the other,
active, dominant, penetrating.
Another way to further illustrate the paradoxical nature of assuming that males
and females and feminine and masculine roles 1) pick out natural kinds and 2) are
essentially exhaustive is by way of a sort of reductio thought experiment. Suppose that
there is a possible world, much like Putnam‘s (1968) Twin Earth, in which most of the
facts that hold true in this actual world obtain in our possible world, call it GenEarth. On
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GenEarth, however, sexual reproduction happens quite differently, insofar as there is a
hermaphrodite-like sex who is capable of both inseminating herself and giving birth to
new members of the species. Should she choose, she can be inseminated by the other sex,
which would be much like the male sex as we know it here on Earth. Thus, reproduction
can occur asexually or sexually and this all depends on the whims of the hermaphrodite
sex. (It turns out that the worm species C. Elegans reproduces in precisely this way and
so the thought experiment need not be so fanciful after all).
Now, given the nature of reproduction on GenEarth, what might we conjecture
about the gender roles of the two types of persons found here? One response would be to
assume that the inhibited intentionality, discontinuous unity, and ambiguous
transcendence with which Beauvoir argues Earth women are subjected to based on their
physical structure and biological sex would be experienced to a lesser degree, if they
were experienced at all. Indeed, if the hermaphrodites on GenEarth were capable of
producing sperm and eggs and thus, were the more powerful of the two sexes in terms of
evolutionary necessity, then we should expect to find that they would have developed a
more robust sense of autonomy, unified sense of self, and an overall ‗I can‘
phenomenology to accompany most actions. ‗I can‘ propagate my entire species all by
myself seems to quite easily entail all sorts of other attitudes of capability regarding
action. Furthermore, we might find out that because of the extra testosterone and
androgen present, the hermaphrodites would have evolved to be just as strong if not
stronger than their male counterparts. But if we were to make such assumptions, on what
would they ultimately be grounded if not the fundamental fact that there are two naturally
occurring kinds of persons on GenEarth and that we can identify these kinds of persons
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based on the roles they perform, which are themselves products of the biological sex
which they have? It would be undesirable to identify biological sex in this way because in
order to prove that it is the substrate of all other identifications, we must rely on an
assumption that it is the substrate of all other identifications.
The problem is best explained like so: On GenEarth, to believe that the
hermaphrodites would be the more powerful of the sexes, or that they would be at least
equals to the males, would be to tacitly agree that it is a universal fact that possessing
traits such as strength, virility, motility, and freedom are valuable and moreover, that
these are inherently masculine qualities. In other words, this assumption implies the
corollary assumption that masculinity is a natural kind. But the original thesis was that
biological sex, not gender identity, was fundamental and more naturally occurring kind of
identification, while masculinity and femininity are constructed upon already existing
biological roles and functions. And yet, do we not need the descriptions ‗masculine‘ and
‗feminine‘ to even begin to understand what would count as a ‗male‘ biological function
and a ‗female‘ one? Indeed it seems we must, and our GenEarth example only illustrates
just how absurd it is to try to determine which comes first on our possible planet, the
male-hermaphrodite biological distinction, or the masculine-feminine/masculine
distinction. To understand the one, we need to assume the other is a natural kind and to
understand the other, we must rely on the one being ‗given.‘ Thus, to further ask from
whence these differences between the sexes arise, would be a non-starter because in order
to even broach the topic of sexual difference, we must rely on gender difference, which is
far from being shown to be inherent to the species, here on Earth, on GenEarth, or
anywhere else.
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A particularly compelling reason to side with the constructionist view of sexed
bodies stems from the real-world occurrence of intersex births. We need not fantasize of
a ‗third‘ type of sex, as nearly one in every one hundred births does not fit the standards
of scientifically determined sexual identity. 34 Rather than accepting that we might have
made a mistake in judging there to be only two naturally occurring sexes however,
medical technology is often used to ‗discipline‘ these bodies that do not conform to the
dual-sex model. Complications from invasive surgeries, psychological trauma, and social
ostracism are often what follow from such stubborn insistence on scientific realism (cf.
Foucault, 1980; Butler, 2004; Dreger, 1998) and such suffering is cause for those like
Fausto-Sterling (1985, 2000) to argue for multiple sexes, rather than only two.
While intersex births provide good reason to question the supposed scientific fact
that there are only two sexes, just because there are those for whom the appellations
‗female‘ and ‗male‘ do not so easily apply entails that it impossible to have a ‗sexed
schema.‘ To be sure, there might be more than two types of sexed schemas if there are
such things at all, but if we assume for the moment that the majority of persons cluster
around one of two identities defined chromosomally, hormonally, and genitally, then we
might wonder if there is anything further that might divide these two types of persons
along lines of motility, comportment, and proprioception. Straus obviously thought there
must be, as he argued that girls were simply born less athletic, more timid, and weaker
than boys. In fact, it seems to permeate a large part of the history of sexual oppression, or
as Shirley Chisholm puts it, the fact that as soon as babies are born – or even prior to this
when they are first identified via ultrasound, for example, and they are labeled ‗male‘ or
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‗female,‘ they are immediately subject to stereotyping, and for females, this is often a
negative labeling.
By drawing a parallel between the socially constructed ‗disability‘ associated with
being born female and the disabilities associated with other bodily abnormalities, I am in
no way attempting to equate femaleness with deafferentation, AHS, or any other extreme
pathological embodiment. The idea is simply to consider that the duality of sexes is not
simply an objective division of persons based on their material reality; it is often couched
in such a way so as to place half of all humans in a category of ‗able to move about freely
and capably‘ and the other half into the category ‗incapable of athletic dominance,
strength, or agility.‘ It is worth discussing therefore, whether or not Gallagher intends for
the body schema to be inherently sexed, such that some bodies and/or brains come
predisposed to comport themselves in very different ways based on the physiological
status. We have only just begun to see the difficulties inherent in trying to ‗schematize‘
experiential modes such as inhibited intentionality or discontinuous unity, as those seem
to be highly contingent and learned; in other words, they occur at or are at least products
of the body-image. In order to talk about the body-schema as being sexed therefore, we
must seriously consider what such a thing would involve, without referencing anything
gender-specific. From a purely biological standpoint, what would a sexed schema entail
for proprioception, movement, agency, and ownership?
Considering IW again, his entire proprioceptive awareness was lost due to a
specific neuropathology and thus, we should expect that if there were some part of the
body schema that encoded what the biological sex of the body was, that it should also be
capable of being disrupted or destroyed. In IW‘s case, as far as we know, he never
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admitted to forgetting that he was indeed a male, but then again, we might wonder if this
was all imagistic representation; he never ‗pictured himself‘ as anything other than a
male, but did his brain, damaged so severely to the point that it forgot where its limbs
were located in space, also ‗forget‘ that it was a male brain? There seem to be no
experimental cues to determine whether or not the body schema encodes anything like
biological sex because we have yet to find a specific neuropathology that knocks out the
‗sex module‘ of the brain. Furthermore, it is difficult if not impossible to provide a list of
criteria for determining how one might behave differently were their schemas to no
longer be sexed without simultaneously referencing already gendered actions. For
example, if IW‘s loss of body-schematic processes had also resulted in no longer having
a sexed-schema, then if he began to move less freely, to experience himself as both an
object to be manipulated and a subject of his own actions, or to approach tasks more with
the ‗I cannot‘ attitude, we could say that his schema is no longer male. Indeed, all of
these experiences were and continue to be to a large extent had by IW. Would it be
correct to then say that his schema is now a female schema, simply because he is unable
to move freely? Surely not, because then we would have to say that the body schema is so
malleable that every time someone lacks a sense of agency over his or her body, they are
undergoing a ‗sex change.‘ In other words, on such an account, the body schema would
turn out to be, just like gendered norms of behavior, entirely socially constructed, which,
as Gallagher has demonstrated quite convincingly, is not the case. I think herein lies the
true difficulty of assigning the schema any sex at all. As soon as we try to, we are already
buying into the gender roles that define masculine and feminine motility and then trying
to map those isomorphically onto biological sex, assuming that the schema somehow
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already ‗knows,‘ simply by virtue of its being male or female, that it ought to be timid
and clumsy or bold and agile.
So, suppose we dispense with talk of a sexed schema. Does this ultimately rule
out the possibility of a ‗gendered schema?‘ It would seem really strange to talk about the
body schema as knowing that it will be more passive, reticent, and careful as opposed to
active, intrepid, and daring. For one, these categories of motility are hardly exclusive and
exhaustive. It is not as if there are only two types of movement and comportment in the
world. To believe so would be to ascribe the ultimate duality to the world. Not only are
there two sexes and two genders, but moreover, there are two kinds of embodied action,
and every body is either one or the other. Another problem with the gendered schema is
that it would not so readily allow for change from one type of embodied action to the
other. If your schema is hardwired to be ‗feminine‘ then it seems it would be really
difficult to assume more masculine motility and yet, as we discussed earlier, this happens
all the time. But most importantly, as the foregoing discussion has illustrated, one‘s
identity as feminine and/or masculine does not necessarily imply that one possesses a
particular set of bodily skills over another. The linkage between, for example, masculine
and athletic, or feminine and graceful, is a byproduct of social contrivance. To be sure,
the body schema is relatively fixed and one might be born with a natural propensity to be
graceful, such as a ballet dancer who was born with long limbs and hip rotation, or a
basketball player who is tall. But this fact in no way means one is born ‗a man‘ or ‗a
woman.‘ Moreover, the body schema can change, for instance, as a child develops, as a
person acquires automaticity and control over a movement that once was new and
awkward, or, of course, when the schema is disrupted, as in the case of IW or GL. All of
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these facts make it nearly impossible to speak of a gendered schema in any meaningful
way, unless we want to entirely disrupt the original intent behind the concept.
Nevertheless, I think if we consider more carefully what I will loosely term ‗Body
Dysphorias‘ (BDs), we might begin to see that the idea of a gendered schema is not so
easily dismissed. In the long run, I will reject the notion that gender roles and
comportment are in any way pre-specified at the schematic level, but I want to spend
some time discussing Gender Identity Disorder (GID) and Intersexed Embodiment (IE)
on the one hand, and a whole other array of BDs on the other, for several reasons. 1) I
will claim that although extreme, GID and IE remain on the same continuum of felt
unheimlichkeit or dysphoria with one‘s body that constitutes bodily experience generally.
2) In all these dysphoric experiences, the tendency, both by professionals and persons
with the dysphoric experiences, is to nativize or schematize complex social identities
such as gender, sexuality, even athleticism and occupational identity and that this
phenomenology is misguided. In order to make this second claim however, I will take
seriously the experiences reported, in particular from GID and IE, namely that there is a
gender the person with GID often feels as though he or she was ‗born with.‘ Likewise, as
is evident in cases from IE, in which persons who are given corrective surgeries to force
their bodies into one or the other sexual category, there are often reports of a mistake
made, such that the ‗real me‘ is now trapped in this body made by medical science. These
phenomenological accounts, along with a host of others, from tall people trapped in short
people‘s bodies to athletic women trapped in big-breasted bodies, will be the focus of the
next chapter. My aim is to argue that although people may feel as though they were born
into this or that social role, even sexual identity is something highly constructed and
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learned, and hence dysphoric experience with one‘s body and its place in society is just as
much externally induced as it is internally driven.
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Chapter 5
Transgressed Binaries: Body Image and Subjectivity in Transgender Embodiment
The ―third‖ is that which questions binary thinking and introduces crisis…The ―third‖ is
a mode of articulation, a way of describing a space of possibility. Three puts in question
the idea of one: of identity, self-sufficiency, self-knowledge. – Marjorie Garber

5.1 Introduction
The preceding chapter began with a premise – that embodiment always shows up
as sexed and gendered, even if only tacitly – and concluded with the argument that this
fact about embodiment is never rigidly fixed, either in the form of a body image or a
body schema, either as male or female, feminine or masculine. While the body image is
much more highly susceptible to social conditioning and alteration than the body schema,
even the schema is to some extent, malleable, as automatic and pre-reflective motor
actions can and do change, are acquired, and even lost, as in cases of deafferentation such
as Ian Waterman (IW). Furthermore, in terms of a sexed schema, the only way such a
program for action could ever be described would be in terms of bodily comportment,
movement, and actions that are already gendered – hence a ‗female schema‘ might be one
that includes among its traits the ability to give birth, being shorter, having less muscle
mass, and so forth. And again, these actions are never inherently necessary simply
because one is born a male or a female. Thus any talk of a sexed schema will, like the
body image, admit to a degree of plasticity and learnability.
Nevertheless, there are at least two bodily experiences – Transgender (TG) and
Intersexed Embodiment (IE) – that challenge the notion that body schemas have no
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inherently ‗female‘ or ‗male‘ encodings. Someone who is born biologically male but who
has identified with the female body and the feminine gender for as long as he/she can
remember, or a person born with ambiguous sexual morphology, who is surgically altered
at birth to fit one sex, but grows up identifying with the other – these are both instances in
which the necessary nature of ‗having a sex‘ is plausibly not the result of learned
behavior or socially internalized cues, but is rather an innate ‗sense‘ of who one truly is.
As I suggested at the end of Chapter 4, I will examine the theories and phenomenological
studies of TG and IE, but my intentions are themselves not strictly theoretical, nor purely
phenomenological. As I have argued in previous chapters, in agreement with Gallagher
and Zahavi (2008), complex phenomena such as cognition are best studied and
understood from multiple vantage points. This is so when it comes to TG and IE as well.
Accordingly I will examine these experiences from various theoretical and
phenomenological vantage points, but will begin by looking chiefly at Queer Theory
(QT). This is where we find the bulk of TG theory and IE discussion, and more
importantly, QT is itself at least partially a product of the lived and shared experiences of
the transgender and intersex community. Through examining QT‘s appropriation, in
particular, of the transsexual as a figure that subverts the traditional gender binary, my
first claim will rest on the idea that by juxtaposing monstrous and natural bodies, QT runs
the risk of replacing one binary for another. Namely, in dismantling the natural/nonnatural divide, it is often the case that a new dichotomy – that between the figurative and
the literal – comes to stand in its place. As I intend to show however, this binary of
figure/ground is no more necessary or ‗given‘ than any of the others of which QT seeks
to subvert.
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While I will follow Jay Prosser‘s (1998) critique of QT to some degree, insofar as
I think he reveals important oversights, such as the one just mentioned, I will diverge
from his account slightly when it comes to characterizing the role of body image in the
formation of transsexual subjectivity. Whereas QT tends to cast how one imagines and
thus identifies oneself – as part of this or that group, for example – mostly, if not entirely,
as a product of power and socially constructed and enforced norms, Prosser attempts to
reclaim the body image of the transsexual as prior to the socio-medico-technological
practices that inconsistently act as the ―cure‖ of a pre-existing disorder while at the same
time functioning as the creator of this disorder. Both QT and Prosser extend the concept
of ‗the body‘ beyond its typical referent – i.e. the human organism – and hence how the
body is thought or imagined never refers strictly to a biological or material entity that is
prior to medico-scientific discourse. Whereas a queer theorist such as Butler (1990), for
instance, will argue that the concept of ‗the body‘ never simply refers to a material reality
independent of discursive practice, Prosser on the other hand, attempts to reclaim some of
the literality of ‗the body‘ as a concept. By considering the way bodies are imagined in
narratives and lived experiences of trans persons, he avoids an overly deconstructive
view of ‗the body,‘ insofar as for Prosser, what this concept refers to remains importantly
rooted in the material reality of the flesh. This grounding, I argue, is lacking in QT.
However, Prosser‘s amended account tends to characterize the body image as somehow
independent of all external influence, independent from even the body itself. This aspect
of Prosser‘s work sidesteps the question of ‗sexed schema‘ and in its place, offers a
‗hardwired image‘ one that I find implausible. Prosser‘s account overlooks an invaluable
contribution made by QT – the deconstruction of the naturalness of the gender binary. In
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the end, I argue, neither a body image prior to technology nor a hardwired sexed schema
are plausible. Although body schemas, as we have seen in Chapter 4, are more fixed and
less influenced by sociotechnological practices than body images, it is quite plausible that
this is a matter of degree, and that the two systems – the schematic and the imagistic –
mutually inform, influence, and shape each other. And, as it turns out, any notion of a
sexed schema is itself a byproduct of the socio-medical discourse that would have us
believe, like Straus (1966), that the way little girls and little boys comport themselves to
the world is already worked out in a complex pattern of motor behavior somewhere in the
brain. Thus, a sexed or gendered body image that is prior to technology and what I will
call ‗sociotechnological hybridity‘ is, I will further argue, even more ‗unimaginable‘ than
a sexed schema.
Several methodological and conceptual clarifications are in order before I begin,
however. First, although I am interested in recounting the role of body image in shaping
the embodiment of transgendered and interesexed persons and thus will discuss them
both throughout the chapter, my focus will be more on transgender. First, there is an
entire theoretical movement, Transgender Studies, devoted to such investigations, and so,
I not only have an abundantly rich resource for personal narratives, but as well, there is a
large group of transgendered scholars who offer both theoretical and first-person
accounts of their experiences. Second, some terminological distinctions: I will use the
term transgender to refer to a consistent queering of accepted gender norms, such as
persistent cross-dressing or cross-gendering, or a continual feeling of ‗not-being-at-homewith‘ the body and the embodiment of that gender. Hence, transvestite denotes a
particular type of transgendering, namely, a cross-dresser. The term transsexual refers to
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a person who identifies with another sex and hence, this term applies more at the
anatomical level. In other words, a transsexual might feel genuinely female, despite male
physiology, and while not all transsexuals who identify with the opposite sex will seek
sexual reassignment surgery or any other bodily modification, persons who do seek such
bodily changes can be characterized as transsexual. This term, the way I am using it, is
broad enough to encompass those who are ―pre-op,‖ mid-transition, and ―post-op‖ and it
does not limit itself to persons who have had the full surgery or any surgery at all. Simply
feeling as though one has the wrong ‗parts‘ as it were, suffices for inclusion in this
category. The term cissexual, on the other hand, is used to denote a person who is nontrans in any way; someone who is comfortable in their own skin, has never questioned
what gender he or she truly is, and who does not have problems with the roles he or she is
expected to perform is ‗cissexual.‘ All of these terminological distinctions are founded in
trans literature (cf. Stryker & Whittle, 2006; Shepherdson, 2006; Serano, 2007). I also
recognize the discrepancies inherent in utilizing a particular taxonomy to generalize over
lived experiences. To this end, I will take special care to address such concerns, and will
even aim at a phenomenology of individual experience that is ambivalent to the
particulars of these terms.

5.2 Inner Selves, Outer Bodies, and the Construction of a Disorder
Prior to detailed phenomenological descriptions, which I will mostly glean from
trans- and intersexed narratives, and without examining the theoretical and historical
frameworks from which these phenomena are typically thought, it is easy to take a
cursory glance at the experiences, generalize over the superficial ‗data,‘ and reach the
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conclusion that anyone suffering from Gender Identity Disorder (GID) has the sense of
being ‗trapped in the wrong body‘ – his or her ‗true self‘ ensconced within a flesh that is
foreign and unwanted. Furthermore, a quick survey of the way gender reassignment
surgery is allotted reveals that most persons awarded ‗new bodies‘ have to have
sufficiently demonstrated that they have felt this dissociation for as long as they can
remember (cf. Hale, 2007; Spade, 2006). Given this totalizing picture of all trans
embodiment, it is therefore not a huge leap to make the assumption that there must be
some element of sexual (or gender) identity that is 1) independent of the specifics of
one‘s particular body and 2) prior to social influence. In other words, we might say that
GID involves forming a body image of oneself that does not correspond in any
meaningful way to the body schema; a body image that has arisen without making use of
said schema. Or, we might characterize the experience as suggestive of an innate,
hardwired, and pre-social facet of embodiment that cannot be fully realized due to the
actual material substance in which it is housed – namely, the ‗opposite‘ sexed body.
Either way, the phenomena of cross-dressing, seeking sexual reassignment surgery, and
even committing suicide in response to GID can at first appear as though what is really
being experienced is some sort of disembodied self, or an ‗inner self‘ that is independent
of the outer body and is trapped within its confines. Put differently, we might conjecture,
based on trans phenomenology, that we all have sexed schemas after all, some of which
are not aligned with our imagistic ‗genders.‘ A brief look at the history of transgender
reveals that there has not always been a consensus regarding the phenomenon and,
fascinatingly, the thinking has shifted from radical materialism concerning sex and
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gender, to a psychologism that more closely reflects a substance dualistic view of the
mind/self versus the body.
The reason such conjectures about the nature of transgender and transsexualism
are so easy to make stems, in part perhaps from the relatively scarce amount of
scholarship devoted to it. More importantly, the larger culture typically consumes the
medicalized, psychologized, and overly generalized accounts, as they are presented in
popular media. For example, the movie, Transamerica, which although it was an
independent film was nominated for two Oscars and so far has been one of the few films
about a trans person to reach so many viewers, tells the story of a road trip taken together
with a pre-op MTF and her son, who is unaware that he is riding cross-country with his
father-soon-to-be-woman. While the plot is innocuous enough, the depiction of the main
character, Bree, helps to further the notion that what is really at stake for transsexuals is
that their ‗outer bodies‘ match their inner selves and in this particular movie, Bree‘s
desire to link the two is portrayed via a hyperbolic obsession with appearance, in
particular, appearing feminine. To be sure, putting forth a feminine image is important to
many transsexuals and transgendered persons alike, but certainly not all of them, and
certainly not to the degree with which Bree was preoccupied. Julia Serano (2007), for
instance, has claimed that portrayals such as Bree in Transamerica work to maintain two
negative images. First, the stereotype of trans persons as only concerned with superficial
gender appearances – makeup, voice, clothing, etc – which thereby effectively erases
nuanced differences in the phenomenology of transsexualism, transgenderism,
transvestitism. Second, by portraying women in general in this way – i.e. as obsessed
with appearance – the depiction of females, including all MTF trans persons, as objects of
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sexual desire is reinforced. Serano‘s assessment is certainly debatable, but what is less
objectionable is that films such as Transamerica, which often serve as the only insight
into trans-lives thatcissexual and mainstream culture receive, should be scrutinized so as
to determine what those images are that are being consumed. Along with Serano, I agree
that if this is all the exposure most people will get to transsexualism, transgenderism, and
the like, then the overly simplified account of ‗real soul/self trapped in wrong body‘ as
applicable to all of these various modes of trans-experience is what will be thought by the
viewers. Again, this overlooks the differences among individual lives, and serves to
bolster the claims already made by psychology and medical science regarding ‗the‘ trans
experience.
Regarding medicalized and psychologized accounts, they have worked to
establish the idea that what is essential to trans experience is a desire to ‗cross over‘ to
the ‗opposite‘ sex or gender, a desire which of course implies that each of us has a solid
notion of what it means and what it feels like to be that other gender, let alone, that there
are only two from which to choose. As Prosser (1998) points out, even in 1864, the year
that one of the first cases of ―inversion‖ was recorded, medical science was the dominant
authority and source of information. That is, prior even to the coining of the terms
―transgender‖ or ―transsexual,‖ and prior to the availability of any surgical intervention,
narratives of ―inverts,‖ as they were called, ―appear to offer up the very stuff of
transsexuality: the expression of being differently gendered; the recounting of a plot that
pulls toward being the other sex; even sometimes the articulated desire to change sex‖
(140). Likewise, some of the first genuine attempts to materially alter sex – a double
mastectomy obtained by a woman to masculinize ‗her‘ body, or an even more obscure
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record of genital masculinization in 188235 - were recorded by Magnus Hirschfield, a
prominent sexologist. Although openly homosexual and an avid defender of gay rights,
Hirschfield was not equipped with the nuances of the sex-gender distinction, nor was
there anything like queer theory, postmodernism, and the like, for him to follow, given
that he predates such movements by several decades. As such, his accounts remain first
and foremost, biological. Like his contemporaries (cf. Ellis, 190; Krafft-Ebing, 1886),
whose accounts also have an air of biological essentialism to them, he sought to diagnose
―inversion‖ via somatic markers – deep voice, manly gait, and small breasts, for example,
as Richard von Krafft-Ebing (1886) proclaimed, ―makes the impression of a man in
woman‘s clothes‖ (410). The driving force behind these proto-trans accounts was the
hope that the bodies of the patients themselves would reveal their own narratives. Much
like the story of Herculine Barbin (Foucault, 1980), a French hermaphrodite who spent
the first twenty years of her life as a woman but was later discovered to have masculine
genitalia, and was then forced to live life as a man, the biological body represents the sin
qua non for both sex and gender. The notion that one‘s gender might supersede the
somatic markers of genitalia, hormones, and secondary sexual characteristics such as
hair, muscles and breasts, was not considered at these early stages. Hence, stories like
Herculine‘s are at once tragic – she committed suicide as a result of never fully
assimilating to the newly prescribed gender – but are also indicative, quite interestingly,
of an early somatic essentialism – i.e. the belief that when it comes to identifying a
gendered ‗self,‘ one need only look to the materiality of the body.
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How then do the more familiar narratives of a ‗true self‘ trapped in the ‗wrong
body‘ emerge? Elizabeth Loeb (2008) traces the legal history surrounding corporeal
practices in the early 1900s and the concomitant drive in psychology to catalogue an
array of mental ‗perversions‘ in order to suggest that body modification practices
generally, including sexual reassignment surgery, soon came to be markers of
psychological disorders, due at least in part, she claims, to ―the arrival of Freud, Valium,
and postwar trauma in U.S. fashion.‖ What was once seen as ―property damage‖ – a
solider purposefully amputating his leg so as to escape the war, e.g. – became ―firmly
established within law, medicine, and psychiatry as evidence of ―gender identity
disorder‖ or ―body dysmorphic disorder‖ or ―body integrity disorder‖‖ (51). 36 In other
words, the attempt to alter one‘s body for the sake of gender or any other ‗deviant‘
reason, such as elective amputations, by the mid 1900‘s began to be seen as a
manifestation of a disordered psyche. It is not surprising therefore, that medical practices
concerning transgender, in particular, the guide for those practices, the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual (DSM) for psychiatry, began to characterize the phenomenon as a
mismatching between one‘s self and one‘s body. Despite the historical contingency and
social malleability of the gender roles that characterize the ‗inversions,‘ which the DSM
IV labels as ‗disorders‘ – boys with GID, for example, ―enjoy playing house, drawing
pictures of beautiful girls and princesses…avoid rough-and-tumble play and competitive
sports, and have little interest in cars or trucks‖ – psychology and psychiatry treats the
symptoms as arising solely from within the subject, as if the dominant social norms
which police count as suitably female and male have nothing to do with the behavior
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showing up as ‗abnormal.‘ It is, as Spade (2006) puts it, ―in the minds of the ill that
gender problems exist, not in the construction of what is healthy‖ (319).
In a similar vein, the autobiographical narratives of persons seeking sexual
reassignment surgery reflect the idea that ‗gender‘ as an identifying category is
psychological, or is at least irreducible to the strictly biological body. Catherine Millot
(1991) recounts that many of the trans-patients she has spoken with feel as if their ―true
self‖ or ―true identity‖ had no ―body‖ to call its own. Raymond Thompson, a female-tomale transsexual, describes his experience as being comprised of two bodies, an inner
and an outer. Although Thompson does not necessarily evoke a disembodied and
immaterial self trapped within a material body, his two-body identity remains consistent
with the notion that there is some aspect of gender identity that escapes the narrative told
simply by the fleshy, outer body. To quote his narrative at length:
I needed to be out of my body, to be free. It felt as if my ―inner body‖ was forcing
itself to the ends of my limbs. It was growing ever larger inside of me, making
me feel I was bursting at the seams and wanting out…out…out! Because this was
impossible, this process would abruptly reverse and I would start to shrink inside
myself. My whole inner body shrank until I became very small inside. It was as if
I became so small I had to find some safe place to hide inside myself. My tiny
inner body was in unfamiliar surroundings, in a place it didn‘t belong and I felt
utterly unsafe. I became like a little shadow inside my physical body, a shadow
running around everywhere trying to find somewhere inside [Thompson &
Sewell, 1995, 200].
In some sense, Thompson‘s narrative echoes accounts given by persons with some of the
bodily pathologies discussed in chapter three; for example, patients with Möbius
syndrome who characterize their ‗true emotions‘ as being locked away behind their
emotionless faces (Cole, 2008), or patients with misoplegia, who often seek amputative
surgery to match the image they have of themselves ‗inside‘ to the ‗outside‘ of their
bodies. Thompson even goes on to describe unexplained blisters that form on his face as
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manifestations of his ―internal stress,‖ which resonates with all sorts of attempts to link
inner psyche with outer soma, from biblical correlations between leprosy and ‗inner
demons‘ (cf. Leviticus 13; Matthew 10:8), to the current trends in plastic surgery to allow
one‘s inner beauty to be expressed more fully as outer beauty. As Kukla (2008) recounts,
even the case of the ―snaggletooth killer‖ depicts what she terms a ―phrenological
impulse‖ that persists today, despite the downfall of phrenology itself, or the ideal that
outer bodily morphology indicates inner charactereological traits. Ray Krone, as he was
officially named, was wrongfully convicted of murder due to the ‗snaggletooth marks‘
found on the victims which matched his dental patterns. After DNA testing proved that
Mr. Krone was not in fact the murderer, he sought reconstructive dental surgery, so that
he would no longer be conceived of as a killer. As a blog from a friend remarks, postsurgery, ―I just saw Ray on Extreme Makeover and he looks great. Now his outer beauty
matches his inner beauty.‖
Prosser (1998) claims that narratives such as these, in which an inner self or body
is felt to be ―pushing out‖ and demanding external embodiment, suggest the rematerialization of the psychological phenomenon of dissociation. By looking at the
―skin,‖ he claims, we can find the connective surface that binds together psychical and
physical, inner and outer. As Anzieu‘s (1974) Skin Ego argues, the body‘s surface is that
which most robustly constitutes the self – the body‘s physical skin is how ‗we‘ relate to
the world, in proprioception, in the sensations we derive from it, and in its unique
position as a ‗border‘ between that which is inside and that which is outside. Thus,
Prosser takes Anzieu‘s ―skin ego,‖ which he sees as a literal rendering of Freud‘s
―surface‖ – that which the ego projects – and argues that the skin is the ―pivotal
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connective surface‖ which explains how the ―trope of being trapped in the wrong body
can be materialized.‖ In other words, the skin provides the ―mechanics of this
catachresis‖ (71). For Thompson, and for other transsexuals therefore, it is often not
enough to simply restructure the material body, surgically or otherwise, nor is it sufficient
to cross-dress and cross-gender without bodily modification. This skin, as it represents
both Thompson‘s inner and outer ‗bodies‘ must project his true nature, both in its
reception by society, but also as he himself recognizes it as part of that true nature.
Hence, before his surgery, he speaks of ―detaching‖ himself from his body so as not to
have to notice those parts of its projected surface that were hindering expression of who
he truly believed himself to be.
This rather lengthy digression about Thompson‘s transformation illustrates two
things. First, the autobiographical narratives of trans-persons are much more complex
than the medical literature would have us believe. To obtain surgery, at least in the U.S.
and Canada, it is required that prospective candidates demonstrate an unheimlichkeit,
first, by being diagnosed as ‗disordered‘ and then by demonstrating that ―living like the
opposite sex,‖ is actually healthier for them – in other words, that they are ‗at home with‘
the opposing gender roles and norms they have adopted. (Millot, 1991). In a real sense,
therefore, they must ―pass‖ as the desired gender, even prior to the surgery itself (Spade,
2003; Prosser, 1998). But according to Thompson, this is impossible so long as his skin
ego is mismatched. Hence, the psychiatric demands made by the ―gatekeepers‖ of
reassignment surgery might turn out to be impossible to meet, not to mention founded on
a lack of understanding of the complex phenomenology surrounding trans-experience.
Second, by insisting that we have a ―master narrative‖ for GID, the DSM overlooks
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differences among individual persons who are gender variant. Unsurprisingly therefore,
as Spade (2006) points out, the distinction between a ‗normal‘ child who is simply a
‗sissy‘ or a ‗tomboy‘ and an ‗abnormal‘ child who has genuine GID, is murky. Covering
over specific differences among narratives in the name of a unified science of gender
identity is not only personally harmful to the patients seeking to finally live in a ‗skin of
their own.‘ It is also damaging to the culture at large, who, rather than actively learning
about the lives of transgendered persons by reading such a vast array of autobiographies
and actually meeting and talking to persons in the transgendered community, are satisfied
with the superficially scientific reductive explanation of gender deviance provided by the
DSM, which is then filtered through mainstream media such as news stories, Hollywood
sitcoms, or movies. As Sandy Stone (2006) claims of this erasure, ―polyvocalities of lived
experience, never present in the discourse, but present at least in potential disappear;‖ this
involves a covering over in which ―both the transsexual and the
medicolegal/psychological establishment are complicit‖ and one that ―forecloses the
possibility of a life grounded in the intertextual possibilities of the transsexual body‖
(231). In order to make sense of how reclaiming the intertextualized transgender body –
that is, a body that is not reducible to medico-scientific discourse, nor simply the product
of it – might afford the transgender community a better voice in the construction of their
social identities, a closer look into the theoretical framework that has dominated the
relatively brief history of what is now known as Transgender Studies will be necessary.
This will not only allow for a more diverse rendering of trans embodiment, but such a
reclamation might also open up a new theoretical space for understanding, both by
scholars and by the culture at large, an understanding that does not cover over differences
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or autobiographical narratives, but instead incorporates them into its ‗body of
knowledge.‘ I will now turn to the intimately interwoven pair that is Queer Theory and
Transgender Studies, examine the former‘s reliance on the latter for its prominent
‗figure,‘ and eventually discuss this coupling in terms of our larger task, which is
approaching a more comprehensive understanding of cognition and embodied
subjectivity generally.
5.3 Queer Theory and the ‘Figure’ of the Transgender Body

In the introduction to The Transgender Studies Reader (2006), Susan Stryker
provides a definition of Transgender Studies, which is:

A field that claims as its purview transexuality and cross-dressing, some aspects
of intersexuality and homosexuality, cross-cultural and historical investigations of
human gender diversity, myriad specific subcultural expressions of ―gender
atypicality,‖ theories of sexed embodiment and subjective gender identity
development, law and public policy related to the regulation of gender expression,
and many other similar issues [3].
This is a considerably broad categorization and it becomes even more extensive if we
consider what the co-editor to this volume, Stephen Whittle, says in his foreword about
the denotation of ‗transgender‘ as encompassing:

Discomfort with role expectations, being queer, occasional or more frequent
cross-dressing, permanent cross-dressing and cross-gender living, through to
accessing major health interventions such as hormonal therapy and surgical
reassignment procedures [xi].
A cursory read of these two passages might suggest to the reader that ―Transgender
Studies‖ (henceforth TGS) is just an offshoot of QT, or even more generally, an offshoot
of Gender Studies. Indeed, as Stryker points out, TGS includes discussions of gender
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diversity, sexual embodiment, and personal gender development, which are all elements
that Queer Theory, among other branches of Gender Studies, examines. Likewise, if
being transgender implies ―being queer,‖ we might wonder on the one hand, does the
converse hold – namely, does being queer imply being transgendered? – and on the other
hand, why bother having two separate domains of inquiry, if both TGS and QT claim as
their purviews, ‗the queer?‘ Nevertheless, as is the case with most terminological
differences based on historical antecedents of and transitions between theoretical
frameworks, a closer look into the dialogues between the two shall reveal perhaps why
TGS has effectively claimed territory that is just as broad, if not broader than QT.
To be sure, the characterization given by Stryker and Whittle is far from
representing unanimously agreed upon definitions for transgender and TGS. Even my
definition at the outset of this chapter was a bit more restrictive. Likewise, not everyone
will so readily accept QT‘s use of the transgendered person as a model for deconstructing
gender. In Second Skins (1998), for example, Jay Prosser spends the first chapter arguing
that while QT has done a great deal to bring TGS into academic focus, the problem with
its ―arrogation of transgender is that it allocates to nontransgendered subjects (according
to this binary schema, straight subjects), the ground that transgender would appear to only
figure; this ―ground‖ is the apparent naturalness of sex. For if transgender figures gender
performativity, nontransgender or straight gender is assigned the category of constative‖
(32). Much like a literary figure comes to stand in for a specific element of human nature
or a personality trope – King Lear as the figure for all human greed, for instance – if
transgender illuminates the performative nature of all gender, then there still remains a
dichotomy, that between this ‗figure‘ of the transgendered performer and its grounding in
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reality, namely, in that this is the ‗nature‘ of gender itself. Of course, more will need to be
said about how performativity features for both QT and TGS and whether or not Prosser
makes a good case, but theoretical skirmishes aside, one thing does appear to be rather
unanimous among those who write in TGS and QT; namely, that the ―figure‖ of the
transgendered person has been an indispensible element for people like Butler (1990,
1992) and others seeking a ―theory of (homo)sexuality distinct from feminism‖ (Prosser,
22). Thus, to better understand this intimate connection, we must turn to Butler‘s seminal
text, Gender Trouble, which, according to Prosser, ―yoked transgender most fully to
queer sexuality‖ (24).
Although transgender occupies just a few paragraphs of Gender Trouble, what
Butler‘s brief discussion of drag has functioned to do for QT is to subvert all conceptions
of gender that treat it as a natural, stable, and necessarily binary category. Because drag
carries with it the potentiality for ―passing‖ – that is, the person performing drag can
sufficiently act out the desired gender roles so as to be attributed, by him/herself and by
others, that gender – transgendering reveals that occupying a particular gender is a matter
of performing that gender convincingly.. As Butler puts it: “In imitating gender, drag
implicitly reveals the imitative structure of gender itself‖ (137, italics original). However,
what gender performances imitate turns out to be altogether unclear. Consider that the
term ‗gender‘ is itself an amalgam of several conceptual and experiential components:
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1. Subjective Gender Identity – how ‗I‘ feel, who I believe myself to be – man,
woman, other – my sense of femininity/masculinity, but also, my sexual
orientation
2. Gender Attribution – can be both subjective and objective. ‗I‘ can name my
gender, label it as ‗man‘ or ‗woman,‘ and likewise, others can identify me as
belonging to this or that gender category.
3. Gender Roles – the actions one performs that align with a particular gender
and the ―cues‖ or signs that are used to determine this attribution
This list, adapted from Kate Bornstein‘s Gender Outlaw (1995),37 suggests that when a
person is ‗gendered‘ they are engaging in a complex and dynamic system of
phenomenological, social, and symbolic rituals. Each of the three components is
dependent on the others – for example, one cannot act in a particular gender role if one
does not also have a sense of what that gender is, how it feels to be it, etc. – and yet, each
can be teased apart from the others, as one might feel as though they are feminine, but
perform as masculine and therefore be attributed as such. Likewise, one‘s performance is
not always ‗good enough‘ and so I might attempt to be a woman because I feel like one,
but I might still be attributed by others the label ‗man.‘ Perhaps most complex among the
list is the third item, gender roles. As Bornstein points out, performing the role of a
gender involves at least these cues: physical, biological, behavioral, textual, mythic,
power dynamic, and sexual orientation. There are likely more to add and ways to further
refine these, but it suffices to simply note that acting as a man, for instance, is more than
simply having a penis (although this is part of it) – it involves one‘s entire body looking
like a man, dressing and behaving like a man, which includes having sex the way ‗men‘
do (whatever that means), possessing the correct documents that prove one‘s manhood,
engaging in and with mythologies of manhood (for example, the myth that all men are
sex-crazed or that they can only focus on one thing at a time), and occupying the specific
37
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nodes on the power grid that signal manhood (traditionally, the dominant nodes). It is
worth reiterating, since the concept has retreated into the background during this
discussion, that ‗sex‘ – the term I have so far used to denote one‘s bodily and biological
markings as either ‗male‘ or ‗female‘ – under this performative framework, becomes just
another way to imitate gender. Hence, having particular genitalia is just one sign among
many – indeed only one physical/biological sign among many – and to be sure, one‘s
anatomy can easily narrate a gender that is in conflict with what one‘s social status or
sexual orientation signal..
Nevertheless, how these various cues come to all triangulate upon the same
gender or conversely, how they might conflict with one another, only highlights their
instability as strict referents. It is not inherently contained within the concept of
possessing an XX chromosome that one will be a heterosexual, female, feminine, mother,
who is intrinsically passive So, if someone attributes the wrong gender to me because
they notice that I like to have sex with transsexual women, this misidentification results
from my failing to meet certain established norms of behavior on the one hand, but it also
highlights the arbitrary nature of the connections drawn between and among the various
categories pertaining to gender performance. To cite the rest of Butler‘s quote from
above, “In imitating gender, drag implicitly reveals the imitative structure of gender
itself – and its contingency.” Drag makes visible not just the performative nature of
gender, but also the fact that what it imitates, the ‗original‘ that it seeks to copy, is a
fiction. What it means to be a gender – what ‗man,‘ ‗woman,‘ ‗other‘ and the like denote
– are matters of historical, social, and political constructions, and hence these terms don‘t
refer to stable, dichotomous categories. . For Butler, drag exposes the heteronormative
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myth that ‗sex‘ and ‗gender‘ have literal referents. The ‗figure‘ of transgender therefore
serves to subvert the supposed naturalness of gender. What gender is thought to be
grounded in – what Butler (1992) later refers to as the ―heterosexual matrix,‖ is made
possible only by the arbitrary positing of the binary systems of male-female, femininemasculine, and heterosexual-homosexual. By imitating gender and hence, exposing the
imitative nature of gender itself, drag therefore exposes these binaries for what they really
are: fluid, figurative, and eminently transgressable.
Despite QT‘s rendering of drag, one might protest that transgender actually
reinstantiates the dominant heterosexual matrix. By seeking to become the opposite sex
or to perform as the ‗other‘ gender, one might be led to identify transgendered identity as
supportive of the two-sex/two-gender model. As Shepherdson (2006) points out, this
view is set up in contrast with the ‗deliterlization‘ view for which Butler is most often
credited – in other words, the view that obscures what the concept of body‘ refers to.
Seen in this way, drag would simply bolster the already given binaries by implicitly
endorsing the notion that one can only cross from gender X to gender Y or from sexual
orientation X to sexual orientation Y. Unlike Butler, who argues that the figure of
transgender serves to undermine the notion that what gender amounts to is a two-part
system, there are feminist theorists and even queer theorists who view the use of transidentity as actually reinforcing the binary system (cf. Raymond, 1979/2006; Hausman,
2006); but the majority of Queer Theory tends towards seeing the figure of trans as
elucidating the ease with which the signifiers, ‗gender‘ and ‗sex,‘ can be detached from
what they signify, which is whatever in the world the terms ‗woman,‘ ‗man,‘ ‗feminine,‘
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‗masculine,‘ and so forth, are supposed to pick out (Prosser, 1998, 27, 64; Shepherdson,
2006, 98).
Nevertheless, in the larger culture, these categories – in particular, the malefemale dichotomy – are taken as ‗given,‘ as natural, and as necessary. The process by
which ‗sex‘ is brought forth as a literal referent is, as Butler (1990) dubs it in Bodies that
Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex (1992), ―citation.‖ ‗Sex‘ is created through our
citing it – by its repeated use in language, for one, but in all other modes that citation
might take, such as recognizing and being recognized as this or that sex, and so forth –
and our continual compulsion to recite it. Likewise, gender and sexual orientation
achieve their statuses as ‗real‘ by the repetition and reproduction of the norms thought to
ground them. Citationality is not exactly the same thing as performativity, although my
reading of Butler‘s use of the two terms is that the former is one mode of the latter.
Insofar as she immediately references speech-act theory38 in the introduction of Bodies
that Matter, as well as her intentions to adapt and adopt parts of Derrida‘s reading of it,
citation can be seen as a new way of conceiving performance. Indeed, as Austin (1962)
originally conceived it, we often ‗do things‘ with words – that is, speech acts can be
performative. In pronouncing a couple man and wife, for example, the illocutionary act is
also the performance of the ritual of marriage. Likewise, the statements, it‟s a boy or it‟s
a girl, when uttered by a physician in reference to a newborn or a developing fetus, serve
to ―cite‖ sex, thereby, ironically but quite fittingly, reproducing the binary categorization
of male and female in order to call forth a subject to which one of these labels can be
attached. And every time I engage in citing – by clicking a box on a form that reads ‗F,‘
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by behaving as a woman or being attributed by others as such – the binary is reiterated.
reinforced. Thus, for Butler, citationality shows that while drag might undermine the
binary, for the most part, our daily routines, behaviors, speech acts, and other forms of
citing gender actually serve to make it appear as thought that which we are citing is
indeed necessary, stable, and given.
As we saw in Chapter 4, Merleau-Ponty (1962) viewed embodiment in a similar
fashion. While never strictly necessary, ‗having two hands‘ shows up as an essential
defining feature of the body through the repeated actions that bodies engage in which
involve two hands. This includes of course, the way objects are produced and reproduced
as well; indeed, the world of objects is continually made for people with two hands and
as such, we come to think of this as a necessary element of embodiment. Similarly,
having a sex is viewed as natural and necessary because it is repeatedly cited, performed,
and enforced. In particular, the enforcement aspect is important to Butler, as she locates
these discursive ‗recitations‘ as emerging from the powerful heterosexual matrix. Much
like Foucault (1975, 1980, 2007) she argues that power relations congealed within this
matrix produce the illusion that it is logically impossible to be unsexed. Intersexed
narratives, such as Herculine Barbin, along with the medico-political narratives regarding
surgical practices on intersexed infants continually recite the necessity of sexual
embodiment (cf. Fausto-Sterling, 1999; Hird, 2004). As Dreger (2004) claims, ―The way
intersexuals are treated today has much of the same effect intended by the conceptual and
practical treatment of the last century: to keep two clear sexes and to retain the notion that
heterosexuality is normal and homosexuality is not‖ (197). Thus, in a mutually
interdependent and reinforcing fashion, gender is also cited as necessarily binary, so that
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contrary to Beauvoir‘s intuition, one really must be born a woman, or a man, and
according to heteronormative standards, this will mean either being straight (normal) or
gay (abnormal).
I want to now turn back to transgender, and consider specifically the DSM and the
Standards of Care (SOC) which regulate sexual reassignment surgery for those
transgendered persons who seek it. My aim in doing so is to examine the ways in which
QT, in particular Butler‘s account, is 1) critical of the DSM and the SOC and 2) utilizes
the figure of the transsexual as it is construed by such medicalized practices to draw
important conclusions about gender in general. Psychiatrists, or ―gatekeepers,‖ as they
are often called in the QT and TGS literature, quite literally evaluate the performance of
surgical candidates based on a manual whose ―criteria and the version of transsexuality
that it posits produce and reify a fiction of a normal, healthy gender that works as a
regulatory measure for the gender expression of all people‖ (Spade, 2006, 329). The SOC
insist that a trans person passes as the desired gender well before the surgery – they must
live as the ―opposite sex,‖ take hormones, and effectively ―prove‖ that they are a suitable
member of this new group (cf. Hale, 2007; Loeb, 2008). But by successfully performing
the desired gender, as Spade notes, what counts as normal gender expression for all
persons is recited. Not only do the practices surrounding and leading up to sexual
reassignment surgery help to reinforce the binaries of sexual difference, but they
highlight the inconsistency with which the heterosexual matrix views gender itself.
Intersexed narratives provide a nice point of comparison. The soma at birth – and in
particular, the external genital morphology – is taken to be the sin qua non of what
Bornstein (1995) refers to as ―Gender Attribution,‖ or that first act of naming/citing a
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person as this or that gender, and yet, as we have seen this is just one among a wide
variety of ways in which gender can be performed and expressed. When it comes to
proving that you are suffering from GID, or if you are simply trying to demonstrate that
you are the gender you ‗feel‘ to be on the ‗inside,‘ behavioral cues – i.e. performances
that go beyond the physical body – are privileged.
In her memoir, Bornstein recounts that no one ever told her ―what it feels like to
be woman,‖ and that all she could ever get clear on was that she was not a man. Based on
the above discussion and QT‘s subversion of gender via the figure of the transsexual, it
would seem that this is because there is no satisfactory definition. By telling a trans
person how a woman acts, this is only one element of being a woman and it turns out that
all attempts to define the concept fall short in providing a comprehensive picture of ‗what
womanhood feels like.‘ I might try to define what it feels like to be a woman by referring
to how I dress, but then in order to understand why the way I dress expresses my feeling
of womanhood, I must refer to some other thing, like, say, acting like a woman.
Nevertheless, acting ‗like a woman‘ is still a step removed from explaining what it is that
unites all these things under the category ‗feels like womanhood‘ and as such, the cycle
continues. In the end, in order to answer the question, what does it feel like to be a
woman, the answer will involve some vague description of womanhood that fails to
capture the essence – if there is such a thing – of the complex phenomenology behind
‗being a woman.‘ Likewise, ‗the sexed body,‘ in the wake of QT cannot be sustained as a
concept that refers to an essential category, nor one that is independent of social
construction, medicalization, or science, since the sexing of bodies is itself a performance
which seeks to reproduce a binary that already has been shown to be unstable.
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While there is much to offer here in terms of QT‘s contribution to deconstructing
the sexed and gendered body and how the transgendered person dramatizes the
performative nature of both, I don‘t think that we ought to adopt the equation, one
suggested by Whittle (2006), e.g. that all transgendered persons are queer. Nor must it
always be the case that transgender is subversive. For one, not all transsexuals and
transgendered persons have subversion ‗in mind‘ – the problematization of gender is
often a theoretical addendum to the lived experiences of individual trans-persons, a result
of what Spade (2006) refers to as autobiographical ―picnicking.‖ Secondly, not all queer
theorists exonerate the figure of the transsexual as a paradigm for subversion. Lesbian
Feminists (cf. Raymond, 2006), for example, are often critical of medical procedures they
see as only buttressing the patriarchy. Indeed, weaving QT together with TGS, or
weaving either of these two branches together with feminism more generally can turn out
to be problematic, given the border wars and boundary politics often present even in
those frameworks which seek to dismantle such exclusionary discourse. Prosser‘s (1998)
concern over seeking to imbricate QT with TGS stems from the notion that the body
becomes so inessential that it features only as a ―costume‖ among all the other
adornments – clothing, behavior, sexuality, etc – that one might choose to express their
gender. Of trans experience, Prosser asks, ―for if the body were but a costume, consider:
why the life quest to alter its contours?‖ (67).
There are several responses one could give to this question off the cuff, but none
seems sufficient. A quick rejoinder is to assume that the inability to sustain the body as a
literal referent, which is the logical conclusion to Butler‘s account, is an undesirable
consequent – in other words, it is not the case that the body is a mere costume and hence,

181

transgendered experience highlights this fault with QT. But then again, transgender and
transsex do remind us that the sexed body is highly constructed, malleable, and certainly
not necessarily fixed, nor does it always align to the gendered self. Thus, another
response to Prosser‘s question might be to suggest that the body, albeit not just costume –
we are after all, always stuck in some body and as such, cannot entirely disrobe from this
particular adornment – is still a mode of presentation that, much like clothing, can be
altered to suit one‘s felt identity. In fact the body, under this read, would be the ultimate
costume, the one we must always tote around with us, and in which we must always be
seen. Nevertheless, like Prosser, I think unproblematically adopting the body-as-costume
framework of QT can and does conceal much of the lived experiences of trans-persons.
Furthermore, if we take seriously, as I suggested we do in Chapter 2, the notion that the
body is one among several tools for constituting cognition, and then extend this idea to
the way in which we utilize this body-tool to fashion ourselves as this or that gender, then
it seems we face a dilemma. Either who I really am must somehow be independent of all
the transitory and unnecessary modes of embodiment I can take up and hence, my gender
is really not grounded in my body, or, we must do away with the concept of a ‗true self‘
altogether. Neither of these is palatable, as the former denies the importance of the body
and embodiment in shaping who and what we think ourselves to be, while the latter
would dismiss any claims – from trans persons or otherwise – to a self that is identifiable
regardless of the body and its morphology. In order to explore these possible
interpretations, and to hopefully resolve the dilemma, it will not be enough however to
simply adjudicate between QT and TGS in order to decide the best ‗theory of the body.‘
Again, doing so always overlooks the particular phenomenology of lived experience. An
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account of subjective experience, as I have argued in this and the chapters preceding, is
crucial to any ‗theory of cognition‘ and transgendered experience highlights just this
necessity of taking seriously the nature of experience. As it turns out, Prosser‘s account
of the role of body image in forming a transgendered identity, as well as any gendered
identity, will serve not only to allow just such a phenomenological approach, but will also
resemble in important ways our discussion of body image and body schema from Chapter
4. What this discussion will add, however, will be a richer understanding of embodiment
generally – one that simultaneously queers ‗the body‘ while reclaiming it as a literal and
material constituent in the formation of gender identity.

5.4 Imagining the Transgendered Body
Ironically, to approach the way ‗the body‘ shows up in subjective transexperience, I want to begin by examining how the medicalization of the phenomenon is
portrayed by TGS. As it turns out, there is a sharp contrast between the way the
experiences of trans persons are recounted individually and the way they are discussed
within the framework of medico-scientific discourse. Because the dominant voice in
assessing and assigning treatment or surgery is this medico-scientific discourse, the
transgender theorists often claim that the individual concerns, desires, and narratives of
the patients are overshadowed by a the ‗master narrative‘ of science, which seeks a more
objective and general account. One underlying assumption, according to transgender
theorists (cf. Stryker, 2006; Spade, 2003; Shepherdson, 2006) that is made by medical
science is that transsexuals seek to become the ―opposite sex‖ and that this binary
framework of choice between the sexes is real; indeed, such ‗naturalness‘ of sexual
difference is only made stronger by the presence of transsexualism. While the SOC
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refrains from making any claims as to whether the existence of transsexualism actually
bolsters the idea that there are only two sexes from which to choose, it is the case that an
assumption of ‗opposing‘ sexes/genders is at play in diagnosis of GID. For example, the
first criterion for inclusion in the category ‗transsexual,‘ according to the current SOC 39
is:
1. The desire to live and be accepted as a member of the opposite sex, usually
accompanied by the wish to make his or her body as congruent as possible with
the preferred sex through surgery and hormone treatment [2001; 5].

Hence, as Shepherdson (2006) suggests, medical science treats transsexualism as a
psychological disorder with an anatomical solution and she further claims that ―the
surgeon works with the conception of anatomy that presupposes a natural version of
sexual identity, thereby foreclosing the question of sexual difference‖ (95). Perhaps
Shepherdson‘s claims are a bit overly dramatic; indeed, it would be difficult to support
the claim that all surgeons operate with the same conception of sexual difference. The
surgeons themselves might simply be carrying out an operation for the sake of fulfilling
their role as a medical practitioner. Furthermore, the SOC do recognize that
transsexualism involves more than mere anatomy alteration, and sometimes anatomical
change is not requested or needed. In fact, a large part of the ―Real-Life Test‖ to
determine one‘s eligibility as the opposite gender is what is known as a ―Real-Life
Experience‖ – the attempted assimilation into the desired gender in one‘s work, school,
leisure activities, name change, and so forth (16-17). What Shepherdson is right to point
out however, is that the question of sexual ‗opposition‘ – the idea that there are two and
only two sexes and/or genders and that there are decidedly specific behaviors, dress, and
39
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activities that belong to each – is not even a question raised by the SOC, or the DSM for
that matter. It is presupposed that if one feels uncomfortable in their gender roles or
anatomical sex then there are two paths available. First, one must engage in
psychotherapy followed by a ―Real Life Experience‖ or test – which involves hormone
therapy and living as the other gender – to see if surgical transition to the ―opposite‖ sex
is required. Then, one either makes the transition or it is recommended that therapy
continues in an effort to achieve comfort with one‘s assigned gender. There is not an
option to live ‗ambiguously‘ or as a gender-queer, at least not as it is written in the SOC
or the DSM. In this way therefore, medical science treats reassignment surgery and
hormonal therapy as helping to create and sustain sexual difference – in other words, as
helping to maintain a ‗healthy‘ gender binarism.
Another interpretation worth exploring regarding the manner by which sexual
reassignment surgery is prescribed is that to some extent, transsexualism – the type of
transsexualism in which surgery is sought – is a modern phenomenon, brought about by
the advent of the technological means to enact such body-modification. Alongside
discoveries of neural plasticity, improved organ and tissue transplanting, and advances in
surgical techniques generally, the body becomes less and less static, more malleable, and,
one might argue, more like a costume that one can readily change. In order for a genuine
MTF or FTM post-op transsexual to exist, certain technological innovations had to arise
on the one hand, but also, the ideology of the body as a relatively stable entity – in
particular, that biological sex was a permanent endowment – likewise radically altered
with more and more ways in which technology could alter the flesh. In a similar vein,
Shepherdson (2006), e.g. sees the history of science, in particular, the history of
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technology, perpetuating the idea that the body is ―present-at-hand, a material substratum
inhabited by a ‗spiritual substance,‘ an ‗animated subjectivity‘‖ (95). I am hesitant to
view technological history as a trajectory towards such a robust ghost-in-the-machine
metaphysics of self, although there is something compelling about the idea that the more
manipulable the body becomes – the more materially and objectively real it is made by
our abilities to ―fashion‖ it like any other tool – the less and less essential it becomes. In
other words, what is the body but a costume, if it is constantly alterable and never truly
who ‗we‘ are? The body, like any other tool, is something to be manipulated and utilized
in order to perform certain functions, and in the case of gender, it is a mechanism for
acting out various gender roles. In order to ‗properly‘ be a woman for instance, one must,
according to medical science, have a vagina, and as such, an anatomical male who
identifies as a woman, will qualify for surgery that can transfigure those bodily parts –
the ‗tools‘ of sex as it were – such that they are appropriate to the ―other‖ sex. But this
leads us back to the earlier problem of sexual reassignment qualification: if an essential
part of enacting the desired gender/sex is possessing the correct anatomy, then how can
one go about proving that he or she really is the ―opposite‖ of what is narrated by the
body?
To be sure, according to transgendered persons themselves, but also, as the SOC
in determining surgical candidacy attest, a particular kind of body is not sufficient for
realizing gender. It would seem, nonetheless, that it is not necessary either, because, as
the SOC dictate, at one can and in fact must prove his or her gender without the
supposedly requisite body. In other words, there is a presupposition when someone is
diagnosed as having GID severe enough to warrant sexual reassignment surgery that the
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proper idea of embodiment is already possessed and that this idea transcends the
materiality of the physical body. Nevertheless, for many transsexuals, this material body
is precisely what is precluding full realization of the ideal embodiment. If we contrast
transsexuals – and here, I mean transsexuals who are in fact dissatisfied with some or all
of their anatomical sex - with transvestites, it becomes all the more clear that ‗the body‘
is quite literally a site of identity crisis for the former, but not for the latter. While
transvestites can simply ‗vest‘ themselves in another gender by cross-dressing,
performing, and so forth, and this suffices for the role-shifting they are seeking to attain,
transsexuals who opt for surgery are cannot simply behave as the desired sex/gender and
be satisfied. And yet, this behaving as is precisely what is required of them in order to
‗prove‘ that they really do identify with the opposite sex/gender. It seems that for many
transsexuals, the body, although not sufficient for enacting the desired gender, is at the
same time a necessary component of it; however, this missing piece, prior to surgery,
prevents the full realization of that desire. Shepherdson comes to conclude regarding this
differentiation between transvestites and transsexuals as such:

Perhaps we could say that cross-dressing is the act of a subject who plays with
what we call ―gender roles‖ while the transsexual is someone whose capacity to
act (in the sense not only of ―performance,‖ but of speech-act theory) waits upon
(an idea of) embodiment [2006; 101].
Shepherdson goes on to say that distinguishing between ―embodiment‖ and ―gender role‖
is no easy task, and is certainly not reducible to biological differentiation. Perhaps the
embodiment of which the transvestite has an idea just is the gender role they enact and
because their idea of gender does not need to be constituted by specific anatomical
material, this idea serves its function well enough. I don‘t like this answer, however, as it
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seems to overlook the quite obvious fact that transsexuals must have some idea of
embodiment. How else would they ‗know‘ that they are trapped in the wrong body? To
add to Shepherdson‘s account, therefore, I want to argue that transsexuals do have an idea
of embodiment, a body image that for them does not correspond to the gender roles that
their actual body is expected to perform (or that they wish it to perform). This idea of
embodiment, since it does not correspond to any material reality (at least not pre-op) is,
unlike a transvestite‘s image, incomplete and is therefore not felt as ‗matching.‘ In fact,
looking at the way many transsexuals describe their experiences, as well as the ways in
which transsexual theorists such as Prosser and Shepherdson characterize themselves and
others, I will further argue that there are actually two separate body images formed, one,
the ideal embodiment – the desired gender – is a projected image of wholeness, while the
other, the body image which the actual body subtends, is fractured, incomplete, and
above all, not experienced in an ‗at-home-with‘ manner.. By examining how these
transsexual body images are formed and transformed, I will then suggest a way to read
transsexual narratives that avoids the pitfalls of QT and the radical anti-essentialism
pertaining the body that results from the body-as-costume model.
Given the accounts of many transsexuals, it is not surprising that their
phenomenological descriptions of embodiment are appropriated by Queer Theorists as
signaling that the body, like a suit or a uniform, is interchangeable and thus no more
constitutive of one‘s identity than any other external prop or aid. Consider these
testimonies:40

40

From Prosser (1998).
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―I might throw off the hide of my body and reveal myself pristine within – forever
emancipated into that state of simplicity.‖ – Jan Morris
―I think how nice it would be to unzip my body from forehead to navel and go on
vacation. But there is no escaping it, I‘d have to pack myself along.‖ – Leslie
Feinberg
―Because my body was becoming more and more alien to me as I developed,
there was an urge to rip off my own skin, for lack of a better description. The
frustration and anxiety were tearing me to bits.‖ – Raymond Thompson
―I used to look at my body and think it was a bit like a diver‘s suit, it didn‘t feel
like me inside‖ – Anonymous

It is tempting to cast GID as an experience that reveals that the body is not sustainable as
any real indicator for sexed or gendered identity. As the above narratives suggest, the
body seems to have little to do with one‘s ‗true sex/gender‘– it is even described as a
diver‘s suit or as something one can unzip and step out of – but to make the leap that the
experience of Unheimlichkeit felt by persons with GID demonstrates that all of
embodiment is a performance and that the body is one among many props is, I want to
argue, too hasty. Prosser (1998) suggests that ―transsexuals continue to deploy the image
of wrong embodiment because being trapped in the wrong body is simply what
transsexuality feels like‖ (69, emphasis mine). Given these narratives, coupled with my
own ignorance of the ‗what it‘s like‘ element of transsexuality, I can accept that for many
trans persons, it must feel as though one is trapped in the wrong skin and if given the
opportunity, they would jump out of it. However, the experience of dissociation between
self and skin does not imply that the concepts of body and embodiment are not literal
indicators of one‘s identity. Indeed, Feinberg (1980) recognizes the true impossibility of
her desire – the body is ―inescapable‖ – and Thompson (1995) alludes to the
unavailability of a better description for his felt need to tear off his skin. It appears that
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the narrators here are quite aware that the immediacy of the experience shows up in ways
that are not expressible in language and, moreover, that the body cannot just be sloughed
off like a coat. In some sense therefore, QT can be accused of reading into these bodynarratives precisely what it has renounced – the ‗figure‘ of the transsexual actually comes
to ground the distinction between the physical body itself and the body image(s), which
are rarely, if ever, literal ‗pictures‘ of that body. In other words, the dichotomy of figureground is itself another engendered categorization, one that is the product of QT‘s
attempt to use transsexuality as a foil for the supposed naturalness of sexual difference.
‗The body,‘ as it is interpreted via this figure/ground distinction, comes to occupy a
tenuous position in the formation of sexed and gendered identity – it is both a ‗that which
I am not,‘ and yet, a ‗that inside which I feel trapped.‘ But it seems that this is not quite
the message conveyed by the narratives; rather than claiming that their experiences
highlight the non-essential nature of the body in the their sense of identity, the transpersons narrating here seem to all have reached the conclusion that the body is both a part
of their identity as trans but is also an object, costume-like though it may be, that they
wish to alter.
Thompson‘s story, in particular, is interesting because he describes his true
identity as his ―inner body‖ and characterizes his ―outer body‖ as that in which ‗he‘ is
trapped. Again, it is enticing to read this as suggesting that ‗the body‘ has no literal
referent, but why not read Thompson‘s narrative in reverse? What if ‗embodiment‘ – the
―idea that transsexuals wait upon,‖ as Shepherdson (2006) characterizes it – is the term
that does not have a referent? Prosser suggests something similar, as he argues that
embodiment for Thompson is ―incomplete‖ and not fully realized, since being a man
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cannot be performed adequately without the proper body. This ―inner body,‖ is an image
of oneself that is comprised of a body that does not even exist. Citing Oliver Sacks‘
(1984) work on phantom limb patients, Prosser (1998) claims that transsexuals, like those
who ‗re-member‘ the otherwise non-existent limbs when experiencing phantom pains, are
themselves ‗phantomizing‘ a newly configured body, one that goes beyond the material
body itself. Although the body phantomized never actually existed, and as such, unlike a
phantom limb experienced after amputative surgery, the referent picked out by the
transsexual body image has no past material reality, ―the body of transsexual becoming is
born out of a yearning for a perfect past – that is, not memory but nostalgia: the desire for
the purified version of what was, not for the return to home per se (nostos) but to the
romanticized ideal of home‖ (84). Based on this interpretation, it makes sense to think of
the ‗dual-body‘ characterization Thompson provides as denoting, on the one hand, the
material, the body itself, or what he calls his ―outer body,‖ and the body image,
Thompson‘s embodiment, or what he calls his ―inner body.‖ It is not that either one of
these experiential domains is any more or less literal – both are ‗real‘ – but Thompson‘s
embodiment, an embodiment that is other-to, or better, one that goes beyond the material
body, is whole and complete. It is an ideal of heimlichkeit, a body constructed by the
imagination that is waiting to be embodied by his ―inner body,‖ which, until successful
transitioning, dissociates from its ―outer body.‖ We might say that in the case of extreme
bodily dissociation such as GID, there are two conflicting body images – one which
corresponds to the ‗inner‘ sense of bodily identity and one which corresponds to the
‗outer, ‗ and hence, visible body. Again, Anzieu‘s notion of a skin ego is helpful here as a
metaphor by which to interpret the sense of confinement that is felt by the inner self of a
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transsexual who describes the desire to jump out of his or her own skin. The skin serves
as a boundary between the inner and the outer body images, but it also helps to form them
both.
Further evidence that body image is key to anchoring transsexual embodiment as
a future ideal of completion, suggests Prosser (1998), can be gleaned by considering the
history of the formation of transsexuality as a concept. Prior to ‗the transsexual,‘ persons
who today would be classified as having GID, were called ―inverts.‖ In fact, the term
inverts in the mid- to late 1800s referred to a much broader variety of ‗gender variance‘ –
being homosexual, cross-dressing, hyper-masculinity in females, etc. But the narratives
of the inverts who were said to feel as though they needed a ―new body‖ or to change
from one sex/gender to the other, Prosser claims, deploy the same body image that we
find in transsexual narratives today. In other words, the protention of transsexual
embodiment, which we might be tempted to think was made possible by medical
technology, actually preceded it. Before there was any real future body for which to hold
out hope – before technology made possible attaining a new sexed body – transsexual
embodiment existed, in the form of projected ideas of heimlichkeit. Specifically, the body
image correlated with the present body and that correlated with the ―inner‖ body image –
which is also projected as a future, real body – are in conflict with each other, whether
surgery is possible or not.
While I see no problem in claiming that transsexualism is a phenomenon that
predates the medico-technological invention of the term, I am concerned here that Prosser
might be overlooking and/or underemphasizing the role that ‗the technological‘ plays in
the construction of transsexual body images specifically, and in the formation of body
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images generally. If technology played no role in forming one‘s identity as transsexual,
or as any other identity, my question is then, from whence do such images arise? As I
have argued in previous chapters, while both body schema and body image can alter, it is
the latter that is more susceptible to modification from ‗outside‘ – namely, socially
constructed norms of embodiment, ideals of beauty, and technological mediation.
However, as Prosser casts it, the body image seems to be just as fixed as the schema;
indeed, he never discusses a body schema and as such, the two are either conflated or
body schema is just not a concept he considers. Regardless of this discrepancy, Prosser‘s
use of body image is, I want to argue, a move too far back in the direction of
essentialism. In other words, while his critique of QT has been fruitful for regaining a
sense of the body as a real referential component of embodiment, the claim that
transsexual body image is technologically unmediated runs the risk of sliding back into
the dilemma claiming either a strict biological-body-as-gender-identity or a disembodied
‗true self,‘ one that is independent of its body, but that also strangely must anchor itself in
some body. Neither of these views captures fully the crucial role that technology does in
fact play in shaping how we imagine ourselves to be qua embodied subjects.
I will argue in the next chapter that Prosser‘s account, along with all of the
phenomenology of transsexualism thus far discussed, actually shows that embodiment is
always already constituted by technology. To defend this claim, I will need to clarify
what I mean by technology, as well as return to some important insights from QT
concerning embodiment, namely from thinkers such as Donna Haraway (1988), whose
image of the cyborg will provide a framework for better understanding transgendered
subjectivity. My claim is that cyborg embodiment is the subtending phenomenology of
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all embodiment and that the body images deployed in extreme cases of bodily
disownership, such as in that of a transsexual, or any other sense of unheimlichkeit, are
not philosophical markers for ‗the rest of us,‘ nor do they simply establish, as Butler
(2004) claims, ―the limits of what we think we know.‖ As it will turn out, the
natural/unnatural divide, a myth perpetuated by juxtaposing non-transsexual with
transsexual as well as human and machine, is, I will argue, another level of concealment,
one which serves to mask the fundamentally hybridized, eminently dissociable, and yet
always already technological nature of all cognitive subjectivity.
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Chapter 6
The Technology of Queered Cognition
―Technologies, as organized systems, produce a range of products, effects,
representations, and artefacts, chief among them … what we could call technologies of
gender, race, and sexuality‖ – Terry & Calvert, 1997; 5.
―Cognition and signification, Self and Other, are not opposed to sensibility or affectivity,
but rather presuppose it; discourse and figure, meaning and sense, the speakable and the
unspeakable are mutually constitutive yet incommensurable. The relation is one of
duplicity rather than duality‖ – Sullivan, 2001; 165.

6.1 Introduction
In this final chapter, I will return to several claims from the previous chapters
concerning cognition; in particular, the notion that ‗we‘ are never entirely ‗in our heads,‘
but are instead, a conglomeration of organism + external processes. No image is better
suited to expressing the nature of this hybridized human than the cyborg and as such, I
will utilize the cyborg as it is evoked both in cognitive science as well as in feminist
theory, in order to draw parallels between the two usages and further show how this
image actually serves to elucidate embodied subjectivity. While the cyborg is utilized for
various purposes by philosophers like Clark (2003) and feminists such as Haraway
(1988), I want to focus on a common thread running through both disciplines, namely,
the idea that who and what ‗we‘ are is always an organism+artifact coupling. To be sure,
this position will require some defending, as well as some clarification as to what
precisely is meant by the second half of the always-already hybridized human – i.e. the
technology to which the organism is coupled. To this end, I will differentiate between
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visible and invisible technologies in order to maintain that complete dissociation from our
tools is impossible, as we are often – in fact always, I will argue – in the grips of
technology, albeit oftentimes of the invisible or ‗transparent‘ type. In order to begin this
process of defining ‗the human‘ as an always already technological being, I will first look
to some of the more extreme modes of organism-machine coupling found in the work of
surgical artists, Orlan and Stelarc.
Having explicated and defended the claim that human cognition and embodiment
is always a hybridization of organism, machine, and/or transparent technology, I will
return to the discussion of Transgender (TG) and Intersexed Embodiment (IE) to revisit
the overriding phenomenology expressed in these experiences, namely, that of dysphoria
or unheimlichkeit. When one‘s actual body is not aligned with one‘s body image, or when
one‘s projected or desired bodily presence in the world is precluded by the body, the
resulting accounts we have seen tend toward describing the experience as being ‗trapped‘
in a ‗wrong body,‘ or having the urgent need to ‗jump out of one‘s skin.‘ It is this
ambiguous bodily-being-towards-the-world that is really the source of Unheimlichkeit in
GID or any of the other bodily pathologies mentioned thus far. In other words,
embodiment and not merely ‗the body‘ is often what one does not feel at home with in
cases of dissociation or pathology. I will examine various modes of ‗embodied
unheimlichkeit‘ and will argue two things in this final chapter: First, we should treat
one‘s sex and/or gender as one mode of embodiment, and more specifically, as argued in
Chapter 5, as an embodied practice of performance. That I feel like a woman and am
labeled as such, is achieved through repeated behaviors that indicate or ‗cite‘
womanhood. Sex and gender are just two examples of the multifarious ways in which
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embodiment generally is a means of performing as this or that type of subject. One of the
key ‗tools‘ utilized in enacting embodied performance is of course, the body itself,
although it is not the only one. In fact, the second claim I will defend is that we ought to
think of sex and gender and other modes of embodied subjectivity themselves as tools.
Indeed, they can be used to enact yet further performances, all of which, I argue, are part
of the larger phenomenon we call ‗cognition.‘ Based on this notion that we utilize a host
of different ‗tools‘ at different times – bodies, sexual identity, gender performance, and
so forth – in order to cognize, I will further suggest that we begin to see cognition
generally, as Clark (2003) does, as ―a shifting coalition of tools.‖ In this way therefore,
what is actually dissociated in cases of GID or other ‗bodily dysphorias‘ is a person‘s
relationship to the tools they are using. Again, our notion of ‗tool use‘ will need to be
broadened and refined, so as to include among its exemplars, dress, language, and other
sociotechnical systems. The payoff to all of this is that by treating the phenomena of
dissociation experienced by persons with GID or IE as a mode of embodiment dysphoria,
or more specifically, as cases in which there is a breakdown between person and world, a
crucial possibility of human embodiment generally is made more explicit. This possibility
I claim, is the always present possibility of breakdown, wherein I feel dissociated from
parts of my body, the tools I am using, or the larger social context in which I find myself.
My account will be overtly Heideggerian for the most part, insofar as the potentiality for
breakdown – be it with tangible tools, such as hammers, or intangible tools such as
language – can be described as a feature of my interfacing with the world. What I will
add to Heidegger‘s account will of course be the notion that the artifacts of sex and
gender are ‗sociotechnical systems of use‘ from which we can and often do dissociate. In
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fact, as I will claim more strongly, our embodied subjectivity is always caught up in
attempting to ‗be at home with‘ one or more of these ‗systems‘ and hence, sexed and
gendered identity, much like language, are ‗tools‘ from which we very rarely, if ever,
entirely decouple.

6.2 (Ex)Change Artists and Bodily Queering
The year is 1993, and New York‘s Sandra Gering Gallery is witness to an exhibit
unlike any other it has hosted. The French surgical artist, Orlan, has reconstructed her
face in order to resemble five separate computer images of famously beautiful women:
Mona Lisa, Diana, Botticelli‘s Venus, Moreau‘s Europa, and Gérard‘s Psyche. She
considered her surgeries to be part of the art and therefore also part of the exhibit. Since
the early 1970s, Orlan has experimented with her body as a means to weave beauty
together with the abject, and her work has thus come to be known as ‗carnal art‘ (cf.
O‘Bryan, 2005). Influenced by the bodily transformations in the Mayan and Olméques
cultures, in 1998, she worked with Pierre Zoville to create several images and video
installations based on her own surgically modified face and pictures with headdresses,
facial implants, and piercings. Below are the images from this project:

Figure 6.1: The Many Faces of Orlan
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Jay Prosser (1998) had the opportunity to ask Orlan questions, in particular about
the ways in which her identity was maintained or lost throughout all the transformations.
Because, as Orlan claims, ―skin is a mask of strangeness,‖41 one that she can peel off,
restructure and resurface, it is a means of identification, but only loosely. It is an
eminently penetrable surface, one that, as Moos (1996) describes it, ―is Orlan's metaphor
for the thin, osmotic surface of being, its existence as interface, intercourse between
inside (flow) and outside (appearances)‖ (70). Recall that thinkers like Merleau-Ponty
and Anzieu have argued that the skin is an ‗interface‘ between world and self, between
external objecthood and internal, conscious subjectivity. Given that Orlan‘s art construes
the skin as so eminently alterable, extendable, retractable, and even ―strange‖ as she calls
it (implying an otherness of the flesh), the term ‗interface‘ itself becomes tricky to
understand, as that boundary between self and world so often shifts. This implies the
continual transitioning of what we mean when we identify as this or that, juxtaposing
ourselves against the other.
In further responding to Prosser‘s question about identity, Orlan went on to say
that she felt like ―une transsexuelle femme-á-femme.‖42 Prosser notes that on the one
hand, Orlan‘s use of transsexuality plays with the very idea of transitioning itself – she
(ex)changed her identity for another one – but it was a female-to-female operation.
Orlan‘s embracing transsexuality, according to Prosser, ―made of surgery a spectacle‖
and ―brought to the surface of a commonplace assumption about transsexuality: that is,
that transsexuality is precisely a phenomenon of the body‘s surface‖ (62). However,
sexual identity generally cannot be relegated to the surface of the skin, as we do not
41
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Cited in Prosser (1998) from Louis Gray (1996), ―Me, My Surgeon, and My Art,‖ The Guardian 2, 8.
Personal communication cited by Prosser (1998), 61.
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locate sex any one place on that surface (i.e. it is not just genital), nor do we find sexual
identity by looking at all of that surface; indeed, much of sexual identification has to do
with internal processes and chemicals. So, one might interpret Orlan‘s rendering of her
body art as ―transsexuelle‖ – as problematizing the very idea that we can ever look
exclusively to the body and hope to ascertain true identity, sexual or otherwise.
Regardless of how we want to read Orlan‘s performances – as suggesting identity is
beyond the skin, internal to it, or is altogether nowhere – the point remains that her art
queers the boundaries between artist and artwork. This line between the artist as she is
seen through her artwork – i.e. an externally constituted subjectivity – and the artist‘s
internal or experienced subjectivity is thereby also blurred in body-art such as Orlan‘s.
As she describes it, she changes ‗from woman to woman‘ with each modification and
surgery, both on the ‗inside‘ and ‗out.‘
Another artist who plays with bodily boundaries in a similar manner, although his
‗materials‘ differ quite drastically, is the Australian techno-artist, Stelarc. Probably best
known for his ―Third Hand Project‖ (1976-81), wherein a robotic arm is attached to
Stelarc‘s body such that contractions in his stomach muscles send messages to the arm to
control and move it about, Stelarc has since continued to expand and invade the flesh. In
an interview with Paolo Atzori and Kirk Woolford (1995), he claims ―the body is an
impersonal, evolutionary, objective structure…the desire to locate the self simply within
a particular biological body is no longer meaningful. What it means to be human is being
constantly redefined.‖ Like Orlan, Stelarc recognizes that the skin is eminently malleable.
Perhaps taking this interpretation a bit further, he maintains that the skin is a means of
identifying ourselves and others, but claims that it is not the constancy of the flesh that
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makes us who we are so much as its transformative potential. It is through the alterations
of the flesh and hence, for Stelarc, the subsequent ―new body architecture‖ that we come
to know our true identities qua human. His more recent project, ―Ear on Arm‖ (2007present) highlights the way in which a seemingly rigid structure – the auditory system –
turns out to be much more malleable and transitory than we might have thought. By using
skin extenders, his own living cells, microphones, and transmitters, he has implanted an
ear on his left arm that he hope eventually will be able to send the sounds it ‗hears‘ not
just to Stelarc himself, but to others as well. He has designed it such that the transmitters
would be in his mouth, allowing for only he to hear what his third ear hears, unless he
opens his mouth, in which case, the sound will come out of his mouth and be audible for
nearby persons. Eventually however, he hopes to have it connected wirelessly to the
internet so he can transmit what he is hearing through his third ear in Sydney, can be
heard by a friend online who is physically in Prague.
Interestingly, MIT‘s Touch Lab has begun developing similar means of
incorporating audio-visual-communication devices into the body. Their ―Sixth Sense‖43
project would allow, for example, the use of one‘s hand as the dial pad of a cell phone or
the observation of ‗meta-data‘ immediately upon viewing an object, text, or even another
person. All of this would be possible because of a mini-projector hung around the neck,
wirelessly transmitting to a cell phone (which could always stay in the pocket) with
internet access, and a blue-tooth enabled ear set. Upon scanning an image of, say, an
approaching friend, the face-recognition technology coupled with a linked database of
information could conceivably project onto the surface of said companion important
43
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information such as his/her name, birthday, even a link to his/her facebook profile. These
developments, along with Stelarc and Orlan‘s artwork, lend credence to the idea that
detaching artist from art, human from machine, and self from world, is not a matter of
tracing the surface of the skin.

Figure 6.2: Stelarc‘s Third Ear

Figure 6.3:MIT‘s ―Sixth Sense‖

The underlying philosophical importance to all of this, claims Stelarc, is that it reveals the
importance of the body in understanding human cognition on the one hand, while
simultaneously showing that ‗this body‘ to which we attach so much importance in
marking us as individual humans, is not merely a conglomeration of flesh, bones, and
blood. Rather, we are biotechnological hybrids and the idea that ‗we‘ have any identity
independent of our tools is a misunderstanding. ―Technology has always been coupled
with the evolutionary development of the body. Technology is what defines being human.
It's not an antagonistic alien sort of object, it's part of our human nature. It constructs our
human nature‖ (Interview with Atzori and Woolford, 1995). This view is reminiscent of
what was discussed in Chapter 2, namely Clark‘s (2003) idea that if there is a human
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nature at all, it consists in that nature being eminently changeable, a ―shifting coalition of
tools,‖ as he terms it.
These extreme versions of human+tool+art intertwining seen in the work of
Stelarc and Orlan serve to illustrate several important points about embodiment, which in
turn sheds light on ways in which the terms ‗body‘ and ‗cognition‘ ought to be reworked.
First, it should be noted that I have purposely chosen to compare ‗art‘ and ‗technology,‘
as they are themselves not so easily distinguished and often become intermingled in each
other. Etymologically, they have similar base meanings – a skill, technique, or craft
knowledge, much like the Greek word, technē – and in terms of the products created by
artistic or technological know-how, it is often difficult to determine whether the objects
ought to be properly considered ‗artwork‘ or ‗tools.‘ In the case of some artwork and
technology, it is difficult to tease apart the tool or instrument itself from the skillful use of
it. Architecture, for example, if done well, achieves a seamless blending of function and
beauty, such that the skilled use of tools, design, building and finished ‗product‘ are just
as much artwork as they are technology. In the case of dance, it is even more difficult to
separate tool use from the tool itself – namely ‗the body‘ is both the tool and the user, the
product and the process. Similarly, in The Question Concerning Technology (1977),
Heidegger claims that the ―poetic revealing‖ of truth – poiēsis – that occurs in and among
the fine arts can also shed light on the essence of technology. The two are united, he
claims in the ancient Greek conception of technē (339) and yet they remain conceptually
distinct:
Because the essence of technology is nothing technological, essential reflection
upon technology and decisive confrontation with it must happen in a realm that is,
on the one hand, akin to the essence of technology and, on the other,
fundamentally different from it. Such a realm is art [1977; 340].
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Much like Stelarc‘s work forces us to consider that ‗art‘ is not just about the final product
– in other words, the ‗essence of art is not any one piece of artwork – Heidegger points
out that the nature of technology is not to be found in something technological. To be
sure, tangible tools such as hammers and computers count as part of what we mean by the
term ‗technology,‘ but they are only one component of a much larger conceptual
framework. As Stephen Kline (1985) concurs, technology is not limited to this
―hardware‖ version of its definition. There are also at least these three alternative
conceptions, in which technology might be treated as:
A Sociotechnical System of Manufacture: wherein technology is not limited to the
tools it produces, but includes the entire system of production itself – the tools
needed to make the tools, so to speak, the machinery, the persons involved in
production, and so forth.
A Knowledge or Know-How: similar to the ancient Greek conception of technē,
here, technology refers to the information and skills necessary to produce tools or
artifacts.
A Sociotechnical System of Use: refers to the ―combinations of hardware and
people (and usually other elements) to accomplish tasks that humans cannot
perform unaided by such systems – to extend human capacities‖ [1985; 215-18].
To illustrate this last version, Kline cites military weapons as an example of hardware
that is necessarily caught up in a system of use – for the purpose of inflicting harm upon
the enemy, which is undoubtedly enhanced by weaponry – a system that is itself only
understood in the larger context of conflict among persons and nations. In this way, the
‗hardware‘ interpretation of technology is only one version of what we mean when we
say ‗military technology.‘ To be sure, a weapon qua single object is not identical to the
larger system of use in which it plays a part, but the weapon has no meaning as a piece of
technology without that larger context. Thus, the production of military weapons goes far

204

beyond the individual guns, grenades, and tanks that are manufactured. Likewise, art is
not just about the product, but also the process and of course, the processor (artist).
Examples that help illustrate this fact can be found easily in the performing arts – dance,
theater, etc, in which the ‗art‘ really consists in its being done – but even within the realm
of fine arts, artists such as Pollock have argued that painting is just as much process as
product – indeed painting is both a noun and a verb. What both art and technology share
therefore is an ambiguity in meaning, between thing and process, creator and created. In
other words, art and technology are hybrids, mixes of tools, tool-users, actions, objects,
and information systems.
Another point behind these examples that is both crucial to my overarching
argument and more contentious: the fine line between art and technology, which is also a
blurring of process and object, serves as a reminder that ‗we‘ are just as much a mixture
of process and object, partial identities, and boundary transgressions. By this I mean that
when we closely examine the melding of art and technology, particularly evident in
Stelarc‘s work, it becomes all the more difficult to pin down where and who ‗we‘ are
without referencing and relying upon the tools otherwise thought to be other-to our
‗essential‘ identity. Simply pointing to the biological body will not do; besides Orlan and
Stelarc, we have encountered numerous examples about how embodiment goes beyond
the body, and because embodiment is a necessary constituent of cognitive subjectivity,
pointing to myself is always going to supersede my body. This is also evident if we
consider again the way embodiment often involves forming a body image, a picture of the
body in one sense, but a picture of the body as a woman, as able-bodied, or as not-athome with itself. These images we form of who and what we are as embodied beings, I
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want to claim, necessarily invoke technological mediation. In other words, embodiment is
always already technological, as Stelarc and Clark claim. However, there are reasons to
disagree with this version of embodiment as always already coupled to technology. For
instance, if we treat the body too much like any other tool, we might overlook the very
important sense in which the body, unlike other tools, functions both as tool and as user. I
will address some of these concerns and in so doing, will refine further the conception of
‗technology‘ in order to show that teasing ‗it‘ apart from ‗us‘ is difficult, if not
impossible.

6.3 Hard and Soft, Opaque and Transparent: Technology Above and Below the
Radar
It is not only painful to undergo surgical modification in the ways Stelarc and
Orlan do; it is expensive, time-consuming, and perhaps, one might even argue, a waste of
resources. More importantly, to use such extreme body modification practices as
exemplars of ‗human nature‘ reeks of a fallacious hasty overgeneralization. Most of ‗us‘
do not engage in these practices. Indeed, the very thought of doing so is often repulsive.
Orlan‘s work, for example, is often described as belonging to the realm of abject art. It
seems that the only element of human nature revealed by these excessive bodily
transfigurations is that we are much more comfortable ‗in our own skin‘ as it were, and
rarely, if ever, are so coupled to machinery and artwork.
This is a fair point and one worth addressing. To begin, let‘s consider body
modification in a broader, less extreme context. Take tattooing and piercing for example.
A recent Harris poll44 indicated that as of 2003, 16% of all U.S. adults (≥18 years) have at
least one tattoo, while 36% of those aged 25-29 years have at least one. As for piercings,
44
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it is estimated that 15% of adults have at least one ―body piercing,‖ although strangely,
the term ―body‖ here does not include the earlobes. One of the earliest forms of body
modification, ear piercing, is so commonplace, it is not even considered in studies of
piercing and tattooing of ‗the body.‘ 45 Ear piercings, nonetheless, just like any other
body-modification practice, can and do signal status, sexuality, achievement, and
willingness to take risk, just as much as any other body art. In a different but related vein,
consider plastic surgery. In 2002, there were 6.6 million procedures carried out in the
U.S. and the American Society for Plastic Surgeons estimates that by 2015, 17% of all
Americans will have sought plastic surgery. 46 It is more difficult than one might think in
fact, to find someone who has not altered the contours of their flesh with metal, ink or
implants. If we include things like earrings, navel rings, hair waxing, and dental
procedures such as braces and whitening, it becomes nearly impossible. While the
reasons for altering the body are vast and complex, in one way or another, piercing,
tattooing, and surgical transformation mark the body as belonging to this or that type,
class, culture, race, gender, or group. Modifying the body to fit within a certain limit of
acceptable appearance – or modifying it so as to not to fit within a particular group, in
cases such as dying one‘s hair so as to cease belonging to a stereotyped group, or
tattooing the body to mark oneself as not part of a gang (although, in both cases just
mentioned, the body modification, while excluding a person from one group,
simultaneously includes them in another) – is the same sort of practice, regardless of the
extremes to which it is taken. In other words, if we are talking simply about the attempt
to locate oneself in a particular social group or to mark oneself as being this or that kind

45
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of subject, then piercing an infant‘s ears as a rite of passage into ‗girlhood‘ is only a
difference in degree, not kind, to implanting lights in one‘s forehead.
An immediate response to all of this is to argue that while common, these
practices do not actually imply that who and what we are is essentially artistically and
technologically modified. Stripped away of all of its tools and alterations, ‗the body‘
remains an organic compound of flesh and bone, all other accoutrement being optional
add-ons. I will table this particular concern for a moment and redirect the discussion to
‗the mind.‘ While our bodies may not always be altered by technology perhaps, if we
revisit Otto and his notebook, for instance, we might reason that cognition is always
dependant on some sort of coupling with external tools. Indeed, while Otto is only a
thought experiment, his kind is not so fictional, it turns out. Clark (2003) recounts a story
of stepping onto a crowded subway car and noticing that while all of the people on the
train were physically there, because they were so immersed in cell phone conversations,
it was as if a part of them were not there. In a real sense, our technologies today allow us
to be transported from one place to another. When we consider what it‘s like to be at a
dinner party, or, as Clark (2003) suggests, on a crowded subway, and see that our
companions are not really ‗there‘ but are instead skyping, texting, or talking on the
phone, it seems as though cognitive presence often has little to do with the physical
location of the organism. Where ‗we‘ are is often directly influenced or changed by the
tools we use, especially tools like the internet, which allow for telepresent
communication, synchronous chatting across the globe, and video conferencing. Switch
the focus yet again to the way these tools, as Kline (1985) put it, extend human
capacities. Like Otto, most of us are dependent on at least one device for ―cognitive
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offloading,‖ such as the use of a PDA for the storage of data about our business contacts
and friends. Even the more Luddite types among us are likely unable to compute large
sums without the aid of pencil and paper. As I argued in Chapter 2, this fact suggests that
cognition is not occurring entirely within the confines of the skull-brain, and while this
conclusion may still be debatable, the idea that we simply cannot perform certain
cognitive tasks without ‗help‘ is far less contestable. Our memories pale in comparison to
our computers‘ and even our sense of direction is often a disaster without having ―an app
for it‖ such that we can depend on our iPhones, GPS, or other navigational software just
to know where we are and where we are going.
Again, however, it might be objected that not all of us are so dependent on tools
for thinking and thus, what it is to be human does not imply a technologically constituted
being. If we are only considering specific types of technologies then this might be so.
According to recent data,47 in 2009, only 26.6% of the world‘s population had reliable
internet access. Estimates concerning phone use are not unanimous, with some studies
suggesting that nearly 70% of the world‘s population have made a phone call and others
indicating that 70% have not.48 Either way, it stands to reason that the technologies I have
argued to be so ubiquitous and constitutive of who ‗we‘ are, are nowhere nearly so
prevalent. However, I intend to maintain that embodiment – not simply the body, and not
simply the mind, but the embodied mind – is always technological, and I think that if we
reconsider the various types of technology and their relationships to embodiment, I can
47

http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm
See for example: http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/irwp/events/braga_presentation/sld005.htm, as well
as a full discussion at http://answers.google.com/answers/main?cmd=threadview&id=20411. The more
dramatic numbers suggesting that only 30% of the world‘s population has made or received a phone call is
taken from Hayles, K. (2002).
48

209

convince the reader that this is so. The interweaving of the tangible and intangible in
sociotechnical systems of use such as gender, body art, and so forth, remind us that
technology has at least two distinct dimensions. I have so far referred to these levels as
the tangible and intangible, while others (cf. Sullivan, 2002) have discussed technology
as being either ―hard‖ or ―soft,‖ but the idea is the same: there are technologies that we
can ‗see‘ and ‗hold,‘ such as hammers and computers and then there are technologies that
are oftentimes much farther below the conscious radar, such as practical know-how.
Social institutions, Sullivan claims, can serve as ‗tools,‘ – I can use the university as a
means to achieve status in my career, e.g. – but, these tools, if they are to be conceived as
such, are inextricably tied to the know-how associated with using them. In other words, it
makes no sense to talk about them as tools, without the correlated technē involved.
Because of this ambiguity, it is often difficult to separate tool from tool-use, and it is also
hard to ‗see‘ these practices as technological, because they become so assimilated into
one‘s identity and embodiment.
I want to argue that we ought to consider gender as an example of a ―soft
technology,‖ specifically, as a kind of institution, or ―system of use.‖ Not usually
considered technological in any way, the social institution of gendering serves as a tool
for classification, identification, and moreover, for shaping one‘s individual embodiment.
As we saw in Chapter 4, the body image which accompanies envisioning myself as this
or that gender can actually change the way I comport myself toward the world and the
ease or difficulty with which I accomplish bodily tasks. Being a woman – i.e. having the
know-how or technē associated with performing ‗woman‘ properly – or being a man, are
not constant constituents of embodiment – we can slide between and among them – and
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as such, according to our imaginary objector above, these modes of embodiment should
not be part of who we essentially are, and yet, as I have argued, it is impossible to not be
gendered in some way or another. I suggest that gendering is a necessary soft technology
that constitutes who and what we are as cognitive subjects at a given time, one that is
eminently mutable, but constantly present, in one form or another.
Since gender-as-soft-technology might not be a convincing idea yet, we can back
up a few paces to the original claim that some technologies are best considered ‗hard‘
while others are ‗soft.‘ The idea behind hard versus soft technologies is not just to
catalogue the tangible or intangible natures of the ‗tools‘ we use. It is also a
phenomenological distinction, one that serves to illustrate an important facet of
embodiment generally. We have already discussed ways in which the body image and the
body schema operate at substantially different levels of awareness. My body image is
often a conscious representation of myself that I can use to manipulate my actual body in
performing an action, while my body schema simply acts, without thought as it were,
since it is a pre-reflective motor program. These levels of awareness, one reflective, and
the other pre-reflective, as Gallagher and Zahavi (2008) term them, are important to
consider because as it turns out, most of my everyday movements and embodied actions
are executed pre-reflectively; that is, I do not form an explicit and reflective image of
myself in order to walk to the fridge and grab a beer. It is only in cases of bodily
breakdown, such as in a disruption of ownership or agency found in persons with
Unilateral Neglect or Anarchic Hand Syndrome – or in cases of non-pathological
embodiment such as hiking a new trail or tightrope walking for the first time - that the
body must be reflected upon and utilized as an image for manipulation. This distinction
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between pre-reflective versus reflective use also applies to the tools we use and dovetails
nicely with the difference between what Donald Norman (1999) calls ―transparent‖ and
―opaque‖ technologies. Similar to the notion of soft versus hard, distinguishing between
the transparency and opacity of a tool adds a phenomenological element to the story;
namely, the distinction maps how we can incorporate a tool seamlessly into our bodiesminds whilst using it, but can also reflect on that very relationship and detach ourselves
from our tools, taking them as things that are not us. As Clark (2003) notes, some
examples of opaque technologies might be things like computers, cars, cameras,
hammers, and the like – in other words, ‗hard‘ technologies – while transparent
technologies, such as a well-functioning cochlear implant or a well-incorporated
prosthesis, are relatively invisible. However, what we consider to be a hard technology
can easily become invisible, and likewise, soft technologies can and do become opaque.
It is thus, my relation to these tools that determines their opacity or transparency. A car,
typically thought to be a highly visible and ‗hard‘ technology, might fade into near
invisibility if I am so accustomed to driving it, or moreover, if the road I am traveling is
so familiar (cf. Haugeland, 1998; Dreyfus, 1990). As Idhe (1990) explains it, the ―alterity
relation‖ between me and my technology in cases like these is best described as the
following (I + tool) + world, wherein the parentheses indicate a unified subject acting in
the world. Pre-reflectively, therefore, technology can and often does show up as
transparent and thereby undifferentiated from ‗us.‘ In cases of breakdown or in reflective
moments of differentiation, ‗I‘ can dissociate quite easily from my tools – hammers, cars,
and traditional ‗hard‘ technologies to be sure, but also, ‗soft‘ technologies such as gender
can show up as present-at-hand, and distinctly other-to me.
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For the dissenter who will now claim that despite all of this, we can still retreat
into our physical bodies and can still think, act, and move about without incorporating
technologies into our pre-reflective awareness, consider that soft technologies, by
definition, already (i.e., before we have a chance to decide about it) show up as
transparent to us. Even the most Luddite of humans, or the person living in a third-world
country without phones, books, or even shoes, has access to one of the most invisible and
pre-reflectively incorporated technologies in existence. Clark (2003) claims that the
ultimate artifact humans have created is language, and while I tend to agree, I want to be
sure to clarify that language is not just a ‗product‘ or tool that we have created, it is at the
same time a sociotechnical system of use that works to create ‗us.‘

6.4 The Ultimate Artifact

When I ask my students to name some of their favorite technologies, rarely do I
receive ―language‖ as a response. Most of the answers tend to be of the ―hardware‖
variety, which Kline (1985) describes as one form of technology – cell phones,
computers, microwave ovens. Nevertheless, if I press the students on the idea that not all
technologies are tangible – hard or opaque – it quickly becomes evident that language
must in some way count as a technology. But what kind? Clark (1998) has referred to
language as the ―ultimate artifact‖ and he goes on to say in Natural-Born Cyborgs (2003)
that our ability to use language was likely an important factor in our learning to design all
sorts of other tools – to build ―better worlds‖ in which to live. ―When we freeze a thought
or idea in words, we create a new object upon which to direct our critical attention.
Instead of just having thoughts about the world, we can then make those very thoughts
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(and thought processes) the targets of more thinking‖ (79). Put another way, language
opens up a space for metacognition. When we can think about our thinking, we can then
learn to think more efficiently, Clark argues. By creating ―cognitive shortcuts,‖ we can
offload mental tasks onto external objects, thereby freeing up space for our brains to
solve other problems. The first and perhaps still most effective means of such delegation
of duties is the written word. The use of writing not only enhances our ability to ―freeze‖
thoughts and make them ―targets‖ or objects of further thoughts; writing also frees up
memory space.
Language might therefore be seen as a ―sociotechnical system of use‖ insofar as it
―extends human capacities.‖ Although, it might be objected that Kline‘s definition also
means to include hardware and as such, language is not really a sociotechnical system of
use because after all, not every language has a written form, and certainly there is no
hardware needed to produce it in its spoken form. That is of course, unless ‗we‘ are the
hardware. Humans are the ones who utter, write, reproduce, recreate, and modify
language, but as Clark (2003) notes, ―instead of seeing our words and texts as simply the
outward manifestations of our biological reason, we may find whole edifices of thought
and reason accreting only courtesy of the stable structures provided by words and texts‖
(82). In other words, on this view, language is not just an extension of our already
cognitively adept minds – it is often what creates cognition. Being caught up in language,
we rarely consider that it is also a type of knowledge or know-how, a means of relating to
the world in a particular way. In this sense, we might see language as potentially
spanning all of the categories of Kline‘s taxonomy. It can be produced like other
hardware, in the form of books, for example, but it is also productive. In fact, it can even
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be made into art – literature, poetry, and song – and so, it goes beyond even Kline‘s list in
its uses. Thus, his list provides an excellent example of how such a taxonomy is really
only a conceptual distinction among components that are in reality, inextricably linked
and moreover, not exhaustive of all the possible modes of technological production,
know-how, and interfacing.
Our relationship to this ‗tool‘ – language – is unique and allows for some
important insights regarding our distinctively cyborg nature, according to Clark (2003).
As an example consider language in relation to another soft technology – gender. The
very terms ‗man‘ and ‗woman‘ are systems of use – ways of cognitively economizing the
world – and as such, ‗we‘ are always already sexed and gendered. In other words, ‗we‘
always decomposes into a collection ‗he‘s‘ or ‗she‘s.‘ Thus, I would like to suggest that
what ‗we‘ are amounts to the sociotechical system of hardware (biological bodies), and
―other elements‖ (technology now broadly construed to include invisible ‗tools‘ such as
language) that work together to enhance who we are and of what we are capable.
Who we are and what we can achieve are not fixed identities, however. Just as
language itself is an evolving process, so too are we. This is perhaps what is most
confusing about Clark‘s depiction of humans as natural cyborgs. On the one hand, he
claims that cyborgs are human+artifact couplings, which seems at least to imply two
elements, a human and its technology, but on the other hand, he says:
No single tool among this complex kit is intrinsically thoughtful, ultimately in
control, or the ―seat of the self.‖ We, meaning we human individuals, just are
these shifting coalitions of tools. We are ―soft selves,‖ continuously open to
change and driven to leak through the confines of skin and skull, annexing more
and more nonbiological elements as aspects of the machinery of mind itself
[2003; 137].
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This latter interpretation of what it means to be a cyborg is more radical insofar as ‗we‘
are not limited to contingent couplings, but are instead ―shifting coalitions.‖ In particular,
the idea that there is no central comptroller that is ‗I‘ means that there can be no original,
naked, pre-technological ‗me‘ who is de-couplable from my tools. Rather, ‗I‘ am always
in transition from one coalition to the next. And to further complicate matters, what
defines something as a coalition is itself a shifting identity. Indeed, there are strange
‗assemblages‘ – consider the rather odd example from Chapter 2, wherein a CEO and her
secretary might count as a ‗coalition‘ that in some cases will only constitute on ‗cognitive
system‘ – that we might not always consider to be coalitions of tools. The fact that ‗we‘
and the shifting assemblages of tools that comprise us are so malleable need not imply
that meaningful cognitive subjectivity is impossible, however. In discussing identity,
Prosser (1998) makes a similar claim, namely that although this transitory notion of
selfhood can be discomforting, one cannot deny its legitimacy in being that which
actually constitutes who we are. Transition ―pushes up against the very feasibility of
identity. Yet, transition is also necessary for identity‘s continuity; it is that which moves
us on‖ (3).
As we saw concerning transsexual identity in Chapter 5, it is not simply a matter
of ―correcting‖ the misguided Cartesianism of trans-narratives who claim to be someone
independent of their bodies – one of the many ‗tools‘ used to construct gender identity –
one must look beyond the body itself, namely to embodiment. In so doing, we found that
body images, the products of socially informed norms and ideals, are a large part of what
shapes one‘s identity, particularly, one‘s gender identity. It is not surprising that if our
ultimate tool – language – is constructed so as to categorize us as either/or, male/female,
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feminine/masculine – that we will naturally construct body images that follow suit. In the
exact same manner however, language works to ―freeze‖ other categories of existence
that might be otherwise fluid. The very dichotomy of biological and non-biological is one
constructed by the sociotechnical system of biology and through the larger discourse of
scientific practice. Science, it may be argued, is a ubiquitous ―cognitive economizer‖ as it
endlessly taxonimizes, categorizes, sets up boundaries, and makes static and stable that
which is often, in actuality, a leaky mess. In this sense therefore, Clark‘s (2008)
amendment to the hypothesis of Extended Cognition (HEC), the HOC – organismcentered cognition – still presupposes the organism as one ‗type‘ of tool, and the rest of
the non-biological arsenal of technology as another. Furthermore, by centering cognition
on this part of the coalition, it allows for a hint of homuncularism to sneak its way back
into the story. But, if this is just one among countless ways of carving up the world and
our relationship to it – one that is a contingent fact of our sociotechnological system of
science – there is no reason to think that it might not be better explained in some other
fashion.
I do not mean to suggest that we do away with all of biological science in order to
more fully capture what it means to be human. What I am arguing however, is that while
language is an ultimate technology by which we construct and are constructed, one which
often expands our cognitive capacities and makes us better thinkers, it is not always such
a clearly beneficial tool. It can and often does blind us to the very transitory nature that
supposedly characterizes our uniquely cyborg existence. In particular, Clark‘s version of
humans as shifting coalitions of tools leaves out one of the most important tools of all
that shapes who we are and what we think we can do. Quite simply, it overlooks the
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difference between the scientifically idealized biological sex – which is supposed to
provide a ‗neat‘ and tidy system of classification – and cyborg sex, which is just as
messy, leaky, and transitory as any other soft assemblage. Biology constructs bodies as
stable entities opposed to the non-biological world. As well, the language of science
constructs sexual identity as 1) a necessary component of the body and 2) necessarily
dualistic. While I have argued that (1) is an inescapable facet of who we think we are, (2)
is hardly a necessity. (cf. Fausto-Sterling, 2000; Hird, 2004).We do however, have a very
difficult time thinking bodies outside the paradigm of sexual difference and this
difference just happens to be one of duality. In fact, many of the dualisms afforded by
language – male/female, human/world, body/mind, us/our machines, sex/gender – are
technologies so transparent and intricately interwoven into our cognitive architecture,
they often go unnoticed. By taking notice of these contingent dualities, however, and the
role they play in shaping who and what we are, I think we might recognize our inherently
cyborg natures. To do so however, we must examine another version of the cyborg that
goes beyond the organism/tool binary.
6.5 When One is too Few and Two is too Many: Haraway’s Cyborg
Donna Haraway‘s Cyborg Manifesto (1991) marks a pivotal point in feminist
theory concerning technology. Continuing to insist, as she does elsewhere (1989), on the
rejection of an ―anti-science metaphysics,‖ the postmodern feminist relationship to
technology, she argues, must neither demonize nor worship it. As well, Haraway‘s
Manifesto has inspired some of the founding texts in Transgender Studies, one of those
being The Empire Strikes Back: A Post-Transsexual Manifesto (1996), written by
Haraway‘s student, Sandy Stone, a piece which then ushered in the critical ―post-gender‖
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analysis common to so many important trans texts (cf. Bornstein, 1998; Feinberg, 1992).
Haraway‘s Manifesto is a politically, culturally, metaphysically, and epistemologically
charged text, interdisciplinary in its aims, and unfaithful to its origins. Much like the
―cyborg‖ Haraway imagines, the text is itself a hybrid, monstrous, and blasphemous
thing, and as a technology itself – qua text – it functions doubly as a piece of ―science
fiction‖ and a ―social reality.‖ As such, it is impossibly dense and so, I shall not feign a
comprehensive, line-by-line analysis of it. What I will offer is a look at some of the
standard interpretations (cf. Sullivan, 2001 Stone, 1991; Stryker, 2006) in the hopes of
providing a general summary of some crucial intentions and outcomes of Haraway‘s
seminal essay. Doing so, I argue, will open up a space for seeing yet another implication
of the Manifesto and how it reaches another discipline, something that has been entirely
ignored. Queer Theory and Transgender Studies alike, as well as Cognitive Science and
Philosophy of Mind have failed to recognize the much-needed dialogue that can and
should occur among these seemingly disparate areas of inquiry. There is no better text in
which all of these disciplines converge – a convergence that is, I argue, long overdue and
absolutely necessary.
While transgender embodiment is never explicitly mentioned, as Stryker and
Whittle (2006) claim in their introduction to the Manifesto,49 the cyborg has come to
depict borderline bodies:
Haraway‘s cyborg demonstrates how a panoply of other marginalized embodied
positions – such as ―women of color,‖ which she discusses in detail – become
sites for critical, cultural, political, and intellectual practice.

49
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Hence, weaving transgender and intersex embodiment into the story is, they claim, no
difficult leap to make:

Transgender and intersex figures have likewise become politically charged sites
of cultural struggle over the meaning of the human being and of being human in
an increasingly technologized world [2006; 103].
A closer look at Haraway‘s cyborg will provide more evidence for the claims made by
Stryker and Whittle – that is, the Cyborg Manifesto is about monstrous embodiment of all
kinds. By carefully considering ‗the monster‘ as it features in the text, it will become
evident that we ought not limit the purview of Haraway‘s cyborg solely to ―women of
color,‖ transgendered, intersexed, or any other specifically marginalized figures. Rather,
her discussion concerning the chimerical nature of all human embodiment – and therefore
all human cognition – offers up an important lesson for cognitive science and philosophy
of mind.
Unlike the two-part ―coupled‖ systems of human+machine that populate Clark‘s
(2003) discussion of cyborgs, Haraway‘s account shies away from a strictly dualistic
system. To be sure, her first pass at explicating cyborgs is to call them machine and
organism hybrids, but she goes on to queer the rather sedimented ideal of hybrids as
being necessarily composed of two parts. She begins by playing on some of the received
dichotomies, in particular, that between fiction and reality. The cyborg is, she argues, ―a
creature of social reality as well as a creature of fiction,‖ but then she goes on to say that
―social reality is lived social relations, our most important political construction, a worldchanging fiction‖ (149). Twisting the commonplace conception of science as the arbiter
of reality, science is made into fiction and social relations are reality; and yet, social
relations, as constructed, are also fictitious. Likewise, science is as much a social relation
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as it is anything else and hence, it is both reality and fiction. Haraway claims that the
boundary between science fiction and social reality is an ―optical illusion,‖ one that
works to reproduce further ―leaky distinctions‖ – between human and machine, human
and animal, and mind and body. What usually marks a machine as not „us‟ is, for one,
that it was made by us; however, as we have seen, machines are constructed so as to be
seamlessly incorporated into our embodiment, such that they become transparent,
invisible even. Furthermore, the distinction between being ‗live‘ and being an inanimate
object is far from clear. As Haraway claims, ―our machines are disturbingly lively, and
we ourselves, frighteningly inert‖ (152). The cyborg – being a mix of human and
technology – hovers somewhere between concrete, organic organism and intangible,
cybernetic information.
Each of these ―leaky distinctions‖ belong to a larger assumed dualism, one that is
perhaps the most insidious of all, and is yet tacitly evoked, even in the most
deconstructive of analyses. Namely, there is a supposed distinction between nature and
culture, between the ‗given‘ world and the ‗constructed‘ or ‗made-up‘ one. Even
Stryker‘s (2006) brilliant analysis of the monster as that which gives rise to the very idea
of belonging and not belonging, itself perpetuates the ―myth of the inner and outer,‖
struggles with its own myth – what Haraway refers to as the ―sacred image of the same.‖
In other words, to belong to a class of monsters is to count monsters as a sort of kind; and
just as there is no ‗we‘ to which all women or all men belong, it is hardly likely that all
monstrous figures fall under one totalizing type. As Haraway (1992) argues elsewhere,
―Who am I? is about (always unrealizable) identity; always wobbling it still pivots on the
law of the father, the sacred image of the same. [W]ho are ―we‖? – that is an inherently
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more open question, one always ready for contingent, friction-generating articulations. It
is a remonstrative question (324). Furthermore, to posit monsters as an ―identity‖ is
already to assume a juxtaposed category of non-monster. Just as Stryker (2006) and
Butler (2004) argue that monsters establish the limits of what counts as normal, it works
the other way around as well – what we call normal, natural, and not queer work to
establish that which does not get to be included among those borders. Hence, even the
distinction between monstrous and normal is one in which the two opposed identities –
natural and unnatural – are themselves neither entirely real, nor entirely mythical. As
Sullivan remarks, ―nature, in this sense, is the truth-effect- both fiction and fact- of a
reproductive optics, of historically and culturally specific technologies (humanism,
equality feminism, radical feminism, and so on) that reproduce the ―sacred image of the
same.‖50
Likewise, she argues, the image of ‗the human‘ is already structured by the hightech mythology of ―the same‖ and as such, ‗we‘ and our ‗machines‘ are never entirely
dissociable. In fact, Haraway claims, we are our technology. ―The machine is us, our
processes, an aspect of our embodiment‖ (180). And in this sense, speaking of cyborgs as
coupled systems is slightly misleading because they are never really de-coupled, not even
in imagination. On the other hand, a cyborg is by definition a hybrid, a chimera, so it is
not a simple and undifferentiated being either. This helps explain the rather curious
passage we find in the Cyborg Manifesto:
To be One is to be autonomous, to be powerful, to be God; but to be One is to be
an illusion, and so to be involved in a dialectic of apocalypse with the other. Yet
to be other is to be multiple, without clear boundary, frayed, insubstantial. One is
too few, but two are too many [1989; 177].
50
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For Haraway, encoding the self as one that transcends the dualisms of inner/outer,
animal/human, human/machine, nature/culture, and myth/reality, is the ―double vision‖
socialist feminists must adopt in order to finally escape the demining identity politics
plaguing feminism generally. This is an explicitly intended aim of her work. In addition
to Haraway‘s own insights regarding her work, I think a case can be made for locating,
among passages such as these, the convergence of Queer Theory, Transgender Studies,
and Cognitive Science. The payoff of doing so, is, as I will argue in this final section, that
we can achieve a more holistic understanding of embodied cognitive subjectivity, one
that is aware of the co-constitutive nature of minds and machines.

6.6 The Sociotechnological Hybridization of Gender and the Construction of Human
Nature
Although the stated aims of adopting the image of the cyborg are, for Haraway,
different than the intentions Clark (2003) has for thinking cognition as a hybrid of
organism and machine, the overarching themes that emerge are not so far apart. Consider
the question Haraway poses:
Why should our bodies end at the skin, or include, at best, other beings
encapsulated by skin? [1991; 178].
Likewise, the original thesis of Extended Cognition (Clark and Chalmers, 1998) was that
cognitive processes are not bound to the organism, nor are they encapsulated by ―skin
and skull,‖ a claim that is furthered in Clark‘s (2003, 2008) argument that we are always
coupled to our technology, whether opaquely or transparently. An always already
hybridized being, ‗the body‘ therefore becomes one among many tools utilized in
embodiment – the bodily-cognitive comportment to and interaction with the world.
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Moreover, we see the body-as-prop motif carried out in TGS and QT; namely, when ‗the
body‘ is treated as a costume among many others to be utilized for performance purposes.
We are always acting out a gender or a sex. We might likewise say that for Clark, the
cyborg is always performing as well. It is acting out the role of human. In fact, it is
precisely this coupling capability that allows us to successfully ―pass‖ as human, whereas
other beings, such as those artificially constructed minds we saw in Chapter 1, fail to pass
in this regard, continually falling short of meaningful environmental interaction and
incorporation. In a similar vein, those of us who do not engage properly with the
‗mechanisms of gender‘ – clothing, mannerisms, sexuality, and even linguistic cues, the
ultimate ―soft technology‖ – are desubjugated, pushed to the margins, or even beyond the
bounds of comprehensibility.
We find therefore, an underlying theme running through each of these movements
regarding embodiment, subjectivity, and technology; namely, that ‗we‘ are never entirely
separated from our tools. Nevertheless, as I have argued in the previous sections,
Haraway goes a step further than Clark by subverting even the coupling of human and
machine. ―These machine/organism relationships are obsolete, unnecessary. For us, in
imagination, and in other practice, machines can be prosthetic devices, intimate
components, friendly selves‖ (178). Much like the discussion in Chapter 5 concerning the
body image formed by transsexuals and how this imagined being conjures up a body that
goes beyond the literal body – i.e. the embodiment of this coupling – Haraway‘s claim
that the relationship between human and machine is a contrived one echoes the idea that
even in our imagined embodiment, we are always already hybridized. Thus, even though
we find similar claims being made by philosophers of mind like Clark, Queer Theorists
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such as Sullivan, and Transgender Theorists like Stryker – that being human, being
female, being male, and so forth are all technologically mediated modes of subjectivity –
nowhere among these texts do we find it stated as strongly as Haraway presents it.
Coupling is too much focused on the duality of machine and organism, and the notion of
a literal versus figurative or normal versus monstrous subjectivity also relies too heavily
on a dualism that, according to Haraway, will always fail to capture the truly fluid nature
of cyborg identity. Hence, she claims:
One is too few, and two is only one possibility…The machine is not an it to be
animated, worshipped, and dominated. The machine is us, our processes, an
aspect of our embodiment. We can be responsible for machines; they do not
dominate or threaten us. We are responsible for boundaries; we are they [1991;
180].
I agree, and in addition to Haraway‘s critique I will add that the notion of a ‗coupled
system‘ perpetuates the idea that decoupling is always a possibility, such that there is
always a naked, non-technologically mediated ‗me‘ once I have disrobed myself of all
my tools. To be sure, some tools – hard technologies, like cellphones and prosthetics –
can and do get detached from our bodies, but this does not imply that all technologies are
so easily decoupled, nor does it entail that is possible to be embodied in an entirely nontechnological way.
As perplexing as this passage of Haraway‘s is, it is important because it
exemplifies the very confounding nature of being human, which, as we have seen so far,
can only be understood through the lens of technology. At the same time, because ‗the
human,‘ is always already technological and as such, to ‗understand humans through
technology‘ does not quite capture the inextricability of ‗us‘ and our tools – such a view,
in other words, still treats technology itself as detachable, non-necessary, and ‗other-to‘
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us. The nature of technology is not simply that it is a means by which we come to
understand ourselves – it is in a very real sense who we are. And yet, to fully understand
the nature of technology, we must have some idea of ‗the human‘ behind its production,
consumption, and most importantly its bodily incorporation, a comprehension which can
only take place through technological mediation. This circularity makes it difficult to talk
about a body, a self, or an individual as detached or decoupled. Attempting to imagine
such a being only propels one into conceiving yet another technologically mediated
image. ‗The Biological Body‘ is a scientific (i.e. technological) body; ‗Who I am‘ is
always a matter of my involvement in or with some sort of sociolinguistic context (and
hence, ‗the self‘ is always a soft-assembled gathering of both hard and soft technologies;
and embodied subjectivity is always already sociotechnologically hybridized.
In terms of sexed and gendered embodiment, as we have seen, these are
inextricable modes of imagining our bodies and ourselves and yet, much like what Clark
claims of cognition generally, these aspects of our embodiment are not skin-skull bound.
Neither are sex and gender wholly other-to us; indeed, ‗they‘ are machines of a sort, but
not the kind of hardware from which we can more readily detach. Instead, sex and gender
are soft technologies or, as Kline‘s (1985) terminology might allow, ―sociotechnical
systems of use,‖ because they represent a dynamic web of relationships between human,
hardware, production, and utilization. To be female, male, transsexual, gay, straight, or
any other type of human just is to be hybridized in this way; in other words, to be caught
up in a complex system of sociotechnologicality. This is why Haraway‘s cyborg is not a
coupling of machine and organism so much as a hybrid – a being that transcends
wholeness, refuses duality as its only possible subjectivity, and yet remains constantly
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chimerical. More importantly, as was discussed earlier, being a cyborg means dispensing
once and for all with the hope that ‗I‘ can ever be a stable and fixed referent. ‗I‘,
according to Haraway is an ―always unrealizable identity,‖ one that depends on the
sacred image of the same. Thus, ‗we‘ as a collective whole – i.e. us qua human, women,
queers, and so forth – ―is an inherently more open question, one always ready for
contingent, friction-generating articulations‖ (1992; 324). The only reason ‗we‘ show up
as a stable or category is, to articulate Merleau-Ponty‘s claim once again, through
repetition. Or, to use Butler‘s (1992) terminology, by repeatedly citing gender, we make
it necessary. As Butler also claims, while reproduction is a mode of copying, the
‗original‘ for which the copy is made does not exist. To reproduce forms of ‗the human,‘
‗the woman,‘ or ‗the transsexual‘ is to copy an image of something that was never and
will never be whole, but will instead always be in performance, transitioning from this
role to that. In a move that resonates with Prosser‘s (1998) claim that ―transition is
necessary for identity‘s continuity‖ (3), the same notion of a never-stable gender identity
is put forth by transgender theorists like Judith Halberstam (1995), who argue, like
Haraway, for the simultaneous universality and categorical non-existence of
transsexuality:

We are all transsexuals except that the referent of the trans becomes less and less
clear (and more and more queer). We are all cross-dressers but where are we
crossing from or to what? There is no ‗other‘ side, no ‗opposite‘ sex, no natural
divide to be spanned by surgery, by disguise, by passing. We all pass or we
don‘t…There are no transsexuals [1995; 212].
The phenomenon of passing, according to Halberstam, implies that the notion of
transitioning from one sex to the other is not a matter of finally arriving somewhere and
resting there. We are always performing, always trying to pass, and as such, transition is
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an eminent possibility. Thus, there are no ‗real‘ transsexuals, and yet people like Prosser
(1998) interpret Halberstam‘s statement to mean that ―Trans-R-Us‖ (14). Because there is
no stable where to which all of us who are transitioning are traveling, it makes little sense
to differentiate between the static (or non-trans) and the transsexual when talking about
sex and gender. Each time any of us passes as this or that identity, which is every time
we allow ourselves to be subsumed under the ―sacred image of the same‖ – in other
words, to be denoted by a personal pronoun, captured by inclusion in a unified group, or
labeled as a particular gender or sex – we obscure this transitory nature of identity. It
appears as a necessary, static, and unitary category. Nevertheless, even as Clark (2003)
argues, we are, all of us, a ―shifting coalition of tools‖ and so, to understand human
nature, if this is even possible, we must return to the notion that ‗we‘ are never ‗the
same.‘ For Clark, this means articulating cognition as an ever-expanding and altering,
albeit organism-centered phenomenon. Although he does not fully realize the
ramifications of his position for cognitive subjectivity, in particular, in terms of gendered
embodiment, his claim that ‗we‘ are never skin-bound and are always incorporating,
exploiting, constituting and constituted by our tools, is an essential step to take in
reaching a theory of ‗mind‘ that actually pays heed to the fundamentally necessary
lessons we have gleaned from Queer Theory and Transgender Studies.
Hence, rather than take these boundary-blurs as a hindrance to any productive
research in cognitive science or gender theory, it is my contention that the ―pleasure in
confusion‖ of which Haraway advocates is an essential next step in developing a
comprehensive and interdisciplinary story about the meaning of being human. It is a story
of the sociotechnological hybridization that makes us who ‗we‘ are, allows us to conceive
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ourselves as otherwise, and to be otherwise, and frees the mind from the confines of a
boundary that has been artificially erected. Once this boundary is usurped, as Clark
claims, we can begin to ―better appreciate what we already are: creatures whose minds
are special precisely because they are tailor-made for multiple mergers and coalitions‖
(2003; 7, emphasis original).
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Conclusion: Post-Cyborgs?
The preceding project has attempted to draw together two otherwise disparate
areas of inquiry regarding cognition, embodiment, and subjectivity. By bringing into
discourse philosophy of mind and feminist theory, I hope to have convinced you of at
least these three things:

-

-

The two seemingly unrelated fields have a lot more in common than might be
assumed and therefore have a lot to offer each other
Much of what the each field can do to supplement, improve upon, and even
methodologically alter the other has been overlooked, an oversight that is
hindering genuine progress in determining who, what, and where we are
By focusing on the ways in which technology – both in the form of hardware and
software, such as gender – is a constantly penetrating facet of our embodiment,
the cyborg is not only a fitting image to depict humanity, but it helps us overcome
some of the traditional difficulties in explaining how the mind works, in what it is
realized, how we ought to explain bodily pathologies, gender identity disorder,
and above all, embodied subjectivity generally.

In order to get to this last point in particular, I have provided an account of the last fifty
years of failed attempts in philosophy of mind, cognitive science, and artificial
intelligence to properly explain and replicate human thinking. It is not until theories such
as Clark and Chalmers‘ Extended Mind come into play that, as I argued in chapter 2, we
have a real shot at truly appreciating just how complex ‗we‘ really are. This ‗we,‘ even in
Clark‘s (2008) ―Supersized Mind‖ however, has been shown to be too centered on our
biological bodies and brains. While these components are indeed important, and are most
assuredly necessary causal constituents of cognitive subjectivity, it is better not to think
of the brain and body as ―senior partners‖ in cognitive processing, but rather as ―equal
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partners,‖ coupled to non-biological machinery at all times in creating ‗the mind.‘
Moreover, any story of who we are must, I argue, take account of our inherently sexed
and gendered subjectivity. Like cognition, my sex and gender are not located in my body,
although the body remains an essential site for identification. Nevertheless, through the
use of the ‗tools‘ of gender – language being chief among them – we can see, particularly
in cases of transgender and intersexed embodiment, that what we mean by ‗male,‘
‗female,‘ ‗feminine,‘ and ‗masculine,‘ does not refer solely to a biological organism, nor
do these terms pick out essentially the same process across time and location. How we
come to imagine our bodies and ourselves as sexed and gendered subjects – an
achievement made possible only through the coupling of our biological bodies to the
―soft technologies‖ of language and gender – will in turn shape the way we think and
how our embodied interactions take place.
Above all, I think my project furthers an idea Clark (2007) put forth, when he said
that what he is ―optimistic that we will soon see the end of those over-used and mostly ad
hoc appeals to the ‗natural.‘‖ By incorporating sexed and gendered embodiment into this
story of subverting ‗the natural,‘ especially when it comes to embodied subjectivity, I
think Clark‘s hopes come closer to reality. To be sure, treating human cognizing subjects
as cyborgs does introduce its own set of difficulties in terms of delimiting, as Rupert
(2004) points out, precisely what the subject of cognitive science ought to be. As I hope I
have shown however, first, we cannot reject a proposal simply because it forces us to
consider just how complex the phenomenon in question is, and second, by examining
what goes into making us cognitive subjects, all signs point toward a messy,
biomechanical, gender-queered, linguistic, and sociotechnological hybrid of a being.
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Taking seriously this cyborg image of who we are and using it to go beyond current
theories of embodied subjectivity both in philosophy and gender studies is, I suggest, the
key to solving some of the most protracted problems in defining and delimiting ‗us‘ as
‗thinking things.‘
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